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ABSTRACT 
The surge of the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' or capitalists' 
foreign direct investment (FDI) from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Malaysia in Vietnam was only noticeable in the early 1990s, especially 
from 1991 to 1995. Their investment in Vietnam had grown by leaps 
and bounds, from U.S.$ 1.06 billion to U.S$ 7.81 billion in 1995. By 
pouring this massive investment into Vietnam, these overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs had out-invested other investors from the countries, such 
as Japan, South Korea, United States of America, France, and 
Switzerland. In view of this, it does seem clear that this overseas 
Chinese investment is heading the way to become one of the most 
dynamic and influential forces in transforming Vietnam's economy. 
Arguably, an unfavourable sudden change of political and economic 
circumstances in Vietnam or in the Asia-Pacific region could dash this 
promising outlook of these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' increasing 
substantial investment, and growing economic significance and 
influence. Nonetheless, by examining the pull and push factors, the 
extensiveness and penetrability of these overseas Chinese investments 
into various aspects of Vietnam's economy, and Vietnam's expanding 
trade ties with East Asian nations and recent accession to ASEAN, the 
afromentioned argument cannot be established. The pull factors which 
relate to the strategic geographical location, abundant unexploited 
natural resources, potentially large domestic market, cheap and highly 
literate labour force, relative political and social stability, inauguration of 
doi moi programme, and the availability of business-oriented and 
Confucian-value-adherence ethnic Chinese have conditioned Vietnam as 
a very attractive investment destination. The push factors which concern 
the positive and negative political, economic, social considerations 
arising from or existing in those overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' home 
countries have prompted them to invest in Vietnam. These overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurs have not only invested heavily in Vietnam but 
also diversed their investment to various economic sectors of Vietnam. 
In doing so, these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs display some major 
commercial commitments and can probably establish some structural 
importance in Vietnam's economy. Moreover, the blossoming trade 
relations between Vietnam and East Asian countries as well as Vietnam's 
admission to ASEAN in July 1995 have not only reflected the economic 
importance of Vietnam to East Asia and the gradual integration of 
Vietnam into regional and international community, but also the growing 
tendency for more economic interaction between those overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs and Vietnam that can most likely facilitate the process of 
regional and international integration. Taking all this into consideration, 
it is clear that these four East Asian nations' overseas Chinese enormous 
investment in Vietnam appears to increase persistently and their 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is an accepted fact that foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
been an engine for growth among all emerging economies in the world. 
In Asia, for example, the high economic growth rates of the Newly 
Industrialized Countries (NICs) have been attributed to the large 
amount of FDI from Japan, United States and Europe. The second 
lower case generation NICs - namely Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia - have also benefited from the inflow of foreign capital from 
not only Japan, Europe and the US, but also the first generation NICs. 
More recently, Vietnam has become the promising destination for FDI. 
FDI in Vietnam has come from a wider scope of countries such as the 
U.S, Japan, Europe, the first generation NICs and the second 
generation NICs. However, the Asia-Pacific countries are the dominant 
investors in Vietnam and they account 70% of the total foreign direct 
investment in the countiy. 
A notable feature of the rapid rise in foreign direct investment 
has been the rising inflows of overseas Chinese or "Hua-qiao" 
investment to Vietnam. The sources of the increasing overseas 
Chinese investment in Vietnam are mainly from Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Malaysia. These four countries emerge as the four of 
the largest top ten foreign investors in Vietnam by the end of 1995 
(See Chart I). Taiwan leads all the others with a total capital of 
U.S.$3.3 billion. Hong Kong is the second largest investor with 
U.S.$2.1 billion and Malaysia became the seventh largest with 
U.S.$846 million. 
Chart 1 : Leading Investors in Vietnam (as at December 1995) 
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Source : Leung, Suiwah, 'Asia-Pacific Profiles : Decision Time for Vietnam', The Asia-Pacific 
Magazine, No.3, June 1996, p. 14 
Among the total capital invested (U.S.$14.33 billion), Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Malaysia accounted for 54% (See Chart 2). 
Taiwan held the biggest share of 22%; Hong Kong and Singapore 
accounted for 15% and 11% respectively; Malaysia constituted 6% of 
the total investment (Malaysia's ethnic Chinese investors or 
entrepreneurs most likely accounted for about 3-4%)*. 
* Note: This is only a speculation because the exact share of Malaysian Overseas Chinese is difficult to 
be computed because some investment of the Overseas Chinese from Malaysia is untraceable or 
unrecorded. 




















Source : Compiled from Chart 1 
The overseas Chinese enterprise groups throughout East Asia 
have grown into a significant economic force in the 1990s. Since the 
1980s, they have been spearheading virtually every major business 
trend in the region. Countries with a major ethnic Chinese population, 
such as the NICs-3 (Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) and minor 
Chinese population, such as the ASEAN-3 (Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Thailand) have created investment flows within East Asia that outrank 
Japanese, European and American investors. The overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs' increasingly prominent role as .sources of foreign direct 
investment in China has been dominated by the overseas Chinese 
from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and 
Indonesia. Considering the amount of foreign direct investment, 80% 
of the total investment channeled by the overseas Chinese to China, 
the galloping economic growth and the long presence of the overseas 
Chinese investment in China since 1979, the crucial, constructive and 
long-term economic role played by the overseas Chinese in China is 
indisputable. The manifestation of the surge of these overseas Chinese 
investment in Vietnam was only in the early 1990s, particularly from 
1991 to 1995. The overseas Chinese entrepreneurs from Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Malaysia have poured voluminous investment 
into Vietnam during this five year period. The investment made by 
these four countries has shown a tremendous increase year by year. 
Taiwanese investment which recorded U.S.$499 million in 1991 had 
shown an increase to U.S.$793 million in 1992; U.S.$1.53 billion in 
1993; U.S.$1.96 billion; and U.S.$3.3 billion in 1995 (See Table 1 and 
Chart 3). The investment made by Hong Kong scoring U.S.$393 
million in 1991 had risen to U.S.$512 million in 1992; U.S.$1.3 billion 
in 1993; U.S.$1.8 billion in 1994; and U.S.$1.8 billion in 1994; and 
U.S.$2.1 billion in 1995 (See Table 1 and Chart 3). Singaporean 
investment which registered below U.S.$100 million in 1991 had 
grown to U.S.$109 million in 1992; U.S.$389 million in 1993; 
U.S.$1.07 billion in 1994; and U.S.$1.5 billion in 1995 (See Table 1 
and Chart 3). Malaysia which invested about U.S.$65 million in 1991 
had boosted its investment to U.S.$90 million in 1992; U.S.$457 
million in 1993; U.S.$580 million in 1994; and U.S.$846 million in 
1995 (See Table 1 and Chart3). 
Table 1 iCumulative Investment Made by the four East Asian Nations in Vietnam, 1991-1995 
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Taiwan 499 million 793 million 1.53 billion 1.96 billion 3.36 billion 
Hong Kong 393 million 512 million 1.30 billion 1.80 billion 2.10 billion 
Singapore 100 million 109 million 389 million 1.07 billion 1.50 billion 
Malaysia 65 million 90 million 457 million 580 million 846 million 
Total 1.06 billion 1.50 billion 3.68 billion 5.41 billion 7.81 billion 
Source : Compiled from various sources which include Asiaweek, vol.18. No. 15, April 12 1992; 
Nguyen Xuan Oanh & Grub, Phillip D, Vietnam : The New Investment Frontier in Southeast Asia, 
Times Academic Press, Singapore, 1992, p.55; 'Vietnam-The Road To Reform', Reading of the Week, 
University of Wollongong, Australia, 1995; Leung, Suiwah, 'Asia-Pacific Profiles : Decision Time for 
Vietnam', Asia-Pacific Magazine, No.3, June 1996, p. 14 ; American Technology : Foreign Investment 
in Vietnam [On line]. Available Internet: American Technology Home Page 
Chart 3 : Investment in Vietnam by the four countries (Taiwan,Hong 
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n view of the rising and colossal amount of these four countries 
investment in Vietnam from the period of 1991-1995, it does seem 
clear that overseas Chinese investment is heading the way to become 
the most dynamic and dominant force in the country's economy. The 
growing significance and influence of overseas Chinese investment in 
Vietnam arguably does not materialize or come into being because the 
overseas Chinese investors or entrepreneurs might be set back by the 
unfavourable sudden change of politicad and economic circumstances 
in the Asia-Pacific region or in Vietnam. However, this undesirable 
phenomenon is most unlikely to happen. By weighing the pull factors 
and push factors, the extensiveness and penetrability of the overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurial role into the various aspects of Vietnamese 
economy, the improving trade ties of Vietnam with East Asia, and 
Vietnam's integration into ASEAN, the aforementioned argument holds 
no validity. 
The pull factors which refer to the favourable and stable 
political, economic, and social conditions produced by the open-
minded and pragmatic political and economic reforms unleashed and 
committed by the Vietnamese government since 1986 as well as the 
abundant unexploited natural resources and mineral reserves, a 
relatively untapped highly literate, and cheap workforce, a 74-million 
Vietnamese potentially lucrative domestic market, and the business-
oriented ethnic Chinese community, have convinced and attracted the 
overseas Chinese investors and capitalists to pour voluminous 
investment into Vietnam. The push factors which concern the positive 
and negative political, economic, and social considerations arising 
from or existing in the overseas Chinese host country or state have 
driven them to invest in Vietnam. The combination of these pull and 
push factors coupled with extensive and penetrating involvement of 
these overseas Chinese investment in various economic sectors of 
Vietnam, Vietnam's thriving trade links with East Asian countries as 
well as Vietnam's attainment of ASEAN membership have all signified 
that the inflow of those overseas Chinese massive investment will 
persist and the economic influence and significance of these overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurs in Vietnam will be increasingly crucial. 
Ob jective and Methodology of the Study 
The main objective of this research essay is to study the foreign 
direct investment of the overseas Chinese, especially from Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia in Vietnam - its reasons and 
implications - in light of Vietnam's and East Asia's economic boom. 
Furthermore, hopefully, this study of these four East Asian nations' 
overseas Chinese investment in the context of Vietnam could also 
shed light on the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' nature, behaviour 
and pattern in conducting their business. In preparing this study, I 
have been very conscious of the serious limitations of the data, 
particularly on the Malaysian Chinese investment in Vietnam. Official 
figures on the Malaysian Chinese are veiy difficult to obtain because 
the Malaysian Chinese entrepreneurs or capitalists have deliberately 
chosen to keep a low profile on their investment in order to avoid 
publicity. In order to identify their investment, I tried to collect all the 
obtainable recorded data or information on the Malaysian investing 
companies in Vietnam from various sources (magazines and 
newspapers), and then I attempted to use the publication of Who's 
Who In Malaysian Business & Directory 1985-1986, Who Owns Whom 
: Australasia 65 Far East 1993 &1994, Major Companies of the Far 
East and Australasia 1992/1993, and David C.L.Ch'ng's publication 
of 806 Companies Owned or associated with Selected Overseas 
Chinese Entrepreneurs 1992 to track down those Malaysian investing 
companies' parent companies or owners. The investing companies of 
the four East Asian countries (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Malaysia) in Vietnam listed in this research, paper are classified as 
overseas-Chinese-owned because the controlling interest of those 
companies is largely or wholly possessed by the overseas Chinese of 
the respective nations. Although Singapore and Malaysia claim to be 
multi-ethnic, the overseas Chinese community of the two nations 
dominate the national economy and hold the controlling interest of 
most of the public or private enterprises. Singapore's Temasek 
Holdings and United Oveseas Bank Ltd (UOB), for instance, are wholly 
owned and managed by the overseas Chinese. The former is a 
venture-capital company that the Singaporean government has direct 
and major stakes and the latter is a limited company controlled by 
Wee Cho Yaw who personally owns at least 40 percent of the UOB 
shares. In Malaysia, the private limited enterprises, such as the MBF 
Holdings Bhd, Kuok Bros. Sdn. Bhd, and Public Bank Berhad, are all 
largely or wholly owned and controlled by overseas Chinese. Public 
Bank Berhad, for example, was founded and controlled by The Hong 
Piow who has a personal stake of 40 percent. MBF Holdings Bhd 
which has more than 100 subsidiary companies was founded and 
wholly owned by Loy Hean Heong. However, this research paper is 
conducted through a methodology of compiling, analysing and 
interpreting some existing statistical data, economic and political 
literature of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore,. Malaysia and Vietnam, 
and the perspectives of economists, political scientists and business 
scholars who have studied foreign investment in developing countries 
from different viewpoints. Statistical data for the four countries' 
(Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore) investment in Vietnam 
and trade with Vietnam is derived and compiled from various sources, 
ranging from the respective country's official sources, such as 
Taiwan's Council for Economic Planning and Development, Taipei 
overseas Chinese affairs Council (Tai-pei Shih: Ch'iao Wu Wei Yuan 
Hui), Hong Kong's Census and Statistics Department, Singapore Trade 
Statistics Department, Singapore International Chamber of 
Commerce, Department of Statistics Malaysia, Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry of Vietnam, and the State Committee for Cooperation 
and Investment, to that of international organisations such as the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB)and the United Nations, and 
complemented by data from various authors in their studies on the 
four countries' (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia) and 
Vietnam's economy. The surge of overseas Chinese investment in 
Vietnam is a recent phenomenon and, hence, further research should 
be carried out in the future in order to verify the significance of 
overseas Chinese, especially from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Malaysia, and their investment in the Vietnamese economy. It must be 
pointed out again that this research essay does not intend to present 
a definite and conclusive discussion or argument on the emergence of 
the overseas Chinese (from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Malaysia) investment in Vietnam and their role in the Vietnamese 
economy. It is hoped that this initial study and effort will attract some 
attention and spark further interest and research in this field. 
Structure of the Study 
Chapter 1 of this research paper provides an overview of the 
overseas Chinese or 'Hua-ren' which includes the general historical, 
cultural, and economic background of the overseas Chinese in 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam. 
Chapter 2 of this research paper examines the Vietnamese 
economy in the period 1975-85, in which Vietnam adopted a centrally 
planned economic model to construct a supposedly prosperous and 
growth-oriented economy. But, the centrally planned economic model 
based on socialist Marxist-Leninist principles plunged Vietnam's 
economy into the doldrums. By introducing and imposing socialist-
oriented economic policies, such as collectivization or nationalization, 
the enterprising economic activities in Vietnam had been severely 
crippled rather than boosted. Furthermore, the Vietnamese overseas 
Chinese or Hoa residing mostly in South Vietnam was particularly 
hard hit under the socialist-oriented economic system. Most of their 
business or enterprises were confiscated and nationalized. By 
antagonizing the ethnic Chinese, the Communist government had not 
only damaged the economic backbone of Vietnam but also the 
potential and powerful economic driving force in the country. 
Chapter 3 & 4 of this research deals with the pull and the push 
factors in an attempt to shed light on the rush of the overseas Chinese 
investment to Vietnam and the post 1986 political and economic 
development in Vietnam as well as the post-cold war economic and 
political situation in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. 
In Chapter 3, the pull factors are discussed. The pull factors 
refer to the favourable and stable political, economic and social 
conditions offered by Vietnam. With the Vietnamese Communist Party 
(VCP) coming into power in 1975, the state of Vietnam has not 
experienced any major political chaos or crisis. The tough line attitude 
adopted by the Vietnamese government towards internal dissenters 
has warded off any political rival or opposition. Furthermore, the 
political "renovation" launched by the VCP, especially under Nguyen 
Van Linh's leadership, pursues a process of reform that can counter 
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bureaucratic ineptitude and corruption and produce wider 
participation and greater administrative efficacy without bringing the 
Party's own legitimacy and position under major challenge. In the 
light of this, the VCP can ensure a firmer and durable position in the 
political arena of Vietnam and faster long-term political stability. The 
introduction of "doi mof or economic "renovation" in 1986 and the 
enactment of a series of lenient laws on foreign investment have 
created a favorable operating environment for FDL Vietnam is a 
country well endowed with natural resources and mineral reserves 
such as timber, oil and gas, coal, bauxite, rare earth metals and a 
number of non-metals which are ready to be exploited. Its cheap, and 
highly-literate labour force is ideal for developing the production of 
consumer and export goods. Besides, a population of 74 million has 
positioned Vietnam as a potentially lucrative consumer market to be 
tapped. One unperceivable factor of the pull factors is the 
approximately 0.7 million ethnic Chinese population living in Vietnam. 
This handful of Vietnam's Chinese community which is traditionally 
heavily business-oriented and has 'cultural similarity and familiarity' 
with the overseas Chinese from the four countries has served as a 
seamless and informal business network for the overseas Chinese to 
tap into the local market. 
Chapter 4 deals with the push factors which concern the 
positive and negative political, economic, and social considerations 
arising from or existing in the overseas Chinese home country. The 
positive political consideration is the rapprochement between East 
Asian countries and Vietnam. In the wake of its withdrawal of forces 
from Cambodia and Laos in 1989 and the Cambodia settlement 
agreement, Vietnam's relationships with Malaysia, Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan have improved greatly. Increasing government 
official visits from these four countries to Vietnam and the mounting 
business and friendship agreements reached by both sides have 
fostered the confidence and willingness of the overseas Chinese to 
invest in Vietnam. The negative political consideration faced by 
Malaysia's, Hong Kong's and Taiwan's but not by Singapore's overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurs has been another push factor. Since the end of 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1990, the investment environment 
of Malaysia for domestic Chinese entrepreneurs is still somewhat 
unfavourable. This is because the economic policy after 1990, the 
National Development Policy (NDP), which includes the Sixth Malaysia 
Plan (6MP) for 1991-1995 and a ten-year Second Outline Perspective 
Plan (OPP2) for 1991-2000, still reiterates the NEP's commitments 
which have disadvantaged the ethnic Chinese. With Hong Kong's 
reversion to PRC sovereignty in 1997, the future well-being of the 
territory in terms of political rights, independent legislation and pool 
of skilled workers and professionals became uncertain. Hence, Hong 
Kong Chinese business is greatly unnerved by all this uncertainty. 
The unsettled and prolonged political tension between the PRC and 
Taiwan has diverted some Taiwanese investment to Vietnam. The 
Taiwanese government and business community are concerned that 
investments could be lost due to sudden policy shifts in Peking, or be 
used as a political tool to influence cross-Taiwan straits relations. 
Therefore, the "Southward Policy^ or "Go South Policy^ was initiated 
by the Taiwanese government to encourage investors or entrepreneurs 
to target Southeast Asian countries and at the same time strengthen 
Taiwan's economic relations with the nations of ASEAN. The emerging 
or existing negative economic consideration which comprises the 
rising land and labour costs, stricter environmental-protection laws, 
scarcity of renewable and non-renewable resources, and the small 
domestic market confronted by the overseas Chinese in the four East 
Asian nations, has compelled them to seek alternative destination for 
investment. 
Chapter 5 deals with the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' ways 
of investing in Vietnam, spatial location of investment in Vietnam, and 
extensive and penetrating entrepreneurial role into the various sectors 
of Vietnam's economy. Most of the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs 
invest in Vietnam through their subsidiary companies that engage two 
common and main methods of investment: joint venture and 100 per 
cent foreign capital ownership. The heaviest concentration of these 
four East Asian nations' overseas Chinese investment is in the 
southern part of Vietnam. Overseas Chinese investment which is 
traditionally and typically confined to property, trading, shipping, 
hotels, and light industry, such as textiles, toys and food, has made a 
breakthrough in Vietnam. The overseas Chinese investors have not 
only poured their investment into the so-called traditional and typical 
economic sectors but also into the sectors of transport and 
communication, agriculture and fishery, services and infrastructure. 
There are also some indicators showing the increasing overseas 
Chinese investment in heavy industries such as steel production, 
cement and vehicles. Taking this into account, the overseas Chinese 
have displayed a very different investment pattern from the Japanese, 
the American, and the European investment pattern in the developing 
countries, such as Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
The investment made by the United States, Japan and the European 
countries in the developing countries is concentrated mainly on 
manufacturing industries ( food, textiles, wood, paper, and chemicals) 
and mineral exploration. With this diversified and borderless 
investment pattern, it does seem clear that the overseas Chinese 
investment is one of the key forces that could transform Vietnam's 
economy. 
Chapter 6 deals with the prospects of Vietnam's integration into 
the regional and the world economy. Since the overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs are the largest source of foreign direct investment in 
Vietnam, their role has been critical to the transformation of Vietnam 
into a probable export-oriented dynamo. Moreover, the trade 
relationships of Vietnam with other countries can also be brought 
closer and improved directly or indirectly by the overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs. With the sustained GDP growth in the range of 6 to 9.5 
percent per annum and the growing and expanding trade ties, 
Vietnam gained the membership of ASEAN in July 1995. By obtaining 
ASEAN membership, Vietnam has built a concrete cornerstone to pave 
the way for participating in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) or even 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). In order to deepen Vietnam's economic 
integration with the region or the world, the East Asian overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurs' continuing and increasing investment into 
Vietnam is exceedingly important and necessary. 
CHAPTER 1 
An Overview of the Overseas Chinese 
1.1 Definition of Overseas Chinese 
The "overseas Chinese" can be defined as ethnic Chinese living 
outside the present geographical boundaries of the People's Republic 
of China (PRC).i This includes the ethnic Chinese population of 
Taiwan and Hong Kong because they are currently living outside the 
administration of the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, the 
political and economic structures of Taiwan and Hong Kong are so 
different from those prevailing in Mainland China that the population 
of these two countries are more appropriately regarded as being 
"overseas''.2 "Overseas Chinese" is a translation of the term Hua-qiao 
(sojourner) and suggests that those so described are temporarily 
resident outside China and intend to return to China. This carries the 
implication that the sovereign and political loyalties of "overseas 
Chinese" lie not with their country of residence but with China.^ 
However, today, the vast majority of the so-called "overseas Chinese" 
who were not born in China and are citizens of the countries in which 
they reside have no intention to return to China to reside."̂  The term 
"overseas Chinese", over time, has been widely used by many scholars 
^ Ch'ng, David C.L., The Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs in East Asia : Background. Business 
Pratices And International Networks. CEDA Monograph M 100, Australia, 1993, p.26 
^ M d 
^ East Asia Analytical Unit. Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia. Department of Foreign 
Affairs And Trade, Canberra AGPS, 1995, p.l 1 
^ ibid 
and academics to embrace all Chinese living outside China, whether 
or not they intend to "return'' to live there. 
1.2 Percentage of the Total Population of Overseas Chinese 
Table 2 presents the percentage of ethnic Chinese in the total 
population for the five East Asian nations, namely Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam. 
TABLE 2 : Overseas Chinese as Number and Percentage of Local Population, 
1991 
COUNTRY TOTAL POPULATION ETHNIC CHINESE ETHNIC CHINESE AS 
(million) (miHions) % POPULATION 
TAIWAN 20.6 20.3 97 
HONGKONG 5.8 5.7 ^ W^ 
SINGAPORE 2.7 2.1 77 
MALAYSIA 18.0 5.8 . 29 
VIETNAM 64.4 0.7 1.3 
Source : Compiled from Ch'ng, David C L., The Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs in East Asia : 
Background, Business Practices and International Networks. CEDA Monagraph Ml GO, 1993, 
p.27 and East Asia Analytical Unit of Department of Foreign Affairs And Trade, Overseas 
Chinese Business Networks In Asia, Canberra AGPS, 1995, pp.49,69,90, and 100. 
The population of Taiwan and Hong Kong are predominantly Chinese. 
In Taiwan 97 per cent of the total population is ethnically Chinese 
and the Chinese comprise 98 percent of the population in Hong Kong. 
77 percent of Singapore's population is Chinese in origin, while 29 
percent of Malaysia's population is Chinese. Vietnam has the smallest 
population of Chinese which only constitute 1.2 percent of the total 
population. 
1.3 Dialect Distribution of Overseas Chinese 
The majority of the overseas Chinese in the East Asian countries 
(Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam) originate from 
two coastal provinces in Southern China, namely Fujian and 
Guangdong (See Table 3). 
TABLE 3 : Provincial Origins of Ethnic Chinese, 1991 
. COUN 'mY 
TAIWAN 
FUJIAN (% ) 
11 
GUANGDONG (% ) 
13 
HAINAN (%) 
H O N G K O N G 2 93.2 -
SINGAPORE 40 42 -
MALAYSIA 30 59 9 
VIETNAM 8 89 2 : 
- refers to not available 
Source : Compiled from East Asia Analytical Unit of Department of Foreign Affairs And Trade, 
Overseas Business Network In Asia, Canberra AGPS, 1995, p.23 
A small proportion comes from Hainan Island at the Southern tip of 
China. Therefore, the dialect groups of the overseas Chinese in these 
five countries are quite diversely formed. Singapore's, Malaysia's, and 
Vietnam's dialect group of overseas Chinese comprise Hokkien, 
Hakka, Cantonese, Teochiu and Hainanese while Taiwan's and Hong 
Kong's dialect groups are predominantly Hokkien and Cantonese 
respectively (See Table 4). 
T A B L E 4 : Distribution of Ethnic Chinese in the Five East Asian Countries by Country 
and Ancestral Dialect Group (By Percent) 
Taiwan 85.0 10.0 - -
Hong Kong 2.0 90.0 1.4 1.6 - - . 
Singapore 40.0 18.0 23.0 9.0 7.0 3.0 
Malaysia 31.7 21.7 12.1 21.8 5.3 7.4 
Vietnam 6.0 56.5 34.0 •1.5 2.0 -
- refers to not available 
Source : Compiled from East Asia Analytical Unit of Department of Foreign Affairs And Trade, 
Overseas Chinese Business Networks In Asia, Canberra AGPS, pp.25, 90, and 100 
The other dialect groups are relatively small in Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. These distinct dialects, to some degree, divide the overseas 
Chinese community because of the mutual unintelligibility of some 
dialects and sub-dialects. However, the shared use of common 
Chinese characters and the practice of some common Chinese 
traditions have served as an informal social bonding that unites the 
overseas Chinese. 
1.4 The Core Values and Beliefs of the Overseas Chinese Community 
Although the overseas Chinese are dialectally different, they 
share some core qualities of Chinese traditions and Confucianism. 
These qualities encompass the Confucian values of thrift, discipline, 
family cohesion, reverence for education, strong sense of responsibility 
and obligation, and the work ethic of diligence and unremitting 
industry. These qualities are commonly and greatly emphasized by 
most of the overseas Chinese. A lot of the overseas Chinese do not 
think of themselves as Confucianists, but the natural Chinese way of 
doing things is largely Confucian.® In these five East Asian countries 
(Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam), the overseas 
Chinese exhibit a strong adherence to these qualities as well as to 
Confucian cultural values and beliefs. As some scholars, such as Lynn 
Pan, David C. L. Ch'ng, Michael Backman, Yuan-Li Wu, S.Gordon 
Redding, Yeu-Farn Wang and Andrew Tanzer have pointed out that 
Ch'ng, David C.L.. op cit p.40 
the life of the overseas Chinese is still very much oriented within the 
cultural context of Confucianism. In one of his works, Andrew Tanzer 
notes: 
In all of these different environments (in host 
countries) overseas Chinese display strong self-
reliance and the Confucian virtues of thrift, 
discipline, industriousness, family cohesion and 
reverence for education.® 
According to David C L Ch'ng, a number of key Confucian 
characteristics can be found in a person brought up as an ethnic 
Chinese and the Confucian cultural values also influence the business 
practices of the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs.*^ 
Taking this into consideration, it does seem clear that the 
sharing of Confucian cultural values and beliefs held by the overseas 
Chinese have formed cultural and linguistic affinities which can most 
likely promote amiability and togetherness among the overseas 
Chinese. 
Besides, these inherited and ingrained Confucian cultural 
values and beliefs have also been partially responsible for the overseas 
Chinese economic success. As Michael Backman put it: 
Confucianism is not without influence. It is, 
however, only one of many factors that propel the 
ethnic Chinese to the forefront of Asian business.« 
^ Tanzer, Andrew,' The Bamboo Network'. Forbes, July 18, 1994, p. 140 
^ Ch'ng, David C.L., op cit, p.42 
^ East Asia Analytical Unit, op cit, p. 122 
In common with Michael Backman, J.A.C Mackie agrees that the 
Confucian cultural values and beliefs only partially explain the 
commercial success of the overseas Chinese. As he comments: 
What can be said, in conclusion, by.way of answer 
to the question raised at the beginning of this 
paper about the relevance of Chinese values to 
Chinese business success? Their values and 
behaviour patterns were clearly one important 
factor contributing to it, but only one among 
many.® 
1.5 Economic Backdrop and Power of the Overseas Chinese 
Ever since the important and large-scale Chinese migration to 
these five East Asian nations during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, many of them have risen from the subordinate 
economic roles their forebears took on as mere 'coolies' or small 
shopkeepers, or as 'compradors' (middlemen) between the big 
European trading houses and the indigenous population, to the 
dominant positions they occupy today as wealthy and independent 
merchants, financiers and industrialists. For example, most of 
Malaysia's small and medium-sized businesses are owned by 
Malaysian Chinese; 99 percent of the Taiwanese manufacturing firms 
are small and medium-sized enterprises, accounting for approximately 
65 percent of Taiwan's export earnings and 55 percent of its GDP; 98 
percent of manufacturing establishments in Hong Kong employ fewer 
than 200 people; and the majority of Chinese-owned enterprises in 
^ Mackie, J.A.C, 'Overseas Chinese FntrpprenenrshipV Asian Pacific Economic Literature, vol.6, No.l, 
May 199i p.58 
Vietnam are medium and small c o m p a n i e s , Apart from these small 
and medium sized enterprises, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs 
also control considerable numbers of conglomerates which are often 
groupings of sometimes hundreds of much smaller companies. Table 
5 shows the major conglomerates owned by the overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. 
Table 5 : Overseas Chinese Conglomerates in the four East Asian nations, 1994 
Country Principai(s) 
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Cathay Life Insurance 
JRoraosa Plastics 
Shin Kong Life Insurance 
China-Trust Commercial Bank 
Evergreen Group/ Eva 
Airways 
Ching Fong Group 
Henderson Land Co. 
Sun Hung Kai Properties 
Hu t̂chison Whmpoa 
meelock Co. 
N m World Development 
Sinoland and f ^ Eastern 
Hong Leong Group 
Malayan Banking Corporation 




Tan Chong Motor 
Source : Compiled from East Asia Analytical Unit of Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Overseas Chinese Business Networks in Asia, Canberra AGPS, 1995, p. 120 and 'Dragon 
Power', Asiaweek, August 24, 1994, pp.38 & 39 
With all this in view, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs did 
exert significant influence on the economies of the five East Asian 
nations. Table 6 shows the contribution of the overseas Chinese to 
their respective countries' economy. Although Vietnam's overseas 
Chinese contribute a small proportion (20% of the total local economy 
10 Ch'ng, David C.L., op cit p. 14 
(GNP) or $4 billion to the GDP) to the Vietnamese economy, compared 
to the other four nations' overseas Chinese, their economic influence 
is growing progressively. 
Table 6 : Overseas Chinese Contribution to the Five East Asian Nations' Economies 
Country Chinese Population 
In million 
Chinese Population 
as % of total locai 
population 
Chinese Business 





Output as GDP 
Contribution in 
U.S$blUion 
Taiwan 20 97 95 255 
Hong Kong 6 98 80 120 
Singapore 2 77 76 62 
Malaysia 6 29 60 48 
Vietnam 0.7 1.3 20 4 
Source : Compiled from 'The Limits of family value', The Economist March 9th, 1996, p.l2. 
The overseas Chinese entrepreneurs have' not only flexed their 
economic muscle in their own countries but also in other countries of 
the East Asian region. Taiwan's and Hong Kong's overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs have far out-invested Japan and the European 
countries in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and 
China. The overseas Chinese entrepreneurs of Singapore and 
Malaysia have also emerged as prominent investors in Myanmar, 
Cambodia, China, Thailand, the Philippines and I n d o n e s i a , 
However, in recent years, the overseas Chinese capitalists of these 
four nations have targeted Vietnam with millions and billions capital 
worth of capital investments. Why has Vietnam become the favourable 
' ' Wang, Yeu Fam. Chinese Entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia : Historical Roots and Modem 
Significance, Center for Pacific Asia Studies at Stockholm University, Working Paper 24, May 1994, 
p.21 
ibid 
destination for these overseas Chinese to invest? Before probing the 
factors for the rush of overseas Chinese capital to Vietnam, the pre-
reform economic situation in Vietnam needs to be examined because 
it reveals Vietnam's past economic chaos and crisis which had 
discouraged foreign investment and handicapped the economic 
development and growth in the country. 
CHAPTER 2 
The Economic Situation Of Vietnam, 1975—1985 
2.1 The Socialist Central-Planned Economic Model and Its Impact. 
When the Vietnam war came to an end in 1975, along with the 
unification of the country's political institutions, the integration of the 
economies of North and South Vietnam was set in motion. South 
Vietnam was imposed with North Vietnam's economic system which 
was based on the socialist centrally planned economic model. With 
this centrally planned-economic model, the Vietnamese Communist 
Party (VNCP), tried to transform the market-oriented economy of the 
South Vietnam to the socialist-oriented one. The central planning 
model, somewhat simplified, was basically intended to operate as 
follows: 
-The state determined all important economic activities of the entire 
country through a system of production plans and goods 
distribution; there were also strict regulations on pricing and 
interest rates. 
-The state monopolized foreign trade and the trade relationship had 
been mainly with the former Soviet Union and East European 
countries through bilateral treaties. Foreign trade companies under 
the control of the state would implement these trade treaties, and 
the profit-and-loss account of foreign trade was entirely taken care 
of by the state. 
-Large-scale private enterprises were not encouraged to expand 
further, but were instead singled out to be finally incorporated into 
either state or collective units. 
-The finance of the state was not separate from that of state-owned 
enterprises. The state undertook to compensate for losses incurred 
by state-owned enterprises by means of subsidies, and when these 
enterprises chalked up a profit, the profit was channeled back to 
the state budget. All productive activities were subsidized by the 
state through its provision of raw materials and other inputs of 
production, machineiy, and equipment imported with old fund and 
credit loans, and sold at low prices to state-owned enterprises. 
-The market mechanism operated only in small businesses and the 
household economy, that is to say in only a part of the agricultural, 
handicraft, and consumer goods retailing sectors. Many capital 
goods used for production were not allowed to be bought or sold on 
the market but were allocated by the state's planned distribution 
system. 
The adoption and imposition of this socialist centrally-planned 
model by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VNCP) brought about a 
devastating multiplier-effect which eventually dragged along the whole 
country towards an unprecedented economic crisis. The Second Five-
Year Plan (1976-80) and the Third Five-Year Plan (1981-85), which 
were launched in accordance with the socialist centrally-planned 
model, plagued the Vietnamese economy with a galloping inflation 
rate, lowered living standards and productivity, caused acute 
shortages of food, essential consumer goods and capital investment of 
all kinds, and lopsided trade relations, 
The economic crisis or predicament suffered by Vietnam is quite 
clearly revealed in Secretary-General Truong Chinh's Political Report 
to the Sixth Party Congress at the end of 1985: 
Our country is facing many socio-economic 
difficulties Failure to fulfil a number of 
major targets, such as food staples, coal, cement, 
Vu, Tuan Anh, Development in Vietnam : Policy Reforms and Economic Growth, Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1991, p.4 
Tran, Dong Phnong. Viemam and its Transition To A Market Economy, Department of Economics, 
University of Wollongong, Australia, 1995, pp.29-30 
wood, textiles, and items for export has affected all 
aspect of economic activity and the working 
people's life Production and investment 
efficiency has been low. i® 
In view of all this, the socialist centrally-planned model pursued 
by the Vietnamese Communist Party did not embark Vietnam's 
economy on an outward-looking and growth-oriented path. Instead, 
the model plunged the country into undesirable economic crisis. It is 
clear that, the Vietnamese government's adherence to an inflexible 
and problem-ridden socialist model was not conducive to motivating 
individuals and companies to boost enterprising economic activities. 
The economic policies implemented had no room for private and 
market-oriented business dynamism. Hence, the socialist model 
discouraged the overseas Chinese or Hoa Kieu's role and involvement 
in the economy of Vietnam. By introducing the anti-compradore 
bourgeoisie movements, the overseas Chinese or Hoa capitalist or 
entrepreneurs were dispossessed and pushed out from the country's 
economic mainstream. 
2.2 The Vietnamese Communist Regime's Harsh Economic Policies 
Towards the Economically-Influential Overseas Chinese 
In 1974, the Hanoi Government estimated that the overseas 
Chinese in South Vietnam controlled more than 80 per cent of the 
Vo, Nhan Tri and Booth, Anna, 'Recent Economic Development in Vietnam', Asia-Pacific 
Economic Literature, vol.6, No.l , May 1992, p. 17 
food, textile, chemical, metallurgical, engineering and electric 
industries; held virtual monopolies in the wholesale and import-export 
trades and controlled over 50 per cent of the retail t r a d e . T h e y 
monopolised the purchase of rice, obtained up to 80 per cent of all 
loans from South Vietnamese banks, owned 42 of the 60 major 
companies, and accounted for two thirds of the total annual 
investments in South Vietnam, Besides, the overseas Chinese also 
formed a large segment of the technical and managerial personnel and 
skilled workers. A substantial number of overseas Chinese were 
employed in diverse industries as well as the civil service : 
The overseas Chinese represented a large 
percentage of workers in the mining , 
manufacturing, and processing industries during 
the French colonial period. They comprised 9 
percent of the 21,000 workers employed by French 
colonial administration in 1929. Under the Saigon 
regime (1955-1975), they accounted for 25,000 to 
30,000 industrial workers in the mid-1960s, 
accounting for one-third of the total southern 
industrial workers, i® 
In view of all this, the overseas Chinese capitalists or entrepreneurs 
and workers did not only play a pre-eminent economic role but also 
form an indispensable and constructive force in the economic 
development of Vietnam. 
Nevertheless, the Vietnamese Communist Party, which came 
into power in the South in 1975, disregarded the economic 
East Asia Analytical Unit, op cit, p.84 
xran, Khanh, The Ethnic Chinese And Economic Development in Vietnam, Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Singapore, 1993, p.72 
significance of t±ie overseas Chinese and dogmatically initiated 
'socialist transformation' movements to confiscate and nationalize the 
business and properties of the compradore bourgeoisie, which 
comprised mainly overseas Chinese and foreign capitalists. By 
launching the XI campaign in 1975 and X2 campaign in 1978 as well 
as enacting Act 14 in 1983, most of the businesses and social 
activities of the overseas Chinese community were relentlessly 
restricted or terminated, i® About 76% of the private industrial 
enterprises in Ho Chi Minh City were transferred to state or state-
private manufactures. In the commercial sector, more than 60,000 
large and medium-sized private trade enterprises in the South were 
banned from trading and ordered to move into the state-controlled 
industrial or agricultural production sector.20 This discriminatory and 
unfavourable economic approach had led to a'large exodus of refugees 
from Vietnam by land and by sea. During 1978-79 an estimated 
150,398 to 270,882 persons left the country, a disproportionately high 
number being from the Chinese community. 
The restrictive and inward-looking socialist centrally-planned 
model adopted by the Vietnamese Communist Party failed to set 
Vietnam on a market-oriented and outward-looking economic course. 
The imposition of the socialist economic model had not only created 
an inauspicious and hostile business environment in Vietnam but 
also disrupted and dismantled the overseas Chinese or Hoa 
ibid, pp.81, 85, and 90 
ibid 
ibid, P.25 
commercial structure which was the integral part of south Vietnam's 
economic system. 
CHAPTERS 
The Pull FcLctors and the Influx of Overseas Chinese Investment 
into Vietnam 
3.1 The Pull Factors 
The year 1986 witnessed a watershed in the economic 
development policy-making of Vietnam. At the- sixth National Congress 
of the Communist Party of Vietnam in December 1986, Vietnam's 
reform milestone, the party decided to initiate economic 'renovation' or 
doi moi, which has consisted of policies creating a market-oriented 
economy, establishing a system of new institutions that are 
appropriate to the changing condition of Vietnam's socio-economy, 
and promoting the integration of Vietnam into the world economy. The 
launch of doi moi has brought about significant increased inflow of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) into Vietnam. 
The largest share of the FDI flowing into Vietnam originates 
from the major Asian-Pacific countries' entrepreneurs or capitalists, 
such as Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, Singaporean, South Korean, 
American, Japanese, Thai, Malaysian and Australian. But among 
these Asia-Pacific nations' entrepreneurs, the overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs, especially from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Malaysia appear to become one of the most dynamic and dominant 
source of FDI in Vietnam (As mentioned in the Introduction). However, 
the tremendous influx of Overseas Chinese investment into Vietnam 
cannot be attributed only to one pull factor, the launch of doi moi In 
fact, a combination or conjunction of some pull factors including the 
strategic geographical location, abundant natural resources, 
potentially large internal consumers' market, cheap and highly-literate 
labour, relative political stability, initiation of unprecedented economic 
reform, and the availability of a business-oriented ethnic Chinese 
community has attracted the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs or 
capitalists to pour their investment into Vietnam. 
3.1.1 The Strategic Geographical location of Vietnam 
Vietnam lies along the eastern edge of the peninsula of 
mainland Southeast Asia, bordered by China to the north (3,818 km; 
2,372 mi), Laos to the west (1,555km; 966 mi), and Cambodia to the 
South-west (982km; 610mi).22 Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Taiwan and Hong Kong, however, 
are lying beyond the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea and 
forming an almost-circle like shape surrounding Vietnam (see Map 1). 
Having the shape of an elongated letter "S", Vietnam has a total area 
of 331, 114 square kilometers extending 1650 km from north to 
south.23 The widest area from east to west is 600km and the 
narrowest only 50km.24 it also has a long coastline looking out on the 
South China Sea and stretching 3260km from the Gulf of Tonkin to 
^̂  Kurian, George Thomas (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Third World," (4th.ed), vol.3. Facts On File, New 
York, p.2081 
^ Tran, Hoang Kim, Economy of Vietnam : Reviews And Statistics, Statistical Publishing House, 
Hanoi, 1992, p.5 
^̂  ibid 
the Gulf of Thailand (see Map 1). Fronting the South China Sea and 
neighbouring Northeast and Southeast Asian nations, Vietnam is 
strategically positioned in the fastest growing part of the world and 
along major shipping routes. Map 2 suggests the underlying 
structure of shipping (Hub/mainline/feeder) networks in Northeast 
and Southeast Asia and Vietnam, with its geographical location, it can 
be said to be in proximity to these shipping networks. 
With all this in view, the strategic geographical location of 
Vietnam can be capitalized by many, including the overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs or capitalists, especially from Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Malaysia. These four countries' overseas Chinese have 
not only channeled their investments into Vietnam because of its 
proximity to their home country but also because of Vietnam's vicinity 
to other Southeast and Northeast Asian natipns, such as Cambodia, 
Laos and China (its Southern parts) which are the potential and 
untapped markets. Hence, Vietnam's strategic geographical position, 
in these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs ' minds, can serve as an ideal 
gateway to plug into other Indochinese and Southern Chinese 
markets. 
Map 1 : The Southeast Asian Region 
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Source : Robinson, Ross, 'Shipping and port development in East and Southeast Asia', in 
Bateman and Sherwood, Australia's Maritime Bridge Into Asia, p.66 
3.1.2 Vast and Unexploited Natural Resources 
Vietnam abounds in natural resources from forests, land, 
minerals and water resources. Most of these natural resources have 
not yet been fully exploited for economic gain. 
*Forest resources 
Recent forest inventories show that Vietnam has 19 million 
hectares of forest land which occupies two-thirds of the total area. 
But due to war destruction, forest clearing for cultivating land and 
fuel, the actual forested land is only 9.3 million hectares.25 Forests 
cover many regions of the country from the far northern border areas 
to the eastern edge in the south. Table 7 shows the percentage of 
forest coverage for Vietnam. 
Table 7 : Forest Coverage by Region in Vietnam 
Ndrthem highland 8.6 
Central midland 26.0 
North eastern highland 23.9 
Mid-northern provinces 33.6 
Central coastal area 19.3 
Central highland 58.7 
Eastern southern provinces 20.9 
Source : Nguven, Xuan Oanh & Grub, Phillip D., Vietnam : The New Investment Frontier in Southeast 
Asia, Times Academic Press, Singapore, 1992, p.47 
However, Vietnam's forests contain ample precious timber, special 
forest products, medicinal plants and various species of wild animals. 
By the end of 1989, timber stock was estimated at 586-million m^ . 26 
With such a vast timber stock, the exploited timber output could be 
^̂  Nguyen, Cong Nghiep and et al, Vietnam : The Blazing Flame of Reforms. Statistical Publishing 
House, Hanoi, 1993, p. 18 
26 Iran, Hoang Kim, op cit, p.9 
76 million m^ , including 73 million m^ of high quality timber 25.1 
million m^ of fuel wood.^^ Bamboo stock is estimated at 5.9 billion 
trees, including 5.2 billion trees of natural bamboo.Apart from 
timber and bamboo, Vietnam's forests also have other special 
products, such as cinnamon, star anise, castor-oil plants, pine star, 
fragrant tree and others. 
*Land resources 
There is approximately 6.9 million hectares (20.9%) out of 33 
milion hectares of natural land used for agricultural production; 9.8 
million hectares (29.7%) is allocated for forestry; 1.7 million hectares 
(5.2%) is for specialized purpose and the remaining part consisting of 
all types of lands totals 14.6 million hectares (44.2%).^^ This portion 
of land includes nearly 1 million hectares of inferior land in the plains 
and 11 million hectares of waste land in the mountainous regions 
where there are possibilities of use for the benefit of agriculture and 
forestry.30 The regions most propitious for an expansion of the 




^̂  'Vietnam : A Potential Recipient of Foreign Investment', Viemam Courier, No.34. August 1992, p.7 
ibid 
Vietnam's mineral potential has been identified in various 
geologic surveys. To date this information largely provides estimates 
of reserves. However, some minerals have proven reserves and the 
Vietnamese government has set priority for the exploration of the 
reserves, but owing to substantial investments required, possibilities 
for comprehensive development depend much upon foreign 
investments. These resources are the background for the 
development of various domestic industries and for exports. The 
principal mineral resources are as follows: 
Oil and Gas — Vietnam boasts a relatively large reserve of oil and 
natural gas and is quite capable of meeting the domestic needs and 
the requirement of export. The surveys conducted so far have shown 
that oil and natural gas are chiefly concentrated in the southern 
mainland and the southern continental shelf.^i in these regions, they 
are distributed on an extensive area covering 200,00 sq. km consisting 
of the low-lying area of the Mekong delta, and in the sea south of Con 
Son, Vung Tau and the Gulf of Thailand. The exploitable oil and 
natural gas reserve is estimated to be about 2.8 billion tonnes of oil 
and 500 billion cubic meters of natural gas.̂ ^ 
Coal — Total reserves are staggering; it is estimated that well over two 
hundred billion tonnes of coal are to be found in Vietnam and its 
m 
^̂  Tran, Hoang Kim, op cit. p. 12 
surrounding coastline areas. Coal is mostly concentrated in Quang 
Ninh province in northern Vietnam with a reserve of 3.6 billion 
tonnes.Besides, the Thai Nguyen region has a prospected reserve of 
80 million tonnes, the Na Duong mine (in Lang Son province) has a 
reserve of 100 million tonnes. 
Bauxite — Located in the Lang Son-Cao Bang area, it is estimated to 
have a reserve of 40 million tonnes. It can also be found in the 
Central Highlands with an estimated reserve of 6 billion tonnes. 
Tin— With a reserve of around 80,000 tonnes, tin is found in different 
areas, such as Tinh Tuc (Cao Bang province). Son Duong (Ha Tuyen 
province, Quy Hop (Nghe An province and Da Choy (Lam Dong 
province). 
Iron ore — Iron ore reserves are estimated at 700 million tons, with 
over half being located in the Thach Khe area. 37 
Chromite — Valuable deposits of Chromite have been found in Nui 
Nua (Thanh Hoa province) with an estimated reserve of 20 million 
tonnes. 38 
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Phosphates — Vietnam has one of the world's largest known 
phosphates resources, located mainly in Hoang Lien Son p r o v i n c e . 
*Water resources 
Vietnam boasts an abundant source of fresh water. Surface 
water is equally distributed in all the regions and could meet the 
requirement of development of different branches in the national 
economy and the daily needs of the population of different regions. 
Throughout the territory, there are 2860 rivers. Surfaces of lakes and 
ponds cover respectively 394,000 and 56,000 hectares to say nothing 
of 85,000 hectares of marshy land and over 1 million hectares of 
mangrove forests."^ These water resources can be exploited for the 
development of hydraulic, for irrigation purpose, for rearing aquatic 
products and for the expansion of water communication. 
In addition to fresh water surface,the surrounding sea water 
surface of Vietnam is relatively large because it has a 3,260 km long 
coastline.'•I Vietnam's saltish water surface is one million km^ and 
belongs to 27 p r o v i n c e s . 4 2 To date Vietnam's sea potential has not 
been adequately surveyed and assessed. Marine resources have been 
explored to a very small extent compared with its potential. The area 
of 31-200 m depth of the sea bed is presenting a great potential for 
marine products. There are a lot of species of fish in the Vietnam 
^̂  Nguyen, Xuan Oanh and Grub, Phillip D., op cit p.64 
'Vietnam : A Potential Recipient of Foreign Investment', op cit p.7 
^̂  Tran, Hoang Kim, op cit p. 14 
Nguyen, Cong Nghiep and et al, op cit p. 19 
^̂  ibid 
sea in which 100 species have great economic value. Fish reserves are 
estimated at about 3 million tons.^ Besides, there are many other 
marine products, including pearl oyster, abalone, jelly fish, crabs, 
shrimps and others. 
3.1.3 Large Consumer Market of Vietnam 
The population of Vietnam with an annual growth rate of 2.2 
percent, stood at 74 million in 1995 and is expected to grow to about 
81 million in 2000, 92 million in 2010 and about 122 million in 
2 0 5 0 . B y and large, Vietnam has or will have a young population. 
This is because the proportion of population aged 65 and above 
remains or will still remain small while the proportion of the 
population aged between 15-64 keeps increasing from 1992 to 2000 
(See Chart 4). 
Tran, Hoang Kim, op cit p. 14 
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Source : Banister, Judith, Vietnam Population Dynamics and Prospects, Institute of 
East Asian Studies, University California, Berkeley, 1993, p.6 
Besides the GDP per capita at PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) and the 
Consumption per capita are also on the rise in Vietnam. The GDP per 
capita at PPP (Purchasig Power Parity) has increased from U.S$1000 
in 1989 to U.S$1263 in 1995 and the Consumption per capita has 
jumped from U.S$ 142.3 in 1992 to U.S$242.1 in 1994 (See Table 8 ). 
The tremendous size and growth of the population coupled with the 
increasing GDP per capita at PPP and consumption per capita make 
Vietnam indeed a great and promising consumer market. 
Table 8 : Vietnam's Purchasing Power & Consumption Power, 1989 to 1996 
1989 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
n/a 1250 1263 1263 1310 
142.3 183.7 242.1 n/a n/a The Consumption Per capita (U,S.$) i n/a 
n/a refers to not available 
* PPP refers to Purchasing Power Parity index which attempts to measure the real purchasing power of 
nominal incomes across Vietnam. 
Source : Compiled from "The Bottom Line' in Asiaweek of various issues and the World Economic 
Factbook 1996 
3.1.4 Abundant Literate and Cheap Labour 
In view of its dense and young population, Vietnam has great 
potentialities in manpower. Vietnam's work-force was estimated to be 
around 34 million in 1994 and is growing by more than 3 percent 
annually as an estimated 1.1 million additional workers seek jobs 
each year.^ It is expected to increase to 49 million in the year 
2000.4'̂  In other words, about 40-45 percent of the total population in 
Vietnam is eligible and ready to participate in the work force. The 
educational level of Vietnamese laborers is fairly high. The literacy 
rate in 1995 according to the Asiaweek survey, was 88.6%.'̂ ® The 
population aged ten or over who have had some schooling is quite 
high, 84 percent overall, or 87 per cent for males and 80 per cent for 
females.̂ ® This is a fairly high rate compared with many other 
developing countries. This educational level would very likely create 
favourable conditions for job-training and skill-improvement and 
make it possible for the trainees rapidly to adapt themselves to new 
working environments. Furthermore, the cost of labour in Vietnam is 
relatively cheap in comparison to most other countries of East and 
Southeast Asia. A skilled worker's monthly wage is about U.S.$250 
and an unskilled worker's monthly wage is about U.S.$40.®® But, in 
46 ibid, p.58 
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some cases, a worker still can receive an appalling-low-monthly wage 
which is only U.S.$20 to U.S.$25 in 1993.51 However, such a large, 
literate, and inexpensive pool of labour has partially made Vietnam a 
target of great attraction for the Overseas Chinese investors. 
3.1.5 The Economic Reform under 'Doi MoV or Renovation 
At the Sixth National Congress in December 1986 the 
Vietnamese communist government introduced a comprehensive 
reform program, doi moi with the objective of liberalising and 
deregulating the economy. The reform measures explicitly recognized 
the failure of central planning and marked a major turning point in 
the economic development of Vietnam. The objectives of the reform 
were mapped out as follows : 
1. to develop the private sector 
2. to increase and stabilize agricultural output 
3. to shift the focus of investment from heavy to light industry 
4. to reform the role of the state enterprises 
5. to focus upon export led growth, based upon the experience of 
Vietnam's dynamic regional neighbours 
6. to attract foreign direct investment, seen as essential for economic 
development^^ 
In order to achieve these objectives, a series of new reformed economic 
policies and programmes have been initiated or launched. The new 
Hainsworth, Geoffrey B., op_cit, p. 196 
^̂  Harvie, Charles, Economic Reform And Future Prospects of the Vietnamese Economy, University of 
Wollongong, Australia, p. 4 
reformed economic policies and programmes can be boiled down as 
follows: 
Price reforms : Price controls on most goods and services in Vietnam 
were abolished in March 1989, except in the case of items such as 
electricity, coal and cement used in major state construction projects. 
But from 1991 onward, most of these items' prices have been liberated 
and only the price of electricity is still controlled by the s t a t e . i t is 
clear that the decentralization of the price decision process and the 
establishment of market price system are emphasized. 
Exchange rate devaluation : The exchange rate was unified and sharply 
devalued in December 1989.®^ Foreign exchange trading floors were 
created which enabled the exchange rate to be largely determined by 
the market. 
Interest rate reforms : Interest rates were raised to very high levels, 
with the aim of making real rates positive, as part of the fight against 
inflation.Although the real rates of interest were allowed to become 
negative again, they did not have much damaging effect on the 
economy. Since 1992 real interest rates have primarily remained 
positive, contributing to the sizable decline in inflation thereafter.®® 
Fiscal reforms : In conjunction with interest rate increases, and to 
consolidate the stabilization program, the government undertook 
" Vu, Tuan Anh,_OEM^, pp.26-27 
Harvie, Charles, op cit, p.5 
^̂  Tran, Dong Phuong, op cit, p.48 
^̂  ibid 
ambitious reforms in fiscal management. The government made a 
great effort to improve financing of the budget. Budgetary expenditure 
has been reduced significantly during 1990-1991 by the elimination of 
budgetary subsidies to state enterprises and large military 
demobi l i za t ion .The tax system has been undergoing a reform 
program with favourable new taxes like housing and land tax, 
personal income tax, profit tax, and others being introduced in late 
1990.5® A comprehensive tax system reform together with tax 
administration reform are being planned in cooperation with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Financial sector reform : This involved the restructuring of the banks, 
which dominate the financial system, into a two tier system with the 
State Bank of Vietnam performing the function of a modern central 
bank, and the four major state owned commercial banks providing 
banking facilities.^^ The financial system is being further expanded to 
include shareholding banks, credit cooperatives and joint venture 
banks. Foreign banks have been allowed to operate since 1991 and 
the government is developing a securities market which is planned to 
start operating by 1996-1997.60 
Promotion of the private sector : The Laws on Companies and Private 
Enterprises, released in 1991, give the private sector, which was 
discriminated against for years, official sanction.®^ Another New 
^̂  Harvie, Charles, op cit p.5 
'' m 
^̂  ibid, p.6 
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Constitution adopted in 1992 provides explicit protection of private 
property rights and recognizes the importance of the private sector in 
the economy.®^ 
Legal system reform : Legislation has continually been reviewed and 
renewed to keep abreast of the market economy. A series of legal 
documents such as the Law on Foreign Investment (which was called 
by the London Economist 'one of the most liberal in all Southeast 
Asia'), the Law on Companies, the Law on Private Business, Law on 
Land, the Oil and Gas Law, and the Bankruptcy Law, have been 
promulgated to create a legal basis for all economic activities to 
function in the market mechanism. 
Foreign trade policy reform : The foreign trade of Vietnam, which had 
been the monopoly of the state, began to be rationalized and 
liberalized in 1989.̂ ^ All sectors, including the private sector, have 
been encouraged to participate in foreign trade. Import quotas have 
been largely eliminated, and import duties on industrial inputs were 
removed. Furthermore, the Vietnamese direction of trade has also 
been reoriented from the former socialist countries or the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries to other countries, 
especially those from Southeast Asia and East Asia. 
The launch and implementation of a series of these policies and 
measures for economic renovation have really restructured a more 
^̂  Vu, Tuan Anh, op cit, pp.36-37 
^ Gates, Carolyn L. and Truong, David H.D., Reform of A Centrally-Managed Developing Economy : 
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reliable, workable, and liberal Vietnamese economic system which can 
produce good and favourable prospects and environment for attracting 
the foreign investors, especially the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs or 
capitalists. 
3.1.6 The Political and Social Stability of Vietnam 
Political stability of Vietnam achieved and maintained by the 
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) since 1975 has also been a major 
pull factor for attracting the foreign investors or capitalists, 
particularly the overseas Chinese. The political and security 
dimensions of Vietnam indicate that political stability is an obvious 
feature in spite of its internal and external stresses. Under the 
Vietnamese Communist Party's rule, Vietnam has not experienced any 
major political chaos. The effectiveness of VCP's in maintaining 
political stability and reducing political risk and uncertainty has not 
only relied on force and coercion, but also on reform of the party 
leadership. 
In order to ward off any political opposition or rival which can 
pose threat to the rule of the VCP and the well-being of Vietnamese 
society, the VCP-led government which came into power in 1975 has 
undertaken a series of violent and coercive measures. After its seizure 
of power in South Vietnam, the communist regime carried out 
extensive summary executions of political e n e m i e s . T h e extreme 
cruelty and barbarity in carrying out the mass killings were part of the 
authorities' plan to terrorize the population- and thereby to secure 
their submission. In addition, the communist regime had also used 
re-education and concentration camps as a means to eliminate or 
neutralize by terrorism, potential opposition to the communist 
political system.®® In December 1985, for instance, the police security 
forces in the province of Long An searched and interrogated 180,000 
families, arresting a total of 6,100 people who were then sent to 
concentration camps for re-education. 
Although the exercise of execution of political enemies and the 
use of re-education and concentration camps as a means of political 
repression appears to have decreased in Vietnam nowadays, non-life-
threatening forms of oppression such as arbitrary arrest and 
imprisonment, authorities' harassment, interrogation and torture are 
still very prevalent in Vietnam. For example, two of the most 
prominent leaders of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBC), 
Thich Quang Do and Thich Huyen Quang, who had shown political 
opposition to the VCP in 1982, were arrested and sent to their native 
village where they remained under house arrest till the end of 1989.®® 
In 1984 twelve more Buddhist monks and nuns, including two well-
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known scholars, Thich Tue Sy and Thich Tri Sieu, were arrested and 
held under administrative detention for more than four years.̂ ® Many 
Buddhist monks and lay activists connected with the UBC have 
always been subjected to the government's arrest, imprisonment and 
torturerò Furthermore, there is a broad multilevel campaign by the 
party to strengthen and tighten the inspection and control system, 
including a range of control personnel from the police to the courts, 
prosecutors' offices, control organization of mass organizations and 
parties, and state and peoples' inspectorates7^ 
While the VCP's ubiquitous and heavy-handed security systems 
are a major deterrent to most forms of dissenting behavior, the 
stability of the communist regime has managed to maintain and 
create a favourable environment for foreign investment. 
With the arrival of Nguyen Van Linh as the secretary of the 
party, the reforms were whipped up. During the course of his tenure 
in office, Linh fashioned an ambitious and comprehensive package of 
party reforms. That package included efforts to empower local 
organizations to take more responsibilities, parallel with the 
increasing economic autonomy afforded e n t e r p r i s e s . L i n h also 
introduced a more flexible style of management, and a concomitant 
active support for the training of a skilled class of party managers. He 
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sought to confine the party to a more limited role as the conscience of 
the revolution responsible for fashioning social and political direction 
and maintaining the integrity of the revolutionary inheritance, while 
allowing responsibilities for daily governance to pass to a body of 
qualified technicians and elected and appointed off icials.Linh's aim 
was to guide the party towards quality control in operational matters 
and membership policy, emphasizing responsiveness to direct, critical 
complaints against party personnel and organizations.'̂ '̂  Hence, it is 
clear that Linh attempted to combat bureaucratic ineptitude and 
corruption and produce wider participation and greater administrative 
efficiency. 
However, all this well-intentioned and radical reform effort of 
Linh did not occur. But, at least, Linh achieved some successes in 
making the party responsive to the altered political playing field, and 
capable of undertaking some organizational changes which can pave 
the way for further reforms. Although Do Muoi, who is Linh's 
successor, has displayed a different planning and ruling style from 
Linh, the main and ultimate goals set by Do Muoi for the party 
remain, by and large, the same. Do Muoi prefers to adopt gradualist 
and cautious way to renovate the party. For example, he sought to 
build consensus slowly and consolidate support within the central 
committee for programs or problem-solving s t r a t e g i e s . ' ' ^ Nevertheless, 
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Do Muoi's intention in transforming the VCP into a more efficient and 
flexible organization can be discerned from his approaches. 
Muoi places primacy on establishing public order and security, 
argued that elimination of corruption was an "imperative" for the 
ruling party, requiring intensified work in several areas and he fixed 
on the importance of developing grassroots party organizations by 
clarifying leadership roles and committee functions, and addressing 
the problem of malaise at that leveU® Muoi also stressed that the 
party had to adhere to carrying out renovation of the state apparatus. 
Muoi himself has high hope for new blood. "We are particularly 
interested in more junior leaders; young, moral, and healthy officials 
should be selected" he announced.The Eighth National Congress 
held in June 1996 witnessed some further reforms in the party, for 
example, the new 170-member Central Committee elected by the 
congress representing all the major groups contains younger and 
better-educated cadres and the party Secretariat was replaced by the 
new five-member Politburo Standing Committee which has been given 
power to conduct Politburo business on a day-to-day basis.'̂ ® As a 
replacement for the party Secretariat, which acted as a bridge between 
the Central Committee and the Politburo, the new Standing 
Committee is an attempt to streamline party management. 
Taking all this into consideration, the VCP is adopting a two-
pronged approach to achieve and maintain political stability. By 
^̂  ibid p.916 
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using force and coercion, the party can suppress the 
uncompromising, recalcitrant and threatening political opposition or 
rival which goes beyond the authority or legislation of the government 
and may lead to political chaos. By reforming the party leadership 
(renovating and revitalizing the party apparatuses and political 
institutions), the VNCP is adjusted and poised to cope with the 
political and socio-economic consequences of Vietnam more efficiently 
and flexibly, and thereby, the legitimacy of the government can be 
safeguarded or even strengthened. With these two approach working 
hand in hand, the VCP has not only ensured a firmer and more 
durable position in the political arena of Vietnam, but also a 
considerable political stability which can entail a favourable 
environment for foreign investments. 
3.1.7 The Overseas Chinese of Vietnam 
Historically, the overseas Chinese in Vietnam, just like other 
overseas Chinese in the four East Asian nations (Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Malaysia) emigrated from China many centuries ago. 
The Overseas Chinese or known as Hoa community in Vietnam 
currently number 0.7 million or account for about 1.2 per cent of the 
total population.'̂ ® This low number or percentage of overseas Chinese 
had resulted from the political-persecution-induced exodus of 
thousands of Chinese. 
79 Ch'ng, David C.L.. op cit, p25 
As elsewhere, Vietnam's overseas Chinese or Hoa community 
includes a multiplicity of dialects. The main dialect communities are 
the Cantonese (56.5 per cent), the Teochiu (34 per cent), the Hokkien 
(6 per cent), the Hainanese (2 per cent), and the Hakka (1.5 per 
cent).®o As with ethnic Chinese communities elsewhere in Southeast 
Asia, these overseas Chinese who came to Vietnam also carried with 
them a package of Chinese cultural values and beliefs which is 
concocted from some key Confucian values. This Confucian-values-
oriented culture is reflected in the Vietnamese overseas Chinese social 
and economic activities. As Barton observed, the business 
transaction conducted by the ethnic Chinese businessmen in South 
Vietnam were characterized by some Confucian values, such as trust 
(sun yung), and obligation.»i In view of all this, obviously, Vietnam's 
overseas Chinese backgrounds are strikingly similar to those of the 
overseas Chinese in the four East Asian countries. 
The incorporating of Confucian values and beliefs into business 
practices and coupling with other circumstances have made Vietnam's 
overseas Chinese assured of a prominent economic role in the 
country. Seen from a historical perspective, the overseas Chinese had 
actively engaged in a variety of economic activities, such as commerce, 
industry, agriculture and trade. The overseas Chinese had also 
captured a considerable share of most of the economic activities. For, 
East Asia Analytical Unit, op cit p.25 
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example, it is estimated that the ethnic Chinese capital controlled the 
entire domestic wholesale trade and 50 per cent of the domestic retail 
trade of the South before 1975.®2 Furthermore, the role played by the 
overseas Chinese in the external trade was even more conspicuous. 
In the pre-French colonial period, especially during the Nguyen 
dynasty, overseas Chinese businessmen were able to establish an 
extensive trading network with their compatriots in China and other 
migrant Chinese communities in East Asian nations, such as Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Thailand, Malaya, and S i n g a p o r e . i n addition, 
the overseas Chinese also controlled most of the export-import 
companies and trading activities in the 1960s when U.S. aid was 
stepped up in South Vietnam.®^ 
Although the overseas Chinese active and significant economic 
role was harshly restricted by the Communist regime in the late 
1970s, the overseas Chinese started to regain their economic power 
when the communist government introduced doi moi in 1986. The 
overseas Chinese have been given more space to conduct their 
business activities than they had since 1975. In the 1990s their 
influence is again substantial. For example, at the end of 1992, there 
were 420 private enterprises registered in Ho Chi Minh City alone, of 
which 200 businesses or 45 per cent were ethnic Chinese o w n e d . 
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Taking all this into consideration, Vietnam's overseas Chinese 
are indeed a very valuable asset to other overseas Chinese from other 
countries, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia. This 
is not only because Vietnam's overseas Chinese dialect, culture, and 
ethnicity have similarities and familiarities with the overseas Chinese 
of the four East Asian nations but also because the historically 
established de facto business and trading net work could serve as a 
common ground to produce mutual trust and bond which can give 
rise to opportunities for co-operation in establishing and facilitating 
operation and transaction of business and trade. For example. Hong 
Kong companies have been bolstered further by Ho Chi Minh City's 
nearly half a million Cantonese-speaking ethnic Chinese residents, 
who have helped Hong Kong's businessmen cope with Vietnam's 
often-cumbersome bureaucracy. 
Chinese scholar, Mr. Tan Tian Shin, has pointed out that the 
share of common cultural, dialectial, and ethnic backgrounds among 
the overseas Chinese can transcend the boundaries of different 
nationality and promote more understanding. Thus, closer 
relationship and firmer trust, which are the ingredients for business 
co-operation, can be built.®'̂  Another scholar, Chen Xiangming, also 
argues that shared traditional and ethnic ties can lay the ground work 
for crosscutting investment flow among the East Asian overseas 
^̂  Hibert, Murray and Goldstein, Carl, 'Vietnam Opening : Hong Rong vies to become gateway', Far 
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Chinese because they provide the cultural 'glue' for sustaining 
organizationally and spatially integrated economic activities in the 
region.®® The director of Singapore's Heshe Holdings, Mr. Xie, 
commented 'any company intends to expand its operations abroad, it 
should begin in a place where there is a common culture'.®^ In the 
light of all this, Vietnam's overseas Chinese similar cultural and 
ethnic affiliation did play a role in attracting or drawing the overseas 
Chinese from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia to invest 
in Vietnam. 
Furthermore, the diverse, long-standing, and reasonably-well-
developed entrepreneurship and business skills possessed by 
Vietnam's overseas Chinese encouraged entrepreneurs or capitalists of 
those four East Asian nations to pour their investments into Vietnam. 
This business and entrepreneurial skills have been manifested by 
overseas Chinese active, pre-eminent and extensive engagement in 
almost all economic activities from the late seventeenth centuiy up to 
the present, except in the period of the late 1970s. Their diverse 
entrepreneurship and business skills have not only revealed their long 
interaction with the domestic market but also their strong capability 
and adaptability in coping with Vietnam's sometime unpredictable and 
harsh business environment. Viewed from this standpoint, Vietnam's 
overseas Chinese entrepreneurial and business strength can be 
Chen, Xiangming, 'Taiwan Investment in China And Southeast Asia : Go West, but Also Go South', 
Aisan Survey, vol.36, No.5, May 1996, p.465 
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harnessed by the four East Asian nations' overseas Chinese capitalists 
or entrepreneurs to facilitate their business penetration. 
Direct family and kinship links and historically established 
business, social and political connections are also the important 
factors in drawing the overseas Chinese to invest in Vietnam. For 
instance, Ve Wong, a Taiwanese food company is tiying to revive its 
investment in Vietnam by starting up a U.S $ 37 million monosodium 
glutamate factory.®® The company hopes eventually to reclaim the 
production facilities it had in Southern Vietnam before 1975.®i Some 
of the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs or capitalists pour their 
investment into Vietnam through relatives or kinsmen in the country. 
Tran Em, an ethnic Chinese living at the Ho Chi Minh City's sixth 
distict, owns a factory which deals with plastic and is fully sponsored 
by his rich relatives in T a i w a n . ^ ^ 
Suffice it to say that Vietnam's overseas Chinese community 
which is heavily-business-oriented and has close affinity and 
connection with outside overseas Chinese can serve as profitable 
middlemen or even business partners. Having these three enticing 
advantageous conditions, the overseas Chinese in Vietnam have 
indeed become a magnet for those overseas Chinese entrepreneurs or 
capitalists. 
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3.2 Existing Obstacles or Problems In Doing Business in Vietnam 
In view of all these pull factors, it seems that Vietnam has a 
veiy sound investment environment for foreign investment. In fact 
this is not the case. Although Vietnam offers a variety of comparative 
advantages (including abundant and unexplpited natural resources, 
relatively cheap and highly literate work forcee, strategic geographical 
location, potentially large internal consumers' market, and availability 
of business-oriented overseas Chinese), it is still fraught with 
undesirable obstacles which are generated by stifling bureaucracy, 
vague regulations and laws, corruption and inadequacy of supporting 
facilities. 
The stifling bureaucracy is reflected in the cumbersome 
administrative procedures and bureaucratic requirements for the 
issuance of project licences, the lack of co-operation among different 
level of governments, and the constant and shameless harasement by 
some obstructionist local officials. 
The overlapping authority of the central and provincial 
governments complicates the approval process and causes long 
delays. Despite the government's policy of making the State 
Committee for Cooperation and Investment (SCCI) a 'one-stop' service 
for investors, most project sponsors find that they need to visit various 
levels of government or agencies personally to speed up the approval 
process.93 xhe obstructionist local bureaucra ts always try to vex the 
foreign investors with different allegations which include tax evasion, 
operating without a host of permits, and violation of laws. For 
example, local authorit ies raided a Vietnamese affiliate of Hong Kong -
based Peregrine Investments Holding Ltd, accusing the local uni t of 
tax evasion ( t h e company denies wrong d o i n g ) . ^ ^ 
Although the Vietnamese government have promulgated many 
investment and business laws, many of these laws are vague or 
contradictory. Under the foreign investment law, for instance, profits 
can be repatriated abroad, bu t the foreignrcurrency law say they 
cannot, with a few e x c e p t i o n s . ^ ^ ¡^ some provinces local regulations 
conflict with national laws and regulations. Authorities are often 
unwilling to commit themselves to a course as defined by law, 
preferring instead to make decisions on a case-by-case basis.^^ 
In order to get projects through the bureaucratic thicket, 
expensive 'sweeteners' are often required. Foreign firms that can 
afford it distribute their largesse widely in the form of scholarships for 
officials and their relatives, expenses-paid trips abroad, training 
courses, and charitable donations. 
Another obstacle lies in the lack of adequate supporting 
facilities, such as banking, insurance and consultancy services. The 
^̂  Nguyen, Tuan Dung, 'Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam', in Leung Suiwah, Vietnam Assessment 
: Creating a Sound Investment Climate, p.83 
Chua, Reginad, 'Vietnam : Economic growth remains robust, but the current account deficit is 
worrisom'. The Asian Wall Street Journal, 22 October, 1996, p.51 
^̂  Kohut, John, 'Doi Moi: Now For The Hard Part', Asia INC., vol.5,No.5, May 1996, p.30 
^̂  Bui Kim Chi, 'Providing legal services in Vietnam : A practitioner's viewpoint', in Leung Suiwah, 
Vietnam Assessment: Creating a Sound Investment Climate, p.l 10 
^̂  Schwarz, Adam, 'Opportunity's Cost', Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 October 1995, p.57 
banking system of Vietnam, for example, is underdeveloped, and 
although foreign and domestic investors are permitted to borrow on 
the domestic capital market, in reality they are forced to arrange all 
financing overseas.^® This delays the rate of projects coming into 
production and increases transaction costs. 
Considering all these obstacles or problems, Vietnam's 
investment environment is somewhat risky and unstable. Many 
foreign investors, including Western and Asian, have expressed a 
chorus of frustration and dissatisfaction over these stumbling blocks. 
Hence, for those foreign investors investing in Vietnam, coping or 
getting around these obstacles is undoubtedly a major consideration. 
As Lawrence Ding, chairman of Central Trading 8B Development of 
Taiwan, commented : "to start a business in Vietnam is not very easy 
because one has to deal with the country's cumbersome bureaucratic 
procedures and other difficulties. It is just like muddling through 
murky water, you need to know exactly where is the stepping stone. 
Nguyuen Tuan Dung, op cit p.85 
^ Vatikiotis, Michael, 'Taiwanese Takeover : Island's entrepreneurs are leading the way', Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 22 September 1994, p.80 
CHAPTER 4 
The Push Factors and the Influx of Overseas Chinese Investment 
into Vietnam 
4.1 The Push Factors 
It is too simplistic to argue that the influx of the overseas 
Chinese investments from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and 
Malaysia into Vietnam is purely prompted by the pull factors. While 
pull factors are important any account would be incomplete without 
looking at the push factors which have also driven the overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurs or capitalists from those four East Asian 
countries to invest in Vietnam. The push factors are the positive and 
negative political, economic, and social considerations arising from or 
existing in those overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' or capitalists' home 
countries. 
4.1.1 Positive Political Consideration 
There can be little doubt that the relations between Vietnam 
and those four East Asian nations (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Malaysia) have improved considerably over the past few years. 
Early confrontation has given way to détente, and detente has opened 
up opportunities for entente. However, Vietnam in the late 1970s and 
early-1980s had little basis for productive contact with the four non-
communist East Asian nations and its approach to these four non-
communist states was influenced by legacies of suspicion from the 
Second Indochina War. Although useful and well-intentioned steps 
were adopted by the four non-communist states, especially Singapore 
and Malaysia, to develop bilateral relationships with Vietnam in 1976 
and 1977, the onset of the severe regional impact of refugee flows from 
Vietnam (especially in 1978 and 1979) and the Cambodia conflict 
impeded their constructive efforts. ̂ ^̂  
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia frightened many non-
communist East Asian countries, including the ASEAN nations in 
which Singapore and Malaysia are members. The invasion revived 
those non-communist East Asian countries' latent suspicion of 
possible future Vietnamese expansionism. In this regard, the non-
communist East Asian nations, particularly the ASEAN members 
pursued a strategy to reject the legitimacy of Vietnam's presence of 
the regime in Phnom Penh and to exert pressure on Vietnam to review 
its position and withdraw its forces, i^i ASEAN also mobilized opinion 
in the United Nations and pushed U.N. resolutions condemning 
Hanoi's belligerent attitude. ̂ ^̂  in so doing, a confrontation resulted 
and the relations between ASEAN and Vietnam turned sour. 
In the changing international and regional environment from 
the late 1980s, the reduction in tensions between the former Soviet 
Union and China, the decline of Soviet power and the progress 
towards a Cambodian settlement, opened the way for detente between 
Vietnam and its East Asian neighbours. In this environment, Vietnam 
has to re-orient its earlier approach towards the East Asian nations 
and, hence, the process of normalization between Vietnam and the 
East Asian nations was underway. Some East Asian commercial 
'Shared Destiny : Southeast Asia in the 21st Century', Report of The ASEAN-Vietnam Study 
Group, February 1993, pp33-34 
Frost, Frank. Vietnam's Foreign Relations : Dynamics of Change, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore, 1993, p.60 
Duiker, William J., oßdt, 211 
relations and bilateral exchanges with Vietnam had increased 
progressively. For example, Singapore and Taiwan pursued extensive 
trade relations with Vietnam when the communist regime initiated the 
doi moi. But it was not until the signing of The Cambodian peace 
agreement by Vietnam in 1991, that the pace of ministerial visits and 
bilateral co-operation between Vietnam and the four East Asian 
nations (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia) were stepped 
up markedly. 
Apart from the changing international and regional political 
environment ( the end of cold war and a shift in the balance of forces 
among the major powers) and the reorientation of Vietnam's foreign 
policy, there are several other reasons why the relations between the 
four East Asian nations and Vietnam progressed from one of 
confrontation to cooperation. 
Vietnam has the spill-over effect on the four East Asian nations 
since they are neighbours of Vietnam. This implies that problems 
affecting Vietnam will inevitably spill over to the next. Consider the 
Vietnamese refugees problem, an outcome of the war in Vietnam, 
which places a burden on the neighbouring East Asian countries. ̂ ^̂  
While these East Asian nations may suffer if there are problems in 
Vietnam, they will also stand to benefit if the latter prosper. If 
Vietnam is able to enjoy a higher standard of living, it will provide not 
only a large market but also investment opportunities. 
Frost, Frank, op cit, p.60 
^^ Lim, Chee Ping, 'ASEAN-lndochina relations : Prospects and scope for enhanced economic co-
operation', in Kawagoue and Sekiguchi, East Asian Economics Transformation and Challenges, p.307 
Vietnam ranks second to Indonesia in terms of population in 
the Southeast-Asian region, and had once competed with East Asian 
nations, particularly ASEAN in establishing a regional order, los 
Vietnam has long been considered an important factor in the major 
powers' regional policies (This had been revealed in the Vietnam War). 
Furthermore, Vietnam is a country with a long history and a proud 
tradition of independence and self- assertiveness, if her goals of social 
and economic rehabilitation or reforms are largely met, she can 
emerge as a more complete regional power. In this regard, Vietnam 
did potentially hold an important political standing in regional and 
international affairs. Vietnam with its potential political weights, 
could pose some complex political challenges for the East Asian 
nations. 
The switch of centrally-planned economy to market-oriented 
economy has signified the Vietnamese government's commitment to 
carry out economic reforms ( wide-ranging policies, institutions and 
systematic adjustment) similar to those of the four East Asian nations 
to renovate its ailing economy. Undoubtedly, this paves the way for 
further economic co-operation between Vietnam and the East Asian 
nations. On their part, the four East Asian can assist Vietnam in 
facilitating its economic transformation and integration into regional 
and international economy by offering their investment capital, 
management know-how, skills and technologies, and skilled 
manpower. By doing so , the East Asian nations would not only 
105 ibid, pp.307-308 
intensify the pace of economic reforms in Vietnam but also develop a 
mechanism for conflict resolution and confidence-building between 
both sides, 
In view of all these reasons, the four East Asian cannot afford to 
neglect Vietnam, which is emerging as a potential arena for 
progressive collaboration and expansion and, hence, they have to 
engage the country contructively and pragmatically. 
Among these four East Asian nations, Malaysia has been 
particularly active in fostering ties with Vietnam. Premier Vo Van Kiet 
visited Malaysia in Januaiy 1992 and an investment guarantee 
agreement to protect Malaysian investments in Vietnam was signed by 
Kiet and his counterpart, M a h a t h i r . ¡^ April 1992, Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad led a large delegation to Vietnam (including four 
ministers, 20 officials and 107 businessmen).During this five-day 
visit Mahathir and his counterpart, Vo Van Kiet, signed agreements on 
economic, technical, scientific, cultural and telecommunications co-
operation. Seven months later, on 11 August, Vietnam's Minister of 
Commerce and Tourism, Le Van Triet and Malaysia's Minister of 
International Trade and Industry, Rafîdah Aziz signed a trade 
agreement to promote stronger trade and economic relations between 
the two countries. According to Rafidah, "the agreement provides 
for most-favoured nation treatment to be accorded by both countries 
Indochina Digest (electronic edition), 31 January 1992 [On line]. Available Internet : W3C/ ANU 
File : The World Wide Web Virtual Library-Vietnam 
Frost, Frank, op cit p.62 
Indochina Digest (Electronic edition) 28 August 1992 [On line}. Available Internet : W3C/ANU 
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in matters relating to customs and charges on our imports and 
exports," adding that the pact will encourage visits by businessmen, 
government representatives and trade delegations of both 
governments, enhance trade, and provide the framework for 
diversification of bilateral trade, lo® 
Singapore had maintained a ban on investment in Vietnam 
during the period of the Cambodia conflict but it was lifted in 
November 1991 after the signing of the Paris accords which put an 
official end to the thirteen-year-old conflict in Cambodia, no 
Singapore's commercial contacts with Vietnam have since proceeded 
rapidly, building on the already flourishing trade relationship. 
Singapore's increasing interest in Vietnam was signified by the visit in 
April 1992 of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew who attended a seminar 
organized by the World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) and met the Vietnamese leaders including Premier 
Kiet and General Secretary Do Muoi.m The relationship was 
bolstered further by Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng who made the 
first visit by a Singaporean foreign minister to Vietnam in O c t o b e r . ^ 
Wong announced that Singapore would support Vietnam's 
participation in ASEAN consultations, and help provide technical 
training for Vietnamese cadres in fields such as infrastructure, 
finance, banking, and economic management. Just after this visit, 
m 
Frost, Frank, op cit p.61 
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the two countries signed an investment guarantee and protection 
agreement which was seen as a further encouragement for 
Singaporean investment. In the following few years, the ministerial 
visits of Singapore to Vietnam were intensified. For example, in 
November 1993 Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew made a five-day trip to 
Vietnam and in March 1995 Lee, accompanied by a business 
delegation, paid another five-day visit to V i e t n a m . ^^^ 
Taiwan and Hong Kong have also improved bilateral relations 
with Vietnam. The contacts of these two nations with Vietnam 
remained at a low profile in the 1980s, but some high level official and 
ministerial visits were organized once the Cambodian peace agreement 
was imminent. In September 1991, Taiwan's Vice Economic Minister, 
Chiang Pin-Kung, led a 22-member Taiwanese trade delegation which 
represented the highest-level Taiwanese official traveling to Vietnam to 
meet the Vietnamese l e a d e r s , The meetings between Taiwan and 
Vietnam focus on Taiwanese aid to Vietnam's communications, 
agriculture and fisheries industries and setting up an industrial zone 
in Vietnam. In 1992 some Taiwanese officials were sent to Hanoi and 
Ho Chi Minh City to establish trade offices and sign an investment 
guarantee agreement, ii® Hong Kong also tried to strengthen bilateral 
co-operation with V i e t n a m . ^ ® i n mid-November 1992, twenty-one 
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corporate representives from Hong Kong paid a visit to Vietnam. 
Anson Chan, secretary for economic services, led the group to 
investigate Vietnam's trade and investment policies. During the visit 
the delegation met with Deputy Prime Minister Tran Due Luong, and 
representatives of the State Committee for Cooperation and 
Investment, the State Planning Committee and numerous 
ministries. "These contacts have given us a very good idea of the 
way in which the Vietnamese government is moving towards a free 
market economy,'' Mrs Chan commented.ii® 
With all this in view, it is clear that the shift of relationships 
between these four East Asian nations and Vietnam from 
confrontation to dialogue and to mutually beneficial cooperation in 
almost all fields has signalled the emerging positive and favourable 
political relations. The abandonment of confrontation and the four-
East-Asian-nations increased level of business and official interaction 
with Vietnam have paved the way for forging a regional entente, or a 
process of sustained, systematic promotion of understanding or 
consensus providing for collaborative endeavours and common 
courses of action on the part of regional states. In the light of this, the 
confidence of the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs or capitalists to 
invest in Vietnam have been greatly enhanced. The somewhat 
pushing but constructive approaches adopted by those four East 
''̂ Jbid 
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Asian nations towards Vietnam have really been the impetus for the 
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs to channel their investments there. 
4.1.2 Negative Political Consideration in Malaysia 
Despite the emerging positive political relationship between 
Malaysia and Vietnam as well as the ensuing Malaysian government's 
official encouragement to step up commercial interest in Vietnam, the 
flow of the overseas Chinese investment into Vietnam has also been 
driven or pushed by the existing unfavourable or inauspicious political 
circumstances in Malaysia. After the May 1969 post-election race 
riots, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was formulated to be 
implemented over a period of twenty years (1971-1990) in order to 
reduce and eventually eradicate poverty among all Malaysians 
irrespective of race and restructure Malaysian society so that 
identification of race with economic function and geographical location 
is reduced and eventually eliminated, ii® More specifically, the NEP 
set the target that within a period of twenty years Malays and other 
indigenous people will manage and own at least 30 per cent of the 
total commercial and industrial activities in all categories and scales 
of operation and in terms of employment the NEP provides that the 
employment pattern at all levels and in all sectors, particularly the 
modern rural and modern urban sectors, must reflect inter-ethnic 
parity. 120 
Lin, Tai Yoke, 'Inter-ethnic Restructuring in Malaysia, 1970-80 : The Employment Perspective', 
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Considering all the objectives or goals of the NEP, it does seem 
clear that the state adopted the NEP as a progressive and sound 
remedy to the major socio-economic imbalances inherited from 
colonialism and exacerbated by the pattern of national economic 
development in the 1960s. However, most of the strategies and 
programmes, such as the Industrial Co-ordination Act and the 
Petroleum Development Act, the quasi-public bodies, and government 
corporations that were charged with providing special assistance for 
Malays or Bumiputeras in obtaining ownership and capital shares in 
private sectors and the establishment of regulations and quotas which 
were devised discriminately to implement the NEP, have perniciously 
undermined overseas Chinese economic status and dynamism in 
Malaysia. As Dr.Lim Lin Lien put it : Insofar as we detect an 
unjustifiable loss or sense of deprivation, we' could say that not only 
has the Chinese economic position been eroded but that is contrary to 
the spirit and intent of the NEP'. 121 The Chinese business community 
was upset with the Petroleum Development Act, which put the 
country's petroleum industry under the control of the national oil 
agency, Petronas. The industrial Coordination Act ostensibly 
promulgated to implement the government's industrialization policies 
and to ensure Bumiputera's involvement in the orderly development 
and growth of i n d u s t r i e s . 122 After implementation of this act. 
Ling, Liong Sik and et al. The Future of Malaysian Chinese, Malaysian Chinese Association, Kuala 
Lumpur, 1988, p.38 
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Bumiputera participation in government-approved manufacturing 
projects grew between 1975 and 1985, with equity participation 
always above 40 percent, surpassing half on two occasions (See Table 
9). But, the non-Bumiputera's equity participation was always below 
40 percent. 
Table 9 : Malaysia's Equity Participation of Ethnic Groups in Approved 
Manufacturing Project^, 1975-87 (percentages) 
Year Bumiputera Non-Bumiputera Foreign 
1975 41^8"" 30.7 27.5 
1976 40.3 34.8 24.9 
1977 42.2 27.7 30.1 
1978 33.3 9.7 37.0 
1979 46.1 14.4 39.5 
1980 40.4 26.7 32.9 
1981 44.5 6.5 29.0 
1982 56.3 16.2 27.5 
1983 47.4 26.9 25.7 
1984 42.5 34.8 22.7 
: 1985 54.4 27.8 17.8 
: 1986 37.6 34.5 28.0 
1 1987 29.4 21.5 49.1 
Source : Gomez, Edmund Gomez and Jomo K.S., Malaysia's Political Economy : 
and Profits, Cambridge University Press.U.K., 1997, p.43. 
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With such discriminatory implementation of the NEP, the overseas 
Chinese business community in Malaysia were unrelentlessly 
marginalized. After implementation of the Petroleum Development Act 
and the Industrial Coordination Act, the Chinese entrepreneurs or 
capitalists had been largely excluded from the country's most recent 
growth sectors, the petroleum extraction and manufacturing 
i n d u s t r i e s . 1 2 3 7he foreign investors, however, were given preferential 
treatment over local (mainly overseas Chinese) investors. The 
Malaysian government has altered its policies to allow foreign 
Jesudason, James V., Ethnicity and the Economy : The State. Chinese Business, and Multinationals 
in Malaysia, Oxford Uniyersity Press, Oxford, 1989, pp. 130-131 
investors full or majority ownership and control over their Malaysian 
incorporated companies. The government has also announced that 
the equity conditions relating to foreign investments made from 
October 1986 to the end of 1990 will not be changed in the sense that 
foreign investors will not ever be required to sell their shareholdings to 
M a l a y s i a n s . 124 AS citizens of the country the non-Bumiputera, 
particularly the Chinese are not allowed to have 100 percent equity 
ownership and they are required to apportion at least 30% equity 
ownership to Bumiputera. Furthermore, most overseas Chinese firms 
have had to allocate equity at par or below market prices to the 
Malays under the NEP.125 with all this in view, the so-called NEP was 
indeed a restrictive and prejudiced framework which allowed little 
room for the Chinese capital investments to thrive or expand. Of 
course, it is not true to say that the Chinese has not benefited in any 
way from the NEP. A handful of Chinese entrepreneurs and 
capitalists, who have fostered close ties with prominent Malay political 
patrons, have gained from the NEP. But, these Chinese represent 
only a small portion of the Chinese business community. The vast 
majority of Chinese have not benefited from the NEP. 
When the NEP drew to an end in December 1990, the overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurs or capitalists were longing for the 
abandonment of the affirmative-action-oriented policy defined solely 
by ethnicity, and its replacement by a plural policy which targets 
Ling, Liong Sik and et al, op cit. p.49 
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small groups with ethnic identifiers. Unfortunately, such hopes of the 
Chinese were dashed by Mahathir-sponsored National Development 
Policy (NDP) which still reiterates all the NEP's commitments. 126 
Although the NDP which encompasses the Sixth Malaysia Plan (6MP) 
for 1991-1995 and a ten-year Second Outline Perspective Plan (OPP2) 
for 1991-2000 highlight 'balanced development in order to establish a 
more united and, jus t society', its substance was largely familiar 
rather than novel. For instance, the 30 per cent equity restructuring 
target is still upheld and no specific time frame is set for its 
achievement. 127 The NDP claims that past efforts aimed at creating a 
Bumiputera (Malay) commercial and industrial community have met 
with the least success.^28 Besides, the government's discriminatory 
investment policies, such as the 1975 Industrial Coordination Act and 
the 1980s heavy industrialization policy are still in effect to 
discriminate in favour of foreign investors and against non-Malay 
(mainly overseas Chinese) investors. 
Taking all this into consideration, it can plausibly be argued 
that the National Development Policy (NDP) is nothing more than old 
ideas in a new package. The tendency for vested interests to mobilize 
around self-benefiting preference policies will very likely be continued 
into the indefinite future. The same group of politicians are likely to 
have preponderant power in defining future policy which is deemed 
Jomo, K.S., U-TURN? : Malaysian Econmic Development Policies After 1990, James Cook 
University of North Queensland, Australia, 1994, p.52 
ibid, p.58 
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non-preferable to the non-Malay, particularly the Chinese. In 
perceiving the unfavourable prospect offered by the NDP, hence, the 
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs or capitalists in Malaysia choose to 
invest in other foreign countries, such as in Vietnam which have more 
lenient investment policies, or at least, the policy is not defined along 
ethnic line. Seen from this perspective, it can be argued that the 
inflow of the Malaysian overseas Chinese investments into Vietnam is 
pushed by the politically-induced limited opportunities and domestic 
constraints in the involvement of Malaysia's economy. 
4.1.3 Negative Political Considerations in Hong Kong 
The British Crown colony of Hong Kong will be returned to the 
sovereignty of the People's Republic of China on 1 July, 1997. The 
return will mark the first time that a society which has functioned 
under western, albeit colonial, institutions will be handed over to a 
massive, developing, socialist country run by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). The adjustments that will be required to absorb 
successfully a free-wheeling capitalist economy into the political fabric 
of a socialist-oriented market economy will tax the diplomatic and 
political skills of both Chinese and British negotiators. The general 
guiding formula which has been accepted since the signing of the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration on the future of Hong Kong in Beijing in 
December 1984 is "One country two systems" whereby China will 
guarantee the continuation of the existing system in Hong Kong for at 
least fifty years after the date of the t a k e o v e r . 129 However, the 
specifics of just how this will be implemented were and, despite the 
passing of the Basic Law or mini-constitution for Hong Kong, are still 
vague. This is because the implementation of the Joint Declaration 
which involved increasing the democratic basis of the Legislative 
Council amid close consultations with the Chinese side, the 
negotiating of agreements in the Joint Liaison Group (JLG) on issues 
relating to the territoiy's future International economic arrangements 
- notable among which were several air services arrangements and 
Hong Kong's accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; 
the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the forum for 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation - and more domestic matters such 
as the localization of a wide range of laws has been enormously 
influenced by the differences between Britain and China. ̂ ^̂  
Therefore, there has always been skepticism in some quarters that the 
absorption can be successfully concluded and was reinforced by the 
Tiananmen incident of 4 June 1989. 
Even when the Chinese side in 1990 finally sketched out their 
scheme for the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(HKSAR) in the form of the Basic Law, considerable uncertainties 
remained both about the process of transition and about the 
vagueness in law of some of the terms used in the Basic Law and 
about its own institutional arrangements with the future HKSAR. For 
Segal, Gerald, The Fate of Hong Kong, Simon & Schuster Ltd, Great Bratain, 1993, p.46 
Yahuda, Michael, Hong Kong : China's Challenge, Routledge, London, 1996, p.66 
example, article 23 of the Basic Law that deals with subversion, 
specifically requires the HKSAR to enact laws 
to prohibit foreign organizations or bodies from 
conducting political activities in the Region, and to 
prohibit political organizations or bodies of the 
Region from establishing ties with foreign political 
organizations or bodies, i^i 
It is unclear what implications this may have for Taiwanese 
organizations operation in Hong Kong, or whether Hong Kong 
representatives would be subject to limits on foreign travel (including 
Taiwan), or meeting f o r e i g n e r s . Needless to say, no legal definitions 
are provided for the key terms. In the view of many within Hong 
Kong, the vagueness of the Basic Law will provide a Chinese-dictated 
legal basis for the central government to exercise considerable control 
over the internal affairs of the HKSAR in addition to those of defence 
and foreign affairs. 
Besides, the Chinese government has also showed its hardline 
stance on legal and constitutional issues. The Chinese authority has 
always publicly and repeatedly pledged to replace all three tiers of 
representative bodies elected under the proposals of Governor Chris 
Patten. These include the District Boards, the Regional and Urban 
Councils and the all-important Legislative C o u n c i l , Among the 
three, the Chinese government focuses its attention upon the 
Legislative Council which is Hong Kong's highest body. On March 24, 
ibid, p. 118 
ibid 
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1996, the Beijing-appointed Preparatory Committee passed a 
resolution to create a provisional legislature to replace the colony's 
elected Legislative Council. ̂ ^̂  The provisional Legislative Council, 
which will exclude members of the outspoken and popular Democratic 
Party, will be empowered to enact laws, but its principal purpose will 
be to devise a new system of elections in favour of the Chinese 
government so that a new and pro-Chinese Council could be elected, 
preferably within a year. The director of China's Hong Kong and 
Macau Affairs Office, Lu Ping, indicated that all judges will have to be 
reappointed after 1997.135 Another ominous sign is Beijing's express 
intention to scrap the Bill of Rights, a 23-article law that enables an 
individual to sue the government for violation of her civil rights. Then 
there is the uncertainty over the Court of Final Appeal, due to be set 
up as the ultimate arbiter of law in the Hong Kong Special 
Administration Region from 1 9 9 7 . A l l of this has clearly exhibited 
the Chinese government's intention to establish a cowed and 
compliant legislature which would soon undermine the independence 
of the judiciary in Hong Kong. 
With all this in view, the sources of potential problems for Hong 
Kong are fundamental and are not subject for the most part to control 
by Hong Kong government actions. The Chinese approaches to people 
in Hong Kong seem to many to show evidence of a desire to establish 
controls on democracy rather than to allow for a proper kind of 
ibid 
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autonomy. Hence, the dynamics of the transition period of Hong Kong 
are fraught with danger and uncertainty which have eventually 
induced massive migration from Hong Kong and exacerbation of 
corruption. 
According to official figures, in 1980 some 22,000 people 
migrated from Hong Kong to Australia, Canada, United States, and 
Englad, with numbers fluctuating by some 5,000 in the subsequent 
six years.137 But in 1987 the total was up to 30,000 per year and 
rising. In 1988, it increased to 45,000; then there was a decline to 
42,000 in 1989; it then climbed to reach level of over 60,000 from 
1990.13® Unfortunately for Hong Kong, a substantial proportion of 
those emigrants is educated, highly skilled and well-trained. The 
emigrant profiles compiled from information on visa applicants show 
that, from 1987 to 1991, between 15 and 19 percent of all emigrants 
had attained degree level or higher in their education. In 1990, fully 
66 percent of emigrants of working age and 34 percent of total 
emigrants could be considered "managers and administrators, 
professionals and associate professionar workers. ̂ ^̂  The comparable 
figures for 1991 were 72 percent of working emigrants and 35 percent 
of total emigrants. In this regard. Hong Kong can be said to be 
experiencing a brain drain rather than simply the drain of bodies. The 
Skeldon, Ronald, 'Hong Kong in an International Migration System,' in Skeldon, Reluctant Exiles? 
: Migration from Hong Kong and the New Overseas Chinese, p.30 
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brain drain is very likely to weaken the manpower and, thereby, Hong 
Kong's business vitality could be eroded. 
With the impending Chinese takeover of Hong Kong, a large 
number of businesses in Hong Kong are already affected by the 
corruption of the Chinese mainland political and economic systems. 
As the interface between Hong Kong and the mainland grows greater 
during the coming years. Hong Kong businessmen will find it 
increasingly difficult to resist pressures for corrupt dealings. Many 
examples of these malpractices could be cited. The Independent 
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) estimated in 1991 that the 
cash and gifts paid to mainland firms to facilitate business 
transactions in China added between three and five percent to 
business operating costs. ̂ ^̂  More worrying is the expectation that the 
post-1997 government will be swayed into granting lucrative 
construction contracts to Chinese firms for other than strictly 
commercial r e a s o n s . ^ ^ ^ ¡̂  ig ^Iso feared that the courts may be 
inhibited from deciding against politically well-connected Chinese in 
civil and criminal cases and against their enterprises in the event of 
contract dispute. 
Taking all this into account, the notion of 'one country, two 
systems' advocated by the Chinese government seems far less like a 
pragmatic policy and much more like a recipe for future uncertainty 
and conflict. Facing the serious changes in legal and constitutional 
Yahuda, Michael, op cit p. 129 
ibid 
systems, human rights issues, business functions, and human 
resources in Hong Kong, the local overseas Chinese business 
community's confidence on the accountability, and transparency of the 
Chinese government has really been sapped. A long-running 
confidence survey conducted by Asian Business Magazine in Hong 
Kong has revealed that economic confidence of business community 
has remained at a relatively low ebb since 1989. Table 10 shows that 
Hong Kong's score of Confidence Index has dropped from 73 index 
point in 1989 to 59 index point in 1995. Compared to the other four 
East Asian nations, Hong Kong has the lowest confidence index. 
Table 10 : The Confidence Index of The fíve East Asian Nations 
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Hong Kong 73 60 57 66 62 66 59 
Taiwan 71 56 66 67 72 71 70 
Singapore 78 70 69 66 74 79 67 
Malaysia 90 83 81 75' 77 80 82 
Vietnam - - - - 84 80 87 
- refers to Not Available 
* The maximum score of the Confidence Index is 100 and this Confidence Index measures the 
following six criteria used in the survey : Local market, export market, turnover, profits, 
company prospects and economy. 
Source : Compiled from Asian Business, vol.31, No. 11, November 1995, p.38 
Hence, the Hong Kong's entrepreneurs or capitalists are forced to seek 
outward investment in such a way that they can avoid any deleterious 
consequences brought about by the uncertainties. This was evident 
that the outflow of local portfolio capital rose tenfold, from HK$2.4 
billion to HK$24 billion in 1989-90.143 Furthermore, the case of Hong 
Kong's smaller firms seeking to diversify elsewhere in the booming 
East Asian economy pointed out by Gerald Segal has shown that the 
143 Segal, Gerald, op cit, p.56 
outflow investment from Hong Kong is already underway. In the light 
of this, it is not surprising that Vietnam has become the Hong Kong's 
Chinese entrepreneurs' destination. 
4.1.4 Negative Political Considerations in Taiwan 
In recent years the relationship between Taiwan and China has 
undergone a sea of change. From 1947 to 1978 Taiwan was 
constantly threatened by direct military invasion from China. The 
shelling of Kinmen and Matsu, the two small offshore islands in the 
Taiwan Straits, in 1958 was a stark e x a m p l e . B u t beginning in 
1979, when Deng Xiaoping led the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
leadership to embark on its "four modernizations'' program, mainland 
China's need to maintain a peaceful image eased its hard-line policy 
towards Taiwan. The new goal set by the CCP was not to coerce but to 
cajole Taiwan back into the fold with 'peaceful' and conciliatoiy 
approaches, such as the 'nine-point' policy promulgated by the late 
Marshal Ye Jianying in 1981 and the "one country, two systems" 
formula advanced by Deng in 1984. î s According to these 
approaches, Taiwan had been promised a large degree of autonomy, 
to keep its militaiy, its foreign policy, and its capitalist political and 
social systems. But Taiwan resisted by adopting its "three nos" stance 
Jacobs, J. Bruce and Hong, Lijan, 'China's Relationship with Taiwan', in Harris and Klintworth, 
China As A Great Power : Myths, Realities and Challenges In The Asia-Pacific Region, pp.215-216 
Long, Simon. Taiwan : China's Last Frontier, Macmillan Press, London, 1991, pp. 161-162 
toward mainland China : no contact, no compromise, no 
negotiations. ̂ ^ 
This deadlock was broken in November 1987 when President 
Chiang Ching-kuo decided to allow people in Taiwan to visit family 
members on the m a i n l a n d . Subsequently, long-standing bans on 
indirect trade and investment, academic, sports and cultural 
exchanges, tourist visits and direct mail and telephone links were 
lifted in rapid succession. This opened the floodgates to people-to-
people exchanges between the two sides of the straits, unprecedented 
at any period of Chinese history. According to the official sources in 
Taipei, from November 1987 to December 1993, Taiwan residents 
made more than 5.9 million trips to mainland China, and 78 million 
letters and 99 million phone calls had been exchanged across the 
Taiwan S t r a i t . i ^ s Indirect trade in this period exceeded US$33.6 
billion; and at least 15,000 Taiwan enterprises were operating in 
Mainland China at the end of 1993, investing an estimated US$15.7 
billion. Most scholars consider that these official statistics released 
by Taiwan under-estimate the true picture, for instance, the 
Taiwanese investment on the mainland can run as high as US$30 
b i l l i o n . 150 Besides, Taiwan's government established three major 
Jia, Qingguo, 'Changing Relations Across The Taiwan Strait', Asian Survey, vol.32, No.3, March 
1992, p.279 
Hsia, Maria Chang, Taiwan's Main Policy and the Reunification of China, The Claremont Institute, 
1991, p.5 
Cheng, Joseph Y.S., 'China, Taiwan and Hong Kong in the mid-1990ws'. Current Affairs Bulletin. 
vol.72, No.6, April/May 1996, p. 17 
'^^jbid 
Munro, Ross H., 'Giving Taipei A Place at The Table', Foreign Affairs, vol.73, No.6, 
November/December 1994, p.l 15 
institutions - the National Unification Council, the Straits Exchanges 
Foundation, and the Mainland Affairs Council - to handle relations 
with mainland China. In 1991, it formulated the National Unification 
Program, which states its agreement to establish direct 
correspondence, air and shipping services, and trade and to promote 
the exchange of visits by high-ranking officials; and on May 1, 1991, 
Taiwan terminated the 42-year-old declaration of the 'period of 
suppression of the communist rebellion".isi 
In view of all this, it does seem clear that there are signs of 
flexibility and even benevolence towards Taiwan by mainland China 
and vice versa. However, beneath the veneer of reciprocity lurks a 
tension which can plunge Taiwan into undesirable crisis. Although 
the People's Republic of China (PRC) claims that it seeks a peaceful 
settlement of the Taiwan reunification issue, it has never ruled out the 
use of force. According to Deng Xiaoping, the PRC would employ force 
to settle the Taiwan issue under the following conditions: 
If Taipei leaned toward Moscow instead of 
Washington; if Taipei decided to develop nuclear 
weapons; if Taipei claimed to be an independent 
state; if Taipei lost internal control as a result of 
the succession process; or if Taipei continued to 
reject reunification talks for a long period of 
time. 152 
The recent political and diplomatic development of Taiwan 
appear to have reactivated the use of the military option by Beijing to 
Jia. Oingguo. op cit p.279 
Hicjey, Dennis Van Vranken, 'America's Two-Point Policy And The Future of Taiwan', Asian 
Survey, vol.28, No.8, August 1988, p.884 
resolve the Taiwan reunification issue. Beijing has watched the 
accelerated political democratization on the island with some grave 
misgiving because the democratization put the island on a collision 
course with China. To begin with, Beijing viewed the rapid rise of the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) with strong disapproval and much 
concern about the development of Taiwan independence s e n t i m e n t , isa 
Ever since its emergence, the DPP has been advocating self-
determination, a euphemism for Taiwan independence from Beijing's 
point o f v i e w . 1 5 4 Furthermore, the democratization has also led to a 
rapid 'nativization' of Taiwanese politics and leadership. 
Consequently, unlike previous Kuomintang (KMT) party leaders, the 
new generation of leaders are much less committed to Taiwan's 
reunification with China. Instead, they see their interests in 
perpetuating Taiwan's de facto separation from China if not its 
outright independence. 
China is even more concerned with the Lee Teng-hui 
administrations' efforts to enhance Taiwan's diplomatic profile. 
President Lee's visits to Nicaragua and Costa Rica in May 1994 were 
the first official trips abroad by a Taiwanese president in seventeen 
y e a r s . Earlier in Februauy of the same year, Lee visited Indonesia 
and the Philippines for a holiday, bu t he met President Suharto and 
President Fidel Ramos and reached a number of agreements on 
153 Jia, Qingguo, op cit, p.279 
ibid 
155 Cheng, Joseph Y.S., op cit p. 17 
economic c o - o p e r a t i o n , ise During the 49th session of the United 
Nations General Assembly in October 1994, Taipei managed to 
mobilize twenty-four countries to indicate their support for its bid to 
participate in the United Nations. The most unexpected and 
disturbing event to the Chinese Government was President Lee's trip 
to the United States in June 1995.157 
In the light of all these political and diplomatic maneuvers 
carried out by the Taiwanese government, the Chinese government 
has been convinced that Taipei is attempting to perpetuate the 
island's political separation from China. Beijing has concluded, 
therefore, that its previous resort to peaceful overtures to Taipei is not 
sufficient to bring about reunification, and that a policy of coercion is 
needed. This perceptible shift has resulted in a series of military 
exercises which include joint landing exercises by the army, navy and 
air force and missile tests near the coast of Taiwan. These recent 
military pressure tactics are beginning to show that China's greater 
inclination to use coercive means if necessary to achieve the goal of 
reunification. In this regard, the Taiwan issue may be highly explosive 
in the foreseeable future and, hence, Taiwanese investors' confidence 
in the business environment in Taiwan or mainland China will be 
considerably jolted. This fear was already evident in China's missile 
tests near Taiwan in mid-1995 and early 1996 causing immediate 
ib id p. 18 
Jia, Qingguo, 'Reflection on the Recent Tension In The Taiwan Strait', The China Journal, Issue 36, 
July 1996, p.93 
concern among a few Taiwanese investors who have begun to spread 
risks by increasing investment in Southeast Asian nations. For 
instance, the Pao Cheng Shoe Co., which earlier set up 17 production 
lines for making athletic shoes in China, subsequently established 11 
similar production lines in Indonesia, and in 1994, committed US$30 
million to build a new factory with eight production lines on 20 acres 
outside Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam, is^ 
Besides, China's potentially unstable domestic policy and tough 
position on Taiwan's reunification problem have also strained the 
nerves of the Taiwanese government on the already growing and 
enormous and growing investment in the mainland. This is because 
the leaders in Taipei realized that most of Taiwan's overseas 
investment capital would be sunk into mainland enterprises within a 
few years. This means that the Chinese government would enjoy 
overwhelming leverage over Taiwan's business community and thus 
considerable influence over the Taiwanese government. In order to 
reduce the potential impact of capricious shift in mainland policy and 
at the same time strengthen long-standing trade and quasi-official 
relations with Southeast Asian nations (especially the ASEAN 
members), the Taiwanese government officially initiated the 
"Southward policy" or "Go South policy" in 1994 to encourage 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs to pour more into the investment in the 
Southeast Asian region, i®® 
Chen, Xiangming, op cit p.457 
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With all this in view, it is clear that the unsettled and prolonged 
political tension caused by the reunification problem facing China and 
Taiwan has indeed produced a latent insecure and uncertain 
environment which is inimical to the growth of business and 
investment in the long term. Hence, the Taiwanese entrepreneurs or 
capitalists are propelled to invest abroad, particularly in the ASEAN 
states which have less political risk. 
4.1.5 Negative Economic and Social Considerations in the Four East 
Asian Countries (Taiwan, Hong Kong. Singapore and Malaysia) 
Apart from the negative political consideration, the emerging or 
existing negative economic and social considerations which includes 
the rising land and labour costs, shortage of labour, stricter 
environmental-protective laws, scarcity of natural resources and 
agricultural products, and small local markets has also been the 
substantial force driving the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs of three 
of the four East Asian Countries out of their home countries to invest 
in other countries which are unrestricted or less restricted by the 
above mentioned negative economic considerations. 
The rapid industrialization and urbanization experienced by the 
four East Asian nations since 1970s and 1980s have intensified the 
use of land. As a result, the problem of inadequacy of land in those 
four East Asian countries, especially Taiwan, Hong Kong and 
Singapore has grown alarmingly. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, 
although not Malaysia, have very limited land area (See Table 11 ). 
Hong Kong and Singapore are simply city states. Furthermore, the 
share of activities of development in total land area of respective 
countries from 1975 to 1992 had increased quite substantially (See 
Table 11 ). Besides, the figures on population density (person/sq km) 
of respective nations from 1975 to 1992 had also intensified (See 
Table 12). Hence, it is clear that these East Asian countries have long 
felt the pressure on their land resources. Although Malaysia has a 
larger land area than the other three nations, it has begun to feel the 
growing pressure on its land since the industrialization and 
urbanization programmes have been concentrated on Peninsular 
Malaysia (West Malaysia). 
Table 11: The Four East Asian Nations' Land Area and Land Use 
Country Total Land Area 
(lOOOsq.km) 
Share of Development Activities* in Total Land Area 
(%) 
1975 1992 
Taiwan 36 12.6 22.6 
Hong Kong 1 69.3 69.7 
Singapore 0.6 82.0 93.4 
Malaysia 329.8 17.3 26.1 
•Development Activities refer to urbanization, construction of road, railway, and residential areas 
Source : Compiled from Kev Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, Asian 
Development Bank, vol.25, 1994. 
Table 12 : Population Density (Persons/sq Km) of the four East Asian 
nations. 
Country 1975 1985 1992 
Taiwan 445 532 574 
Hong Kong 4231 5246 5588 
Singapore 3645 4000 4548 
Malaysia 37 48 56 
Asian Development Bank, vol.25, 1994. 
In the light of this, the prices and premium on land or properties have 
eventually been driven up. As an example of the change in land 
values of Hong Kong, the rent on one 30193-square-metre industrial 
site rose from HK$442 (US$56.67) in 1956 to HK$900,000 
(US$115,384) in 1990.i6i This reveals that the monthly rental of one-
square-metre land has risen from approximately U.S.$0.0018 in 1950 
to approximately U.S.$4 in 1990. The capital value of prime office 
space also skyrocketed. For instance, the prices of prime office space 
rose by 9 percent in the first quarter of 1992; by 16 percent in the 
second quarter of same year.i®^ Singapore also experienced rapid 
increases in land and property prices. For example, the monthly 
rental of one-square-metre land has soared from approximately 
U.S.$2 in 1960s to approximately U.S.$4.25 in 1980s.i63 The 
monthly rental of prime office space (per-square-metre) rose from 
approximately U.S$31 in 1980 to approximately U.S.$79 in 1997.1^4 
In a word, the growing demand for land in these East Asian 
nations h a s led to spiraling growth of land or property prices. Hence, 
any commercial, industrial and residential projects established in 
these states are very expensive. Inevitably, some overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs ' businesses which require large land areas may find 
their competitive edge being eroded by rising land costs. To remain 
competitive, these business operations are forced to be relocated in 
other foreign countries which have cheap land, such as Vietnam — 
'Hong Kong Property : Heading Upwards', The Economist 18 July 1992, p.84 
iMd 
Lee, Tsao Yuan, 'Sub-regional Economic Zones in the Asia-Pacific : An Overview', in Toh and 
Low, Regional Cooperation and Grov t̂h Triangles in ASEAN, p.38 
164 ibid., p.37 
the cost of renting space in the country is U.S.$2.50 per square 
metre. 
Rising labour costs in these four East Asian nations have also 
become another negative economic consideration bothering the 
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs. Taiwan's, Hong Kong's, and 
Singapore's labour costs have been climbing at a considerable rate 
since the early 1980s while Malaysia's labour costs have just started 
to increase from late-1980s or the early-1990s. For example, between 
1987 and 1992, average wages of Taiwanese in manufacturing grew 
by 9-15 percent annually and currently the labour costs of Taiwan's 
manufacturing sector are the highest in Asia, after J a p a n . i ^ ® jn the 
case of Hong Kong between 1983 and 1991, the annual average salary 
for manufacturing employees and professionals increased 10 percent 
and 65 percent respectively. A nation-wide survey conducted by 
the Federation of Malaysian Manufacturers suggested that wages in 
Malaysia rose by 7.3 per cent in 1994.1^8 chart 5 shows the labour 
cost of some selected Asia-Pacific nations and Vietnam has the lowest 
labour cost among those Asia-Pacific countries. 
'Cash Call: Haiphong's grand dreams hinge on foreign investment', Far Eastern Economic Review. 
13 February 1997, pp.50-52 
Country Economic Brief: Taiwan, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, July 1995, 
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Wilkinson, Barry. Labour and Industry in the Asia-Pacific : Lesson from the Newly-Industrialized 
Countries, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1994. 
Country Economic Brief : Malaysia, Department of Foreign Affairs And Trade, Canberra, July 
1995, p.35 
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Having high growth of wages, all these four East Asian nations have 
undoubtedly become expensive places for doing business, especially 
setting up the labour-intensive industries. This is because the rising 
labour wages can increase the cost of production and, thereby, 
products cannot be sold at a lower price in a competitive market. In 
such an environment, it is no surprise that the overseas Chinese 
investors head out for low-wage-labour countries, such as Vietnam. 
Limited supplies of labour in these four East Asian nations have 
also been a concern for the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs. Since 
the late-1980s, the labour markets for these four East Asian nations 
have become tighter because of persistent labour shortages. In point 
of fact, the four East Asian nations have small labour forces and also 
slow or negative rates of growth in the labour force (See Table 13). 
Table 13 : The Four East Asian Nations' Labour Force 
Country Total (millions) 1993 Average Annual Growth (%) 1993-2000 
Taiwan 7.9 n/a 
Hong Kong 3 -0.4 
Singapore 1 0.5 
Malaysia 8 2.5 
1995, pp210 &211 and Gale Country & World Rankings Reporter, gale Research Inc, Detroit, 
1995,p. 166. 
In order to alleviate the problem of labour shortages, these four East 
Asian nations turn to recruit large amounts of foreign labour. In 
Taiwan, for example, between 12,000 and 30,000 illegal foreign 
workers were estimated in 1989.^^^ Between 1990 and May 1994, 
over 73,200 foreign workers were estimated in T a i w a n . i ^ o ¡n 1985, 
150,000 foreign workers, around 12 per cent of the total labour force, 
were employed in S i n g a p o r e . i ^ i Nearly 2 million guest workers were 
employed to work in Malaysia in 1 9 9 5 . v i e w e d in the light of the 
mass employment of illegal or legal foreign labours, the problem of 
labour shortages facing these four East Asian countries is critical. 
Furthermore, the average annual growth rate of labour supply in each 
countiy has an inclination to decrease in the near future (See Table 
14). 
Table 14 : The Four East Asian Nations Labour Force's Growth Rate 
Country Average Annual Growth Rate (%) 1965-
1995 
Average Annual Growth Rate (%) 1995-
2025 
Taiwan 2.75 1.45 
Hong Kong 2.55 -0.17 
Singapore 1.82 n/a 
Malaysia 3.49 2.01 
Source : Compiled from Workers in An Integrating World 1995, Oxford University Press, U.S.A, 1995, 
p. 144 and Gale Country & World Rankings Reporter, Gale Research Inc., Detroit, 1995, p. 166 
Wilkison, Barry, op cit, p.54 
The Republic of China Year Book 1995, Government Information Office, Republic of China, 1995, 
p.391 
Wilkinson, Barry, op cit, p.54 
Asia-Pacific Profile Profiles 1995, Asia Pacific Economics Group, ANU, Canberra, 1995, p. 192 
The shortages of labour experienced by these four East Asian 
countries have indeed posed a serious problem for labour-intensive 
manufacturing activities in the four countries. Hence, in order to 
overcome the constraint of labour shortages on their business survival 
or expansion, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs have to go abroad 
to invest in those countries, for example, to Vietnam which has a rich 
pool of labour force. 
These four East Asian nations have reaped the benefits of their 
impressive economic growth and modernization which was brought 
about by industrialization and urbanization, with rapid increases in 
gross national product (GNP), per capita income, international 
economic standing, and other indices. At the same time, however, 
these four East Asian nations have also laid the foundation for serious 
environmental problems, which have begun to surface in ever-
increasing numbers and severity. In 1987, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) reported that of Taiwan's twenty-one major 
rivers, 13 per cent of the river waters were polluted with domestic 
sewage, industrial effluents and solid w a s t e s . in Malaysia, heavy 
metals such as lead, zinc, copper and cadmium have recently been 
detected in Klang River, which has been classified by the Department 
of Environment as one of the most polluted rivers in the c o u n t r y . 
The water pollution is just one of the common and serious 
Williams, Jack F., 'Environmentalism in Taiwan', in Simon and Kau, Taiwan : Beyond the 
Economic Miracle, pp. 189-190 
Seda, Maria, Environmental Management in ASEAN : Perpespective on Critical Regional Issues. 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1993, p.87 
environmental problems besetting these four East Asian countries. 
The other environmental problems, such as air pollution, noise 
pollution, soil degradation, and marine pollution have also exerted 
pressures on their environment. 
With the emergence of all these environmental problems, there 
is no doubt that some undesirable and detrimental effects on the 
quality of life and the well-being of society have been generated. 
Hence, the governments of these four East Asian countries were 
certainly under pressure to tackle these environmental problems, and 
particularly in this recent year, these countries have decidedly 
stepped up their efforts. In Singapore, for example, new 
environmental laws are often enacted and old laws, especially those 
concerning pollution control, were continuously amended from the 
1960s onwards. Table 15 gives details of the newly enacted and 
amended environmental laws of Singapore. In Malaysia, the 
Environment Quality Act (EQA) which was passed by Parliament in 
1974 forms the basis of much of the legislation, Currently, there 
are at least 15 laws under EQA which are being enforced by the 
Department of Environment (See Table 16). In addition, several other 
pieces of legislation have also been enacted to buttress the EQA and 
deal with the environmental issues more specifically (See Table 17). 
By stepping up the use of legislation to curb environmental problems, 
Taiwan is no exception. For the past ten years, the Taiwanese 
Sani Sham, 'Urban Environmental Issues in Southeast Asia Cities : An Overview', in Brookfield 
and Ryron. South-East Asian's Environmental Future : The Search for Sustainabilitv. p.353 
government has introduced, enforced and strengthened numerous 
environmental laws, such as the Air Pollution Control and the Water 
Pollution Control. 
Table 15 : Singapore's Environmental Laws 
AMENDED LAWS Environmental Public Health Act 1974 (amended 1987) 
Clean Air Act 1971 (amended 1975 and 1980) 
Public Utilities (Central Water Catchment Area and Catchment Area Parks) 
Reflations 1989 (amended 1992) 
Public Utilities ( Water Supply) Regulations 1977 (amended 1992) 
Agricultural Pests Act(amended 1986) 
Parks and Trees Rules (last amended 1986) 
Planning Act 1959 (last amended 1989) 
NEW ENACTED LAWS Building Control Act 1989 
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea Act . 
National Parks Act 1990 
National Parks Regulations 1990 
Composition of Offences Regulation 1991 
Detergents and Equipment Regulations 1991 
Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk Regulations 1991 
Reporting of Pollution Incidents Regulations 1991 
Radiation Protection Act of 1991 
Control of Noise from Construction Site Regulations 1991 
Source : Compiled from Bankaff, Greg, and Elston, Kylie, Environmental Regulation in Malaysia and 
Singapore, University of Western Australia Press, Western Australia, 1994, pp.57, 62, 63, 
66,67, 73,77,and 80. 
Table 16 : Legislation Enforced by the DOE, Malaysia as at 1 January 1990 
Motor Vehicle (Control of Smoke and Gas Emissions)Rule 1977 made under the Road Traffic 
Ordinance 1958 
EQA 1974 and the Environmental Quality (Amendment) Act 1985 
Environmental Quality (Licensing) Regulations 1977 
Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Crude Palm Oil) Order 1977 
Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Crude Palm Oil) Regulations 1977 
Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Raw Natural Rubber) Order 1978 
Environmental Quality (Clean Air) Regulations 1978 
Environmental Quality (Compounding of Offences) Regulation^ 1978 
Environmental Quality (Sewage and Industrial Effluents) Regulations 1979 
Environmental Quality (Control of Lead Concentration in Motor Gasoline) Regulations 1985 
Environmental Quality (Motor Vehicle Noise) Regulations 1987 
Environmental Quality (Prescribed Activities) (EIA) Order 1987 
Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Scheduled Wastes) Regulations 1989 
Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Scheduled Wastes Treatment and Disposal Facilities) 
Order 1989 
Environmental Quality (Prescribed Premises) (Scheduled Wastes Treatment and Disposal Facilities) 
Regulations 1989 " 
Source : Compiled from Brookfield, Harold,and Byron, Yvonne (ed).. Southeast Asia's Environmental 
Future : The Search for Sustainabilitv, United Nations University Press & Oxford University 
Press, Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur, 1993, p.353 
Table 17 ; Environment-related Legislation, Malaysia 
Protection of Wildlife Act 1972 
Streets, Drainage and Building Act 1974 
Pesticides Act 1975 
Antiquities Act 1976 
The National Parks Act 1980 
National Forestry Act 1984 
Exclusive Economic Zone Act of 1984 
Atomic Energy Licensing Act of 1984 
Petroleum (Safety Measures) Act of 1984 
Environmental Quality (Control of Lead Concentration in Motor Gasoline) Regulations of 1985 
Fisheries Act of 1985 
Environmental Quality (Control of Emissions from Diesel Engines) Regulations of 1986 
Enyironm^̂ ^̂  Assessment Order of 1987 
Source : Compiled from Brookfield, Harold, and Byron, Yvonne, Byron (ed). Southeast Asia's 
Environmental Future : The Search for Sustainabilitv. United Nations University Press & 
Oxford University Press, Tokyo & Kuala Lumpur, 1993, p.354 and Bankoff, Greg & Elston, 
Kylie, Environmental Regulation in Malaysia and Singapore. University of Western 
Australia Press, Western Australia, 1994. 
Besides, the public environmental consciousness in these four East 
Asian nations has also been growing. For example, in Taiwan, the 
environmental consciousness in the last decade prompted an ever 
increasing number of mass demonstrations against firms polluting the 
environment and demands for payouts in compensation. 
In view of all these circumstances, the room for the operation of 
polluting industries in these four East Asian nations appears to be 
restricted, hence, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs who own those 
polluting industries, such as paper making, leather processing, 
petrochemical making and electroplating are forced to move or 
relocate their industries to somewhere else, like Vietnam, which pays 
less attention to environmentalism and has lax enforcement of 
environmental laws. 
The Vietnamese government's indifferent attitude towards 
environmental protection is evidenced by the fact that it has 
Cheng, Humg Yu, 'Taiwan's Economic Relations with Southeast Asia', in Klintworth, Taiwan in 
the Asia-PAcific in the 1990s, p. 127 
established an ineffective and vague national environmental Protection 
law (EPL) which is an umbrella law establishing broad responsibility 
and directions for environmental policy, administered by the Ministry 
of Science, Technology and Environment. The EPL has provisions for 
levying fines against polluters will be determined nor who will enforce 
them, and it prohibits the "importation of technology and equipment 
not meeting environment standards, but provides no means to 
monitor equipment imports. 
With this half-hearted EPL in view, it is clear that the lack of 
political will and the commitment to active industrial policy as well as 
foreign investment promotion have impeded the application and hard 
enforcement of the environmental laws. 
The highly market-oriented and resource-intensive 
industrialization embarked by these four East Asian countries since 
1960s and 1970s has enormously increased the pressure on the 
renewable and non-renewable resources. Pursuing this treacherous 
pattern of industrialization, these four East Asian nations are 
exhausting and consuming their renewable and non-renewable 
resources, such as agricultural production, fisheries, and minerals at 
a remarkably rapid rate. Table 15 provides some information on the 
agricultural and mineral production in individual countries — Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. The agricultural and mineral 
production of each country has been declining since 1980. For 
Sikor, Thomas O. & Rourke Dara O', 'Economic And Environmental Dynamics of Reform in 
Vietnam', Asian Survey, vol.xxxvi, No.6, June 1996, p.607 
example, Malaysia's production of natural rubber which was one of 
the country's main export commodities is in decline. Tin and bauxite 
are no exception. Hong Kong and Singapore have already run out of 
agricultural and mineral production. Agricultural and mineral 
production in Taiwan are also in fast decline 
Besides, the agricultural sector's and mining sector's share in 
GDP of each nation has displayed a pronounced decline (See Table 
19). For example, Malaysia's agricultural sector had declined from 40 
percent in 1960 to 1990; the mining sector had declined form 14 
pecent in 1970 to 7 percent in 1990. But, the manufacturing and 
services sector grew strongly from the 1970s and has overtaken 
agriculture and mining in its share of GDP. Within two decades, from 
1970 to 1990, the manufacturing's share of Malaysia's GDP soared 
from only 14 percent to 28 percent; the services share of GDP tripled 
from 15 percent to almost 45 percent. 
In the case of Taiwan, the country's production base has been 
the growing share of industry and services at the expense of agriclture 
and mining. (See Table 19). The agriculture's and mining's 
contribution to GDP of both nations was eclipsed by the 
manufacturing and services sectors which have become the dominant 
share of GDP of the two countries. 
Nations 
MALAYSIA 
Year Production of Natural Rubber ('000 Tonnes) Production of Tin And Bauxite (Tonnes) 
Tin Bauxite 
1980 1,530.0 61,404 920,356 
i 1989 1,415.3 32,034 355,174 
1990 1,291.5 28,468 398,180 
1991 1,257.2 20,710 376,418 
1992 1,173.2 14,339 330,593 
1993 1,074.3 10,384 68,824 
SINGAPORE 
Year Agricultural Production ('000 Metric Tons) Mineral Production ('000 m.t) 
Coconut Sugarcane 
1980 11 2 0 
1989 2 0 0 
1990 1 0 0 
; 1991 1 0 0 
1992 1 0 0 
1993 0 0 0 
HONG KONG 
Year Agricultural Production ('000 metric Tons) Mineral Production ('000 m.t) 
Ve|![etable Rice or Paddv • Feldspar Kaolin 
1980 195 0 3 1 
: 1989 131 0 5 0 
1990 112 0 4 0 
1991 105 0 0 0 
1992 95 0 0 0 
1993 91 ^ 0 0 0 
TAIWAN 
Year Agricultural Production ('000 Metric Mineral Production ('000 Metric Tons) 
Tons) 
Rice (brown> Banana Soy Beans Natural Gas Crude Petroleum Coal 
1980 2354 214 26 1708 . 211 2574 
1989 1865 198 11 1158 135 784 
1990 1807 201 8 1129 260 472 
1991 1819 196 8 765 157 402 
1992 1628 196 9 630 103 335 
1993 n/a n/a n/a 587 n/a 327 
n/a refers to not available 
Source : Compiled from Kev Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 1994, Asian 
Development Bank, vol.xxv, 1994 and Statistics on Commodities, Ministry of Primary 
Industries, Malaysia, July, 1994. 
Table 19: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by Sector of The Four East Asian Naions, 
1960-1990 (Percentage) MALAYSIA 
1960 1970 1980 1990 
Agriculture 40 37 23 19 
Mining 6 14 10 7 
Manufacturing 9 14 20 27 
Services 5 15 30 43 
T A I W A N(Table 19 Continued) 
Agriculture 26 9 6.7 3.5 
Mining 3 1.7 0.7 0.3 
Manufacturing 22 43 43 28 
Servies n/a 46.9 47.5 59.1 
H O N G K O N G 
Agriculture 4 2 0.9 0.3 
Mining 0.4 0.2 0 0 
Manufacturing n/a 30.9 23.9 25 
Services n/a 14.9 22.9 32 
SINGAPORE 
Agriculture 3.5 2.5 1.4 0.2 
Mining 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.1 
Manufacturing 15 19.7 28.8 26.0 
Services 10 14.2 17.2 30.5 
n/a refers to Not Available 
Source : Compiled from Kok Swe Kheng, Malaysia to 2003 From Redistribution to Growth. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 1994, pp.42 & 43; Country Report : Singapore. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 1982 to 1992; Country Report : Hong Kong. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 1986 to 1992; Country Report : Taiwan. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 1980 to 1990. 
In the light of these decreasing trends in agricultural and 
mineral production and share of GDP, it is clear that these four East 
Asian nations are facing serious scarcity of renewable and non-
renewable resources which are so vital for economic development. 
Under such circumstances, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs 
of these four East Asian nations have to seek other places, such as 
Vietnam which is endowed with abundant un^exploited renewable and 
non-renewable resources. Table 20 shows the overseas Chinese 
companies of the four East Asian nations investing in the agricultural, 
fishery and aquaculture, and mining sectors in Vietnam. 
Table 20 : The Investment of The Overseas Chinese Companies in Agriculture, 
Fishing and Aquaculture, and Mining in Vietnam 
Companies of The overseas Project Title Project Operation 
Chinese 
Malaysia Rubber Development Corp. N/A Planting and processing 
rubber 
IJM Corporation Berhad (Malaysia) N/A Planting and processing cocoa 
and rubber. 
Mycom Berhad (Malaysia) N/A Planting and processing 
agricvdtural crops. 
Amanda Aquaculture Pte.Ltd A.C.S. Shrim Co.(J.V) Ltd Breeding and trading shrimp 
Table 20 (Continued) 
Nagarjuna Holdings Vietnam Pte. Vietnam Nagarjuna Intern Co. Plantuig Sugarcane and sugar 
Ltd. (Singapore) Ltd. processing 
South Wing Sea Product Pte. Ltd Sing Viet J .V Ckjmpany Fishing and producing fish 
(Singapore) powder for livestock 
High Horizon Invest Pte. Ltd 
(Singapore) 
Nguyen San Ltdd CO. Fishing and processing seafood 
EIFO Co. Ltd. Trang Bom Marble Exploration Marble Mining 
Co. 
Top-Mill Enterprise Corp. (Taiwan) N/A Raising livestock & poultry 
and pigs and processing meat. 
Oceanic Enterprise (Taiwan) N/A Catching and processing 
seafood for export 
Formosa Co. Ltd and Jello Hung Co. 
(Taiwan) 
Formasa Aqua Co. Ltd. Raising and processing fish 
and ducks 
Galore Industrial Taiwan Puree Farming Industry 
(Vietnam) Ltd. 
To farm and process shrimps 
and lobsters 
Taiwan Sugar Corp., King Car Food 
Industrial Co.Ltd., Imei Food Co. Ltd. 
and Fu-Mei Co.Ltd(Taiwan) 
Vietnam-Taiwan Sugar 
Company Ltd. 
Planting Sugarane and 
poducing sugar and honey 
United Agriculture Co.Ltd. (Taiwan) Lam-Tai Co.Ltd. Planing vegetable, fruit seeds 
Halim International (Hong Kong) N/A Marble Mining 
Golde Resources Development 
International Ltd. (Hong Kong) 
N/A Gowing and processing high 
quality rice for the Hong Kong 
market 
Chia Hsin Vietnam Co. Ltd. (Hong 
Kong) 
N/A Raising livestock and 
processing fi-ozen meat 
Tanjun International Ltd. ( Hong Asia Pacific Agriculture To grow and process 
Kong) Development Co. veggetables for export 
Source : ¿Compiled from Appendixes Tables A, B, C, and D 
So far, not all the overseas Chinese companies of the four East Asian 
nations have invested in the mining sector. But, those overseas 
Chinese companies have indicated their interest in investing in the 
mining sector in Vietnam. For instance, the Johan Holdings of 
Malaysia ( controlled by Tan Kay Hock and his family), Senky Mining 
Co. Sdn.Bhd. of Malaysia ( owned by Tan Seng Kee), and Sungei Way 
Quarry Industries Sdn.Bhd. of Malaysia have sent a team to Vietnam 
to carriy out survey on tin-mining, bauxite-mining, iron-ore mining, 
and marble-mining. 
Besides, the Straits Steamship Co. of Singapore and the Straits 
Trading Co. Ltd. of Singapore have also undertaken a study on the 
prospects of the mining sector in V i e t n a m . xhe overseas Chinese 
companies of Taiwan and Hong Kong have already established their 
respective companies to explore the mining sector in Vietnam. For 
example, the Trang Bom Marble Exploration Co., established by EIFO 
Co. Ltd. of Taiwan, is operating to extract marble.(See Table 20) 
These investments in Vietnam from the four East Asian nations 
are involved in exporting agricultural and aquatic products to their 
home countries. Hong Kong's investing companies in Vietnam, for 
example, export thousands of tonnes of rice, meat and vegetables to 
the Hong Kong market annuallly. Taiwan's investing companies also 
export substantial amount of seafood and agricultural products to 
Taiwan market. According to the managing director of Galore 
Industrial Co. of Taiwan, the joint-venture project Puree Farming 
Industry of Vietnam produce 1200 tonnes of prawn yearly and 60 to 
70 percent of the prawn are exported to Taiwan. 
The domestic markets of these four East Asian countries are too 
small for the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs to reap more profits. 
This is because the current population of each of these four East 
Asian states is comparatively low (See Table 21). 
^̂ ^ Nanvang Siang Pau, 4 February 1998, pp. 1-2 
Richardson, Graham, Singapore to 2003, The Economist Intelligence Unit, United Kingdom, 1994, 
p.32 
Table 21 : Population of the Five East Asian Nations 
Country Total (thousands) in 
1995 
Average Annual Growth 
(%) 
Projected Total (thousands) 
in 2000 
Taiwan 21,100 0.9 22,448 
Hong Kong 6,108 0.73 6,336 
Singapore 2,874 0.84 2,997 
Malaysia 20,037 1.85 21,983 
Vietnam 74,475 2.03 82,427 
Source : Compiled from World Population Prospects 1990. No. 120, Population Studies, United Nations 
Publication, New York, 1991 and Gale Country & World Rankings Reporter, Gale Research 
Inc., Detroit, 1995 
Furthermore, the population growth of each of the four East Asian 
nations is slow and, the projected population in 2000 of each of the 
four East Asian nations does not increase greatly, compared to 
Vietnam (See Table 21). In this regard, these four East Asian nations' 
markets are very unlikely to become vast and largely latent consumer 
markets. Vietnam's growing population is also expected to have an 
increasing GDP per capita at Purchasing-Power Parity (PPP) [See Table 
22]. 
Table 22 : Vietnam's Expected Purchasing Power Parity from 2000 to 
2025 
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
The GDP Per capita 
at PPP* (U.S.$) 
1424 1790 2154 2320 2409 2716 
*PPP refers to Purchasing Power Parity index which attempts to measure the real purchasing power of 
nominal incomes across Vietnam. 
Source : Tran, Cao Nguyen, Vietnam's Long -Term Economic Development : Viewpoint and 
Solutions', Vietnam Economic Review, vol.32, No.2, 1996, p. 12. 
Hence, the country's potential buying power of population should not 
be underestimated. In order to maximize their opportunity for 
squeezing more profits, these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs have to 
go for other populous countries, such as, Vietnam. 
Arguably, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs of these four East 
Asian nations can export their production instead of making offshore 
investment to expand their market and capture more consumers. 
But, some countries, especially the developing countries like Vietnam 
have imposed high tariffs on imported goods, such as foodstuffs, 
garments, textiles, electronic and electrical equipment, and wood 
products. High tariffs, undoubtedly, add to the cost of products, and 
thereby the products become unaffordable for the average consumers 
in that country. In this regard, it is more .economical to invest in 
Vietnam, which already has a favourable environment for foreign 
investment, to capture the large consumer market than export to 
Vietnam. 
CHAPTERS 
The Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs' Ways of Investing in 
Vietnam, Distribution of Investment in terms of Spatial Location 
and Sector in Vietnam 
5.1 The Overseas Chinese Entrepreneurs' Ways of Investing in 
Vietnam 
The inflow of these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' investment 
into Vietnam from the four East Asian countries is by various 
government-owned or private-owned companies which range from 
small and medium-sized firms to large conglomerates. However, most 
of the government-owned or private-owned large conglomerates which 
are mostly based in the overseas Chinese home countries channel 
their investment into Vietnam via their, subsidiary or parent 
companies. For example, the Temasek Holdings Pte. Ltd. which is a 
government-linked corporation, uses some of its subsidiary 
companies, such as Straits Steamship Land Ltd., Keppel Corp Ltd., 
and Sembawang Engineering Pte Ltd., to invest in Vietnam; the Hwa 
Hong Corp Ltd. also made its investment in Vietnam through 
subsidiary companies, such as Singapore Piling 85 Civil Engineering 
Pte Ltd. and Econ Vietnam Investment Pte Ltd. (See Appendix Table A 
for more details). In the case of Malaysia, the United Engineering 
(Malaysia) Berhad uses its subsidiary companies like Vista Spectrum 
(M) Sdn., and Northern Eight (M) Sdn. Bhd. to invest; some others 
such as MBF Holdings Bhd., Pengkelen Holdings Berhad, and Pilecon 
Engineering Berhad invested via their main or parent companies 
instead (See Appendix Table B for more details). For Taiwan's and 
Hong Kong's companies refer to Appendix Table C and Appendix Table 
D. However, the ownership and identity of some companies from 
these four East Asian nations investing in Vietnam are difficult to 
trace or recognize because of the complexities of cross share holding 
and unrecorded company details. 
On the other hand, the small and medium-sized companies of 
these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs cany out their investment 
through setting up another company or firm in Vietnam. A few 
examples are Glove Industry (Vietnam) Ltd. set up by Mr. Ng Hai Ping 
of Malaysia, Hoa Trang Company Ltd. set up by Mr.Hsieh Sheng Ming 
of Taiwan, the Lee Clan Trading Co. of Hong Kong, and Shu Sang Co. 
of Hong Kong ( See Appendix Tables A, B, C, and D for more 
examples). Most of these small and medium-sized companies are 
involved only in modest projects or investment, such as processing 
food, making gloves, trading and others. 
Most of the parent or subsidiary companies and the companies 
established by small and medium-sized companies from the four East 
Asian countries form joint ventures with foreign partners (the Western 
or other Asian companies) or local partners ( state-owned and 
Vietnamese-Chinese-owned companies) to invest in Vietnam. Table 
23 provides some information on the joint ventures formed between 
the overseas Chinese-owned companies and the local companies of 
Vietnam or foreign companies of Western and Asian countries, as well 
as the type of projects involved. 
Table 23 : Joint Venture Investment in Vietnam Between Overseas Chinese and 
Vietnam or Foreign Partners 
Conipanies of the Overseas Vietnamese Partners or Joint Venture Name 
Chinese 
Malayan Flour Mills 
Foreign Partners 
VINA Food I Co. (Vietnam) VIMA FLOUR LTD 
Project 
Grinding Flour 





Noi Bai Development 
Co. 
Established to construct 
new Noi Bai Export 
Processine Zone 
| G & T Equities Sdn Bhd 
i (Malaysia) 
MITSUI & Co. (Thailand) Vietnam TNT Fibre Co. 
Ltd. 
Producing fibre of all 
kinds 
^ Pengkalen Holdings Berhad 
i (Malaysia) 
Industrial Construction Co. 
(Vietnam) 
Grand Imperial Saigon 
Hotel Ltd. Co. 
Build and Operate a 5 
star hotel 
: AMANDA Aquaculture 
1 Pte. Ltd. (Singapore) 
Cuu Long Aquaculture 
Company (Vietnam) 
A.C.S Shrimp Co (J.V) 
Ltd. 
Breeding and Trading 
Shrimp 
i Goodman Fielder Overseas 
I Holding Pte. Ltd. 
: (Singapore) 
The Australian Wheat Board 
(Australia) 
+VISSAN(Vietnam) 
Vietnam Flour Mills Ltd. Grinding Flour 
1 South Wing Sea Product 
: Pte.Ltd. (Singapore) 
Minh Hai Mechanical 
Enterprise (Vietnam) 
Sing Viet Joint Venture 
Company 
Producing fish powder 
for livestock 





Vietnam Fertilizer Joint 
Venture W.,Ltd 
Production of NPK 
fertilizers 
j 
Johnson System Co., Ltd. 
(Taiwan) 
Mand M Apparel (Private) 
Limited (Sri Lanka) 
M.J. IMPEX Co., Ltd. Garment Making 
; Lieu Ya International Co 
Ltd. (Taiwan) 
Commerce & Construction 
Co. (Vietnam) 
Dong Tam Ceramic 
Brick Producing JV Co. 
Production of Ceramic 
Bricks 
Great Dragon International Hanoi's Housing Service Co. Thang Long Building To rent apartments for 
Co.(Hong Kong) (Vietnam) Ltd. office and residential use, 
offer business services 
transport and tour 
services 
Source : Compiled from Appendix Tables A, B, C, and D 
In addition, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs also choose the form 
of 'enterprise with 100 per cent foreign capital' to invest in Vietnam. 
Table 24 shows some of the four East Asian nations' overseas Chinese 
companies engagement in this form of investment. 
i 08 
Table 24 : Investment of Enterprises with 100 % Foreign Capital by the Overseas 
Chinese 
Eva Footwear Co. Ltd. (Hong 
Kong) 
DONA Victor Footwear Co. Ltd. Making Sport Shoes 
BODOK Trading Co. Ltd. 
(Taiwan) 
SHI JAR (Vietnam) Company 
Limited 
Manufacturing enamel bricks 
BOTRON Enterprise Co. Ltd. 
(Taiwan) 
DONA BORTON Textile Co. 
Ltd. 
Making first material layer used 
for the main body of sport shoes 
Chu Hsing Garment Co. Ltd. 
(Taiwan) 
Chu Hsing Garment Vietnam Co. 
Ltd. 
Manufacturing garments and 
bleaching garment products 
WINAWA International co. Ltd. 
(Taiwan) 
SOCTRANG WINAWA 
International Co. Ltd. 
Producing female hygenic pads 
Tanjun Int'l Investment Ltd (Hong 
Kong) 
Asia Pacific Agriculture 
Development Co. 
Grow and process vegetables for 
export 
Sadec Consortium & Emas 
Utilities (Malaysia) 
Binh An Water Supply build water treatment plant 
Nagarjuna Holdings Vietnam Pte. 
Ltd. (Singapore) 
Vietnam Nagarjuna Intern Co-
Ltd. 
Grow sugarcane & sugar 
processing 
Source : Compiled from Appendix Tables A, B, C, and D 
Among these four East Asian nations, it appears that the overseas 
Chinese companies from Taiwan are dominant in this form of 
'enterprise with 100 per cent foreign capital (See Table 25). 
Table 25 : Overseas Chinese Investment of Enterprises with 100% Foreign 
Capital by Percentage in Vietnam, 1991 to 1995. 
Country Number of Projects'̂  Percentage (%) 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 10 22.2 
Singapore 7 15.6 
Malaysia 4 8.9 
Total 45 100 
*Some of the numbers of projects may be underestimated due to the difficulty in obtaining 
adequate data. 
Source : Compile from Appendixes Tables A, B, C, and D 
There are two other methods of investment engaged by these 
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs from the four East Asian nations. 
They are the establishment of a contractual business cooperation with 
a Vietnamese entity and the Build-Operate-Transfer Contract (BOT). 
But, these two methods are not as common as the former two 
methods. 
5.2 Spatial Location of Overseas Chinese Investment in Vietnam 
Overseas Chinese investment originating from the four East 
Asian countries (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia) are not 
evenly spread throughout Vietnam. Table 26, which gives a location-
by-location breakdown of the four East Asian nations' overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurs' number of projects invested from 1991 to 
1995, shows that the overseas Chinese investment is concentrated in 
the Southern part of Vietnam. The favourite and largest concentration 
is in the Ho Chi Minh City. There are also other significant 
concentrations, such as Da Nang, Dong Nai,.Song Be, and Long An. 
In the northern part of Vietnam, Hanoi and Hai Phong are the 
favourite and significant recipients of these Overseas Chinese 
investment, but the volume of investment is still less than the south. 
By juxtaposing the geographical concentrations of these 
overseas Chinese investments from the four East Asian nations with 
the geographical distribution of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, a 
direct correlation can be observed (See Table 26 and Table 27). 
Table 26 : Locational Distribution of the Overseas Chinese Investment in Vietnam (1991-1995^ 
MALAYSIA «iNriAPODF 
l.Ho Chi Minh City (S) 8 l.Ho Chi Minh City (S) 2S 
2. Hanoi (N) 5 2.Hanoi (N) 7 
3.Song Be (S) 3 3.Vung Tau (S) 5 
4.Dong Nai (S) 2 4.Thu Due (S) 2 
5.Da Nang (S) 2 5.Hau Giang (S) 2 
6.Hau Giang (S) 2 6.Da Nang (C) 
7.Hai Phong (N) 2 T.Hai Phong (N) 
S.Lam Dong (C) S.Long An (S) 
9.Hai Hung (N) 9.Tra Vinh (S) 
lO.Halong Bay (N) lO.Minh Hai (S) 
11 .Quang Ninh (N) 1 l.Gia Lai (C) 
12. Hue (C) 12.Khanh Hoa (C) 
TAIWAN HONG KONG 
l.Ho Chi Minh City (S) 14 l.Ho Chi Minh City (S) 17 
2.Dong Nai (S) 12 2.Hanoi (N) 13 
3.Da Nang (S) 4 3.Da Nang (C) 3 
4.Song Be (S) 4 4.Hai Phong (N) 2 
S.Hanoi (N) 3 5.Hau Giag (S) 2 
6.Hai Phong (N) 3 6.Dong Nai" (S) 
7. Khanh Hoa (C) 3 T.Song Be (S) 
S.Hau Giang (S) 3 S.Long An (S) 
9.Thu Due (S) 2 9.Lam Dong (C) 
1 O.Long An (S) 2 lO.Ha Tay (N) 
11. Vung Tau (S) 2 11 .Quang Ninh (N) 
12.Thai Binh (N) 1 12.Kien Giang (S) 
13.Kien Giang (S) 1 n .BenTre (S) 
14.Lam Dong (S) 1 14.Gia Lai (C) 
(S) refers to the southern part of Vietnam 
(N)refers to the northern part of Vietnam 
(C)refers to the central part of Vietnam 
* Some of the numbers of project may be underestimated due to the difficulty in obtaining adequate 
data 
Source : Compiled from Appendix Table A, B, C, and D. 
Most of the geographical locations in the South targeted by these 
overseas Chinese for investment have quite substantial number of 
ethnic Chinese. Locations like Ho Chi Minh City, Hau Giang, Dong 
Nai, Minh Hai, and Song Be can be considered as a having large 
ethnic Chinese population numbering between 10,000 and 524,000, 
and also constitute 70.7 per cent of the total Chinese population (See 
Table 27). 
Table 27 






% of total 
population 
% of Chinese 
population 
Ho Chi Minh City 524 13.3 54.4 
Hau Giang 102 3.8 10.6 
Dong Nai 85 4.2 8.8 
Minh Hai 40 2.5 4.2 
Song Be 32 3.4 3.3 
Ha Bac 25 1.2 2.6 
Cuu Long 21 1.2 2.3 
Kien Giang 21 1.7 2.3 
An Giang 19 1.0 1.9 
Lam Dong 10 1.6 1.0 
Thuan Hai 10 0.8 1.0 
Ha Tuyen 9 0.8 0.9 
Tien Giang 8 0.6 0.8 
Dong Thap 7 0.4 0.7 
Khanh Hoa 6 0.9 0.6 
Phu Yen 0.4 - -
Ben Tre 6 - 0.6 
Tay Ninh 6 - 0.6 
Da Nang 5 - 0.5 
Hanoi 4 0.1 0.4 
Long An 3 - -
Haiphong 3 0.2 -
Dac Lac 3 - -
Lang Son 2 - -
Quang Ninh 2 0.2 -
Vung Tau-Con Dao 2 -
Bac Thai 1 - -
Lai Chau 1 - -
Binh Dinh 1 - -
Quang Ngai 1 - -
Hoang Lien Son 1 - -
Hai Hung 1 - -
Gao Bang 1 - -
Gia Lai Kontum 1 0.1 -
Ha Nam Ninh 0.6 - -
Vinh Phu 0.3 - -
Son La 0.1 - -
Ha Son Binh 0.2 - -
Nghe Tinh 0.1 . -
Thanh Hoa 0.1 - -
Thai Binh 0.1 - -
Quang Tri - - -
Quang Binh - - -
Thua Thien Hue 0.3 - -
Total 962 100 
- Not Available 
Source : Compiled from Tran, Khanh, The ethnic Chinese And economic Development in 
Vietnam, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1993, pp.26-27. 
On the other hand, places like Hanoi, Haiphong, Hai Hung, Halong 
Bay, Quang Ninh, Ha Tay, and Quang Ninh which are located in the 
north have small ethnic Chinese populations, ranging from 300 to 
5000 (See Table 27). In view of this distribution, it is clear that the 
Southern locations of Vietnam have more ethnic Chinese than the 
northern locations. In the light of this, it can be concluded that the 
locational concentration of these Overseas Chinese investments in the 
south is clearly associated with the high density of the ethnic Chinese 
population clustering in the southern part of Vietnam. The 
phenomenon can be best explained by a few factors which are the 
Vietnam's overseas Chinese cultural affiliation, entrepreneurship and 
business skills, direct family links, historically established de 
facto business and trade ties with other nations' overseas Chinese. 
These factors act as important inducements for these overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in Vietnam because they can provide 
an excellent basis for borderless commercial networking ( As 
mentioned earlier in Chapter 3.1.7). Of course, the ethnic Chinese 
factor is not only reason for the overseas Chinese to focus their 
investment on the south. There are other reasons which include the 
southern region's more developed human and physical resources. 
5.3 Sectoral Distribution of the Overseas Chinese Investment in 
Vietnam's Economy 
The outward investment of these overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs from the four East Asian nations into other East Asian 
Gates, Carolyn L. and Truong, David H.D., Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Change in 
Vietnam : Trends. Causes, and Effects, NIAS Report, No.20, 1994, p. 16 
countries, particularly the Southeast Asian countries has been 
traditionally and typically confined to property, trading, shipping, 
hotels, and light industry (such as textiles, toys, and food). For 
example, the Taiwanese and Hong Kong investment in Malaysia and 
Indonesia is mostly concentrated in textiles, garments, timber 
processing, electrical, computers and restaurants. The Singaporean 
investment in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand also very much 
revolves around manufacturing, property and hotels. Nevertheless, 
the investment of these four East Asian countries' overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs has been channeled into various sectors of Vietnam's 
economy. A break down of these overseas Chinese capital investment 
in various economic sectors in Vietnam from 1991 to 1995 in Table 28 
and Chart 6 shows an interesting phenomenon. 
Taiwan Hong Kong Singapore Malaysia Total 
Light Industry 31 13 19 11 74 
Construction 4 11 17 1 33 
Hotel 4& Tourism 5 9 4 7 25 
Heavy Industry 6 6 1 2 18 
Agriculture & Forestry 9 2 • 6 3 15 
Infrastructure 1 1 2 5 9 
Services 2 4 3 1 9 
Fisheries & Aquaculture 4 5 1 0 7 
Finance & Banking 1 1 1 1 4 
Mining 1 1 0 0 2 
Source : Compiled from Appendix Table A, B, C, and D 
Chart 6 : Overseas Chinese Investment in Vietnam, 1991 to 1995 
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Source : Compiled from Table 26 
The list was headed by light industry, construction, hotel and tourism, 
heavy industry, agriculture and forestry, infrastructure, services, 
fisheries and aquaculture, as well as finance and banking. Although 
these overseas Chinese investments remain in the traditional and 
typical economic sectors such as light industry, construction, hotel 
and tourism, finance and banking, small investment is also flowing 
into other sectors. These other sectors are the heavy industry, 
agriculture and forestry, infrastructure services, fisheries and 
aquaculture which are not normally engaged actively and significantly 
by these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs, but have now emerged 
markedly (See Table 28). 
The venture into other alien economic sectors did bring both a 
quantitative and qualitative change to the nature of this overseas 
Chinese capital in Vietnam. The heavy industry engaged in by these 
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs of the foiir East Asian nations 
encompasses steel production, cement and vehicles. Taiwanese 
investment in the heavy industry sector from 1991 to 1995 was 
targeted on producing cement and motorbike spare parts, and 
assembly of motorcycles (See Appendix Table C ). The leading 
Taiwanese companies involved in these heavy industries are Ching 
Fong Group, Lucky Cement Corp., and Universal Cement Corp. These 
three companies had invested U.S.$858.3 million in setting up cement 
plants (see Appendix Table C). The investment projects in the heavy 
industry sector conducted by the Singaporean companies comprise 
building Mercedes cars, small buses, light trucks, and manufacturing 
steel. The companies involved are Sembawang Group (subsidiary 
company of Temasek Holdings), the Economic Development Board of 
Singapore, Sinbus Engineering, Netsteel Ltd Co., and Boon Teck 
Marine Steel Works (See Appendix Table A ). The Malaysian Overseas-
Chinese-owned companies like the Nam Fatt Bhd. and Federal Iron 
Works of Malaysia have also engaged in the heavy industry sector, 
such as steel and iron production (See Appendix Table B). In the case 
of Hong Kong, there is only one company, Steel Co. Std, involving in 
the heavy industry sector in Vietnam (See Appendix Table D). 
The diversification of these overseas Chinese investment into 
heavy industry sector in Vietnam may be attributed to three 
underlying reasons which are:-
(I) Vietnam's unexploited and rich mineral reserves (such as iron ore, 
coal, and petroleum) provide the significant domestic source of raw 
materials for the development of heavy industry. 
(ii) Vietnam has a good domestic market potential for the products 
of the heavy industry, such as steel. Acccording to the estimation of 
the Ministry of Heavy Industry, Vietnam's steel demand will reach 1.5 
million tonnes by the year 2000. 
(iii) Establishment of a long-term economic commitment to 
operating in Vietnam since heavy industry can act as the main 
industrial sector stimulating ancillary activities, especially in 
developing backward linkages, a lower relocation risk compared to 
other industries. 
Furthermore, these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs of the four 
East Asian nations have also found a niche in the infrastructure and 
services sectors. During the five- years period (1991-1995), some 
infrastructure has been established and upgraded by these overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurs. Table 28 shows that among the four East 
Asian nations, Malaysia appears to be the major investor in the 
infrastructure sector. The infrastructure-related projects embarked 
by the Malaysian Chinese-owned companies are a power plant built by 
the MBF Holdings Bhd.; two water treatment plants built by IJM Corp. 
Bhd., Sadec Consortium and Emas Utilities; Noi Bai Export 
Processing Zone built by Vista Spectrum (M) Sdn. Bhd., and Da Nang 
Export Processing Zone built by Malaysia's South-South Corporation 
(See Appendix Table B). Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan have also 
carried out a few infrastructure projects, such as developing and 
upgrading seaports, building power plant, and Export Processing 
Zone. In the services sector, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs of 
these four East Asian nations have attempted to provide some 
shipping, trading, marketing, management, and accounting services. 
With all this in view, overseas Chinese entrepreneurs have 
displayed a very different investment pattern from that of the 
Japanese, the Americans, and the Europeans in developing countries, 
such as Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. The investment 
made by the United States, Japan and the European countries in the 
developing countries is concentrated more on manufacturing industry 
and mineral exploration (See Table 29, Table 30, and Table 31). 
Table 29 : Japanese Direct Investment in Malaysia by Sector, 1976 and 1986 
Sector 1976 1986 
Agriculture/fishery 4.5 2.3 
Mining 25.7 11.5 
Manufacturing 57.6 66.7 
Banking/insurance 0.8 3.8 
Other Services 8.4 15.6 
1991,p.ll4 
Table 30 : U.S. Direct investment in Malaysia by Sector, 1976,1987, and 1988 
Sector 1976 1987 1988 
Petroleum 66.3 63.4 36.1 
Manufacturing 18.1 29.6 60.1 
Trade 9.3 4.7 2.5 
Banking, Finance & Insurance 1.7 0.3 0.6 
Services n/a 0.0 0.0 
Other Industries 3.3 2.1 0.6 
n/a refers to not available 
Source : Mohamed Ar i f f , The Malaysian Economy : Pacific Connections. Oxford University Press. Sineaoore. 
1991,p.ll6. 
Table 31 : Complementarity in United States and Japanese Inyestment in Indonesia, 
1980 (Percentage) 
Sector United States Japan 
Mining and Petroleum 84 121 
Manufacturing 9 31 
Food 1 n 
Textiles 2 14 
Wood and Paper n n 
Chemicals 2 4 
Metal Products 4 11 
Electrical Products 0 0 
Machinery transport 0 0 
Other 1 1 
Services 2 1 
n = Negl ig ible (less than 1 per cent) 
Source : Hill, Hall, Foreign Investment and Industrialization in Indonesia, Oxford University Press, 
U.S.A, 1988, p.76 
Heavy industry and infrastructure sectors have not been paid any 
attention. The services and other sectors are easily surpassed by 
manufacturing (including food, textiles, wood, paper and chemical) 
and mining. Compare this to Japanese or American investment 
pattern in those developing countries with the overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs' investment in Vietnam, the overseas Chinese 
investment pattern is more diversified. Sticking with the traditional 
and typical sectors yet venturing into other sectors, the overseas 
Chinese entrepreneurs are not only diversifying and expanding their 
business, but also penetrating into the framework of Vietnam's 
economic development and improving the infrastructural capacity 
which is imperative for sustaining Vietnam's pell-mell economic 
growth. With this diversified and penetrating investment pattern in 
view, the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs have not only demonstrated 
some major commercial commitments in Vietnam, but also the great 
possibility to take on the key role in shaping the economic structure of 
Vietnam and intensifying the pace of Vietnam's economic reforms. 
CHAPTER 6 
The Prospects of Vietnam's Integration into Regional and the 
World's Economy 
6.1 The Growing Exports and Trade Activity of Vietnam 
The expansion of the main economic sectors, such as 
agriculture and industry in Vietnam has been quite substantial since 
the Vietnamese government initiated economic reforms in 1986. The 
economic reforms have caused a surge in agricultural production (See 
Table 32). 
Table 32 : Vietnamés Agricultural Production Indices 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
116.28 121.06 122.57 122.79 127.0.1 132.14 132.25 
Source : Compiled from F.A.O. (Food and Agriculture Organization) Yearbook Production, vol.48, 
1994 
Agricultural production indices of Vietnam have shown a constant 
rate of growth since 1988, from 116.28 to 131.25. Table 33 indicates 
that a remarkable increase in production of major crops were achieved 
during the years 1986-1991. 
Table 33 ; Production Of Major Crops (1000 tons) in Vietnam 
Crop 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Paddy 16,003 15,103 17,000 18,996 19,225 19,426 
Coffee 19 21 31 41 60 n.a. 
Rubber 50 52 50 51 58 n.a. 
Coconut 711 791 857 872 895 n.a. 
Pepper n.a. 3.6 6.2 7:1 8.0 n.a. 
Source : Compiled from Nguyen Xuan Oanh and Grub, Phillip Donald, Vietnam : The New Investment 
Frontier in Southeast Asia, Times Academic Press, Singapore, 1992. 
Industry has also experienced high rates of growth in the economy, in 
absolute as well as relative terms. During the period 1981-1990, the 
industrial sector grew at an average 6.8 per cent per annum.isi From 
1991 up to 1995, the growth rate varied from about 9 to more than 11 
per c e n t . 182 Large-scale, centrally-managed, state-owned enterprises 
dominated the sector as production of crude oil, coal, fertiliser and 
building materials all increased rapidly. Output of non-state 
industries which included food processing, textiles and garments, 
leather tanning, shoe making and wood processing and handicrafts, 
increased by close to 10 per cent.̂ ^^ 
In view of all this, the level of production in agricultural and 
industrial sectors has really been raised. With this increasing level of 
agricultural and industrial production, and the government's open-
door policy, the position and performance of Vietnam's exports have 
been considerably changed and boosted. . Table 34 shows the 
structure of Vietnam's merchandise exports from 1986 to 1993. 
Table 34 : Vietnamés Merchandise Exports from 1986 to 1993 
1986 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Merchandise exports (U.S.$ million) 376 1438 2027 2677 2941 
% agriculture-intensive 77.5 55.4 51.3 39.2 32.1 
% capital-intensive 2.4 2.9 1.4 2.1 2.6 
% labour-intensive 11.2 9.5 12.3 21.9 30.3 
% minerals-intensive 8.1 31.4 34.9 36.2 34.4 
Source : Compiled from Asia-Pacific Profiles 1995. Asia Pacific Economics Group, ANU, Canberra, 
1995 
The growth rate in merchandise exports has increased steadily from 
U.S.$376 million in 1986 to U.S.$ 3600 million in 1994. Minerals-
intensive, agriculture-intensive, and labour-intensive commodities 
Nguyen, Ngoc Lan. Investment Pattern, Trade, And Economic Growth in ASEAN And AFTA : 
Implication For Vietnam, Department of Economics, University of Wollongong, Australia, 1995, p.l 14 
m 
183 ibid, p.l 15 
have made up 34.4 per cent, 32.1 per cent and 30.3 per cent of the 
merchandise exports respectively. The shares of agriculture-intensive 
commodities have declined markedly since 1986 while the shares of 
the labour-intensive and minerals-intensive commodities have risen. 
Nevertheless, Vietnam is still relying on primary products for export 
earnings. Arguably, the primary products will only stay as the main 
export earner for a certain period of time, and then give way to the 
light industry products. Table 35 shows Vietnam's top ten leading 
exports which are dominated by primary products but the light 
industry products, such as textiles, garments and shoes are picking 
up. In the light of all this, it is clear that Vietnam has the potential to 
become an export-oriented economic dynamo. 
1992 1993 1994 
Crude Oil 805.00 861.00 976.40 
Textiles & Garments 221.00 350.00 555.00 
Sea Products 307.00 370.00 480.00 
Rice 418.00 350.00 405.00 
Coal 62.00 84.00 114.70 
Shoes 16.00 24.00 110.00 
Coffee 91.40 85.00 97.50 
Rubber 67.00 70.00 70.00 
Cashew Nuts 41.40 31.30 60.00 
Peanuts 32.00 46.70 45.00 
Source : Harvie, Charles, Economic Reform And Future Prospects of The Vietnam Economy, 
University of Woilongong, Australia, 1996, p. 20. 
The increase of exports coupled with an outward-looking 
strategy adopted by the Vietnamese government have intensified 
Vietnam's trade activity. According to the figures from Table 36, by 
region. East Asia accounted for 78.7 per cent of Vietnamese trade. 
Europe 12.2 per cent, Oceania 1.15 per cent, and North America and 
Caribbean 0.92 per cent. 
Table 36 : Major Trading Regions with Vietnam in 1991-1993, Percent of Total 
Turnover 
Regions Exports Imports Exports & Imports 
East Asia 79.74 77.59 78.72 
Europe 9.79 14.97 12.23 
Oceania 0.96 1.36 1.15 
North America & Caribbean 0.68 1.19 0.92 
South America 0.16 0.01 n/a 
n/a refers to not available 
Source : Compiled from Ngyuen, Ngoc Lan, Investment Pattern, Trade And Economic Growth in 
ASEAN And AFTA : Implications for Vietnam, University of Wollongong, Australia, 1995, 
p.130. 
Clearly, Vietnam's trade has been increasingly oriented towards East 
Asian countries. Among the Northeast Asian countries, Japan, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea are the major trading partners 
(See Table 36). Japan and Hong Kong are the leading countries 
because their exports to and imports from Vietnam have grown 
tremendously since 1986. Meanwhile Singapore has emerged as the 
leading trade partner among the Southeast Asian nations. Singapore 
has played the role as the main exporter and importer in trading with 
Vietnam since Singapore's exports to and imports from Vietnam have 
increased at a breakneck pace (See Table 37). Other Northeast and 
Southeast Asian nations like Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines have also increased trade 
with Vietnam as seen in Table 37. 
Northeast Asian Countries' Exports 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Japan 37 130 162 • 261 340 520 913 
Taiwan n/a n/a n/a 3.5 28.1 45 n/a 
Hong Kong 97 103 123 139 147 157 275 
South Korea n/a n/a n/a 25 25.6 60 n/a 
Northeast Asian Countries' Imports 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Japan 135 138 222 106 174 189 192 
Taiwan n/a n/a n/a 1 40 60 155 
Hong Kong 40 52 28 103 197 202 281 
South Korea n/a n/a n/a 15.6 51.5 65 n/a 
Southeast Asian Countries Exports 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Singapore 130 120 140 70 194 250 503 
Malaysia 15 12.6 24.6 36.4 41.3 34 39 
Indonesia 4.2 5.4 5.7 19.5 38.4 n/a 125 
Thailand 1.6 2.6 8.3 30.4 86.7 n/a 72 
Philippines n/a 0.3 n/a 19.3 104 n/a n/a 
Southeast Asian Countries' Imports 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Singapore n/a n/a 80 42 498 636 881 
Malaysia 1.6 3.8 6.8 11.9 7.0 n/a 9.5 
Indonesia 5.4 32.2 26.9 21.1 30.0 25 90 
Thailand 1.2 4.7 5.1 15.2 22.5 34 86 
Philippines 2.8 1,9 13.6 14.6 9.8 12 46 
n/a refers to not available 
Source : Compiled from Mya, Than & Tan, Joseph L.H.(ed), Vietnam's Dilemmas And Options : The 
Challenge of Economic Transition in the 1990s, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore, 1993, pp.229,230,231; Lim, Chee Peng, "ASEAN-Indochhina relations : 
Prospects and scope for enhanced economic co-operation", East Asian Economies 
Transformation And Challenges, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Singapore, 1995, 
pp312-314. 
With all this in view, it is clear that these East Asian countries, 
especially, Japan, newly industrialized economies (NIEs), and ASEAN 
can play an increasingly important role in Vietnam's trade. However, 
the amount of trade conducted between these East Asian Countries 
and Vietnam still leaves much room for expansion. Additionally, the 
flows of foreign direct investment from those East Asian nations. 
especially the Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' investment from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia to Vietnam can create 
closer trade relations compared with other countries in Europe or 
America. Hence, the trade between Vietnam and these East Asian 
nations is very likely to become more significant and interdependent 
for both sides. 
6.2 Vietnam's Integration into ASEAN, AFTA, APEC, and WTO 
With its high agricultural and industrial productivity and 
output, voluminous foreign direct investment, and growing and 
expanding trade ties which have contributed to sustained GDP growth 
in the range of 6 to 9.5 per cent per annum, Vietnam gained full 
membership of ASEAN successfully in July 1995. The implications of 
ASEAN membership are widespread, ranging from more access to 
international funding and investment to alignment with other member 
nations on trade issues. However, the most important point is 
membership reflects that a basis for common approaches and 
interests between Vietnam and ASEAN has been created. 
Being a member of ASEAN, Vietnam has shown its 
determination to immerse itself rapidly in ASEAN's co-operation 
network. Since joining ASEAN in July 1995, Foreign Minister Nguyen 
Manh Cam pledged : 'As a full member of ASEAN, Vietnam [will] fulfill 
all obligations and responsibilities of a member country to the targets, 
objectives, principles and regulations that have been clearly specified 
in the ASEAN basic documents, including its joining in AFTA'.i»^ 
an interview given to The Nation ( a Bangkok-based newspaper) prior 
to the fifth ASEAN Summit held in Bangkok, the Prime Minister stated 
that, "under specific conditions, we will do all that is necessaiy to fully 
participate in the work of ASEAN, contributing actively to peace, 
stability and co-operation in the r e g i o n " . ^ ^ ^ JQ this end, in September 
1995, the Vietnam Bank Association (VBA) joined the ASEAN Banks 
Association (ABA) and Vietnam joined the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Organization (AIPO).i®® In October 1995, the Vietnamese government 
set up the National ASEAN Committee headed by Vice-Premier Tran 
Due Luong.i®'̂  Almost simultaneously, a directive was issued 
demanding that all ministers or ministerial-level institutions set up 
sub-committees to conduct research aimed at promoting relations 
with ASEAN. The National Assembly of Vietnam also adopted the first 
adjustment on taxation in preparation for joining the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) beginning from 1 January 1996.i®® 
These are all the examples of Vietnam's commitment to 
participating in all activities and associated organizations of ASEAN 
although Vietnam may experience short-term difficulties in complying 
with ASEAN's requirements on the road to total integration. 
'Vietnam's Integration into ASEAN Gathers Pace', The Standard Chartered Indochina Monitor, 
vol.4, No. 12, December 1995, p. 10 
Hoang, Anh Tuan, 'ASEAN Dispute Management : implications for Vietnam and An Expanded 
ASEAN' . Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.18, No. l , June 1996, p.75 
'Vietnam'slntegrationinto ASEAN Gathers Pace', op_cit, p. 11 • 
m 
Hoang, Anh Tuan, op cit, p.75 
Taking all this into consideration, it is clear that Vietnam's 
membership of ASEAN and commitment to it highlight the country's 
desire to become not only a member of a regional community but also 
the international one. Moreover, Vietnam's entiy into ASEAN also 
reveals the six-ASEAN countries' determination and ambition to 
incorporate Vietnam which still adheres to communist ideology and 
has a developing market economy into their more-developed market 
economy and 'democratic' political systems. All in all, Vietnam's 
membership of ASEAN will give Vietnam long-term and constructive 
economic advantages and boost its image regionally and 
internationally as a reform-minded market economy capable of 
satisfying pro-market forces. In this regard, Vietnam, with its 
membership of ASEAN, has built a concrete cornerstone to pave the 
way for joining the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) or even the Asia-
Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) and World Trade Organization 
(WTO). However, all this can apparently allow more room for those 
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' business manoeuvres and more 
investment linkages to be formed. Therefore, to deepen Vietnam's 
economic engagement and integration with the region or the world, 
the East Asian overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' continuing and 
increasing investment into Vietnam as well as the expanding regional 
or international trade ties are undoubtedly and exceedingly important. 
CONCLUSION 
Foreign direct investment (FDI), especially from the East Asian 
countries overseas Chinese entrepreneurs has obviously become 
increasingly significant and influential in East Asia. This 
phenomenon is becoming evident in Vietnam because of the recent 
assertion of overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' colossal investment from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia in the country. These 
four East Asian nations' overseas Chinese voluminous investment has 
outweighed other sources of foreign investment, such as Japan, 
France, Australia, United States, and Switzerland. The surging inflow 
of this overseas Chinese investments into- Vietnam can only be 
observed markedly from 1991 to 1995 because the unfavourable 
business environment from late-1970s to early-1980s which resulted 
from the Communist government's centrally-planned economic model 
and the political tension existing between the East Asian nations and 
Vietnam, had hampered incoming foreign direct investment. 
These four East Asian nations' overseas Chinese investment 
rush to Vietnam can be attributed to the pull and push factors. The 
pull factors which encompass the strategic geographical location, 
abundant and untapped natural resources, potentially large domestic 
market, cheap and highly literate labour force, relative political and 
social stability, the introduction of the market-oriented doi moi 
programme, and the availability of business-oriented and Confucian-
value-adherence ethnic Chinese community have conditioned Vietnam 
nicely to become a magnet for these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs. 
By themselves, the pull factors are not enough to prompt these 
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' investment in Vietnam. The push 
factors which concern the positive and negative political, economic 
and social considerations arising or existing in these overseas Chinese 
home countries, should be taken into account. The positive political 
consideration which has been produced by the rapprochement 
between these four East Asian nations and Vietnam, rapid increase in 
bilateral visits and commercial interest, and the emergence of 
increased interest in regional co-operation has indeed encouraged the 
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in Vietnam. The negative 
political consideration confronted by the overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs in Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan has also provoked 
offshore investment. The launch of Mahathir-sponsored National 
Development Policy or NEP-type restrictive and discriminatory 
regulations and imposition, such as the 1975 Industrial Coordination 
Act and the 1980s heavy industrialization policy on the Malaysian 
overseas Chinese entrepreneurs has undesirably incited local overseas 
Chinese making outward investment. The reversion of sovereignty of 
Hong Kong on 1 July 1997 to China has inevitably driven the Hong 
Kong's local Chinese entrepreneurs to invest abroad because the 
reversion of sovereignty has cast doubt on the future well-being of the 
legal and constitutional systems, human rights, business functions, 
and human resources in Hong Kong. The unresolved and protracted 
political tension created by the reunification issue between China and 
Taiwan has led to the continuance of potential insecurity and risk that 
has really unnerved the people of Taiwan, especially the business 
community. Besides, the negative economic and social considerations 
which comprise soaring land and labour costs, shortage of labour 
force, stricter environmental-protective laws, scarcity of renewable and 
non-renewable resources, and small domestic markets have 
inexorably induced these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in 
other countries, such as Vietnam which has a a rich pool of cheap 
labour, abundant natural resources, lax environmental laws and a 
large domestic market. 
The investing companies of these overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs which are government-owned or private-owned employ 
different forms of investment, such as joint venture, enterprise with 
100 per cent foreign capital, contractual business co-operation, Build-
Operate-Transfer Contract (BOT) to make their investment in Vietnam. 
These overseas Chinese entrepreneurs have not only invested 
enormously in Vietnam, but also diversified their investment to 
various economic sectors of Vietnam, such as light industiy, 
construction, hotel and tourism, agriculture and forestry, heavy 
industry, infrastructure, services, financed and banking, and fisheries 
and aquaculture. These overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' massive and 
diversified investment in Vietnam which are largely located in the 
Chinese-densely-populated southern part of Vietnam reveal a very 
different pattern from the Japanese, the American, and the European 
investment pattern in the developing countries. In the light of this, it 
does seem clear that these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs can play 
an increasingly important role in changing the economic structure of 
Vietnam and intensifying the pace of Vietnam's economic reforms. 
Vietnam's accession to ASEAN in July 1995, which was brought about 
by Vietnam's growing significance in terms of economy and politics (to 
certain extent), and the continuing and mounting foreign direct 
investment of the overseas Chinese entrepreneurs in Vietnam can 
facilitate the country's process of integration into AFTA, APEC, and 
WTO. 
All in all, the presence and position of these overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs in Vietnam's economic development are becoming 
increasingly indispensable. The magnitude of their investment in 
Vietnam, the reasons generating their investment in Vietnam, and 
their horizon of engagement in the economic sectors of Vietnam have 
all suggested that these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' wave of 
foreign direct investment is irreversible and profound. However, the 
Western nations' and other East Asian nations', such as the United 
States of America, France, Switzerland, Australia, Japan and South 
Korea, investment in Vietnam should not be overlooked. Their 
investment is equally important and constructive for Vietnam's 
economic development but the investment made by them from 1991 to 
1995 seemed to be overshadowed by those overseas Chinese 
investment from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia. Yet, a 
conclusive confirmation on the long-term and far-ranging influence 
and impact of these overseas Chinese investment and entrepreneurial 
role on Vietnam's economic development cannot be made because 
more on-going and future research and data-collecting are needed. 
For the time being, it does seem clear that their investment and 
entrepreneurial role has carved out a crucial niche in Vietnam's 
economy. Hence, these overseas Chinese entrepreneurs' foreign direct 
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APPENDIX TABLE A : SINGAPOREAN OVERSEAS CHINESE COMPANIES' INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM, 
1991-1995 
YEAR NAME OF INVESTING 
COMPANY 




1991 Sembawang Maritime Ltd. 
(Temasek Subsidiary) 
Installation of floating 
storage and loading 
system 
9 million off the coast of 
Vung Tau 
The Singapore shipping firm 
Orient Lines (NOL) 
Shipping services N/A Ho Chi Minh City 
1992 Natsteel Properties Ltd. 
Lim Kah Ngam Ltd. 
Planergo Ltd. 
- to build Hotel Equatorial 
25 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Steamers Telecommunication To supply a mobile 
telephone system 
N/A Ho Chi Minh City 
1993 Tredia Investment Contract to develop the 
part of Vung Tau 
The project is in the form 
of a "build, operate and 
transfer (BOT)" 
905 million Vung Tau 
United Land and Trading Co. To develop a 150 hectare 
residential area in the 
suburban district of Thu 
Due 
600 million Thu Due 
Sembawang Engineering Pte 
Ltd. (Temasek Subsidiary) 
To expand Vietnam's oil 
refinery 
5.6 million Cat Lai 
United Overseas Bank Ltd. 
(owned by Wee Cho-yaw) 
To open a representative 
office 
N/A Ho Chi Minh City 
Straits Steamship Land Ltd. 
(Temasek Subsidiary) 
The project - "Saigon 
Center'' to develop a 
commercial complex 
75 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Dragon Properties To build Hanoi's tallest 
building 
41 million Hanoi 
Asia Pacific Breweries Ltd. To build a brewery to 
produce Tiger Beer 
49 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Natsteel Ltd Co. To build a rolling mill 8 million Thai Nguyen 
1994 Property Company DBS Ltd. To develop 90 service 
apartment for foreign 
businessman 
7.2 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Keppel Corp. Ltd. 
(Temasek Subsidiaiy) 
To provide general ship 
repair, ship building and 
steel fabrication services 
4.4 million Ho Chi Minh City 
N/A : Not Available 
Ill 
YEAR NAME OF INVESTING 
COMPANY 




1994 Straits Steamship Land Ltd. Signed an agreement with 
Hanoi's Trade Union 
Federation to turn its guest 
house on the West Lake into 
a complex of services 
apartment, villas, restaurant 
and a business center 
100 million West Lake of Hanoi 
Cycle & Carriage Ltd. To distribute Ford cars and 
commercial vehicles in 
Vietnam 
N/A N/A 
United Land and Trading 
Pte Ltd. 
To build an office and 
residential complex (4-Star 
hotel, detached and semi 
detaching housing, an 
international school & 
trading centers) 
733 million Ah Kanh area of 
Ho Chi Minh City 
Geomex Surveys Pte Ltd. Business cooperation on 
surveying and salvaging 
sunken ship 
3.79 million N/A 
Amanda Aquaculture Pte 
Ltd. 
A.C.S. Shrimco (J.V) Ltd. 
- breeding and trading 
shrimp 
1.3 million Tra Vinh 
Goodman Fielder Overseas 
Holding Pte Ltd. 
Vietnam Flour Mills Ltd. 
- grinding flour 
18.6 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Mekong Holdings Pte Ltd. 
Sembawang Engineering Pte 
Ltd.(SEPL) 
(Temasek Subsidiary) 
Mekong-Hacota J.V Co. Ltd. 
- constructing a building 
complex and offices for rent 
A turnkey contract to deliver 
a special-purpose offshore . 




Ho Chi Minh City 
N/A 
Asia Resourse Corp Pte Ltd. Plan to apply for licences to 
build 2 bottling plants 
N/A Hanoi 
Da Nang 
1) Singapore Trade 
Development Board 
2) PICO Group 




4.5 million Ho Chi Minh City 
N/A : Not Available 
APPENDIX TABLE A (CONTINUED 
YEAR NAME OF INVESTING 
COMPANY 




1994 1. Singapore Tobacco 
Pte Ltd. 
2. Guthrie GTS Ltd. 
To build leisure complex 
"Saigon Superbowl" include 
32-lane bowling alley, 
amusement center, 
supermarket, restaurant and 
fast-food outlets 
12.6 million Ho Chi Minh City 
(near Tan Son 
Nhut Airport) 
1. Singapore Piling & Civil 
Engineering Pte Ltd. 
2. Econ Vietnam Investment 
Pte Ltd 
(Hua Hong Subsidiary) 
Sinviet 
- to cany out project 
management in Vietnam 
- initiating manage 
construction of the Hanoi 
Club and the Hanoi Plaza 
8.5 million Hanoi 
Singapore Airlines Group 
(SIA) 
To provide Cargo handling 
services at Tan Son Nhut 
International Airport 
15 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Far East Lavingston 
Shipbuilding Ltd. (FELS) 
To develop an office building 
in the coastal town of Vung 
Tau 
23 million Vung Tau 
S.China Sea Pearls Co. Pte 
Ltd. 
Nha Trang Pearl Co. Ltd. 
Fishing-100% foreign owned 
5.5 million Khanh Hoa 
High Horizon Invest Pte Ltd. Nguyen San Ltd. Co. (100%) 1.3 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Feal International Tosac International Hotel 
- to build and operate the 
Hong Bang Hotel 
11.55 million Hai Phong 
Lam Ho Investment Ocean Place 
- to build and operate a 
hotel and office building 
26 million Hau Giang 
Yuan Chemg Holdings Pte 
Ltd. 
Saigon Singapore 
International JV Corp. 
- to construct and operate 
a high-rise office building 
5.9 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Nippon Paint Co. Pte Ltd. To produce high quality paint 
(100% foreign-owned) 
19.9 million N/A 
Sanyo Shompla Pte Ltd. To produce high standard 
plastic(100% foreign-owned) 
6.2 million N/A 
1. Sembawang Group 
2. The Economic 





- to build Mercedes cars, 
small buses and light 
trucks 
- to 90 services apartments 
for foreign businessmen 
70 million 
7.2 million 
Ho Chi Minh City 
Hanoi 
Ho Chi Minh City 
N/A : Not Available 
YEAR NAME OF INVESTING 
COMPANY 




Straits Steamship Land Ltd. To develop an office complex 
(18 storey office building) 
20 million Hanoi 
1995 RDC Vietnam Pte Ltd. 
(Subsidiary of Resources 
Development Corp. Ltd.) 
1. RSC Vietnam Investment 
Pte Ltd. 
- to build luxury 
apartments and offices 
2. RDC Saigon Co. Ltd. 
- to produce and sell 
ready-mixed concrete 
and bore piles 
23.3 million 
3.82 million 
Ho Chi Minh City 
Ho Chi Minh City 
STL Trading Pte Ltd. Dat Lai squid Prcs 86 Lacquer 
Ex Co. 
- squid processing, fine art 
lacquer products 
0.75 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Palmsville Investment 
Pte Ltd. 
Royal Garden-Quang Be 
Joint Venture 
- housing and hotel 
construction 
50.9 million Hanoi 
Asia Resource Corporation 
Pte Ltd. 
Bottle Top Production Joint 
Venture(100% foreign-owned) 
- bottle tops 
2 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Komatsu Singapore Pte Ltd. Saigon Komatsu Buiding 
Machines 
- construction of equipment 
1.9 million Ho Chi Minh City 
CHNG Holdings Pte Ltd. Fortuna Hanoi Hotel 
Joint Venture 
- construction of commercial 
centre, office and hotel 
13.5 million Hanoi 
Centrepoint Properties Ltd., 
Co. 
Me Linh Central Ltd., Co. 
- construction of office and 
commercial centre 
35.7 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Citra Sumit Valind 
Investment Pte Ltd. 
Vietubes Oil Pipe Co. Ltd. 
- oil and gas products 
8.6 million Vung Tau 
Nagarjuna Holdings 
Vietnam Pte Ltd 
Vietnam Nagarjuna Intern 
Co. Ltd.(100% foreign-owned) 
- Sugarcane & sugar 
processing 
22.5 million Long An 
Vietnam Land Pte Ltd. Centre Park Joint Venture 
- construct of a 14 floor 
building 
12.9 million Ho Chi Minh City 
N/A : Not Available 
APPENDIX TABLE A (CONTINUED) 
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1995 Transpacific Riverview 
Pte Ltd. 
Trans-Rose Joint Venture Ltd 
- construction of offices hotels 
36.5 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Everstrike Investment 
Pte Ltd. 
My Canh Office & Commercial 
Centre 
- construction of commercial 
building construction 
14 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Coopers & Lybrand 
Indochina Pte Ltd. 
Coopers & Lybrand - AISC Co. 
- accountancy, auditing and 
consulting 
1 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Watson EP Ind 1. Watson Plastic JV 0.59 million Ho Chi Minh City 
2. Viet Thuan Viet Co. 0.59 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Netsteel Ltd. Co. Natsteel Vina Co. Ltd. 
- steel production 
21.7 million N/A 
Boon Teck marine Steel 
Works 
Construction Steel Co. Ltd. 
- manufacturing of 
construction steel(100% 
foreign-owned) 
0.7 million N/A 
Xenon Manufacturing Pte 
Ltd. 
Manufacturing & Printing 
Metal Bag Co. Ltd. 
- manufacture and print 
metal bags 
1.7 million N/A 
Antara Koh Development Co. Urban Housing 8& Development 
Co. 
- to build houses and offices 
48 million Hau Giang 
South Wing Sea Product Pte 
Ltd. 
Sing Viet J.V. Company 
- producing fish powder for 
livestock 
0.9 million Minh Hai 
TCI Trading PTE. Palm Song Be Golf Co. 15 million Thuan An 
Song Be 
N/A : Not Available 
* The numbers of projects may be underestimated due to the difficulty in obtaining adequate data 
Source : Compiled from Indochina Digest (Electronic edition) [On line] from 1991 issue to 1995 
issu^Available Internet : W3C/ANU File : The World Wide Web Virtual Library-Vietnam; 
Vietnam Economic News from No. 16 April 1994 to No. 50 December 1995; Vietnam Economic 
News from issue of January 1995 to issue of June 1995: Vietnam Economic Times from issue 
of June 1994 to issue of January 1996; The Straits Times from 1992-1995. 
APPENDIX TABLE B : MALAYSIAN OVERSEAS CHINESE COMPANIES' INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM, 
1991-1995 
YEAR NAME OF INVESTING 
COMPANY 




1991 The Malaysia Rubber 
Development Corp. 
Rubber processing plant 1.5 million N/A 
IJM Corporation Berhad Planting and processing 
rubber and cocoa 
N/A N/A 
1992 Mycom Berhad (owned by 
Kwek family) 
Planting & processing 
agricultural crops) 
N/A N/A 
Public Bank Berhad VID Public Bank (VPB) 10 million Hanoi 
1993 MBF Holdings Bhd. To build a power plant 1.2 billion HCMC 
IJM Corp. Bhd. 
(IGB Corp.'s Subsidiary) 
To build a water treatment 
plant 
30 million Hau Giang 
Wellden International Ltd 
[Subsidiary of Mulpha 
International Bhd.] 
To build a hotel 6.88 million Ho Chi Minh City 
1994 Land & General Bhd. Construction of a petroleum 
storage terminal 
100 million N/A 
Edaran Otomobil Nasional 
Bhd. 
Vina Star Motors Corp 
- to produce minibuses 
50 million Song Be 
Malayan Cement Bhd. Produce ready-mixed 
concrete 
1 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Vista Spectrum (M) Sdn. 
Bhd. with financing 
banking from Renong Bhd. 
Noi Bai Development Co. 
- to construct the new Noi 
Bai Export Processing 
Zone (Concentrate on 
the manufacturing 
electronic items and high 
technology goods) 
20.5 million near Hanoi's Noi 
Bai Airport 
Northern Eight (M) Sdn. 
Bhd [Subsidiary of United 
Engineering (Malaysia) 
Bhd] 
Noi Bai Golf Resort Corp. 
- to build and operate 
a golf course 
14.7 million near Hanoi 
Faber Hotel Holdings Bhd. To build a hotel 44 million Hanoi 
N/A : Not Available 
APPENDIX TABLE B (CONTINUED) 
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1994 Nevy Kit International Ltd. Vietnam Industrial Wood 
JVCo. 
0.7 million Hai Hung 
Pengkelen Holdings 
Berhad 
Grand Imperial Saigon Hotel 
Ltd. Co. 
- to build and operate a 
5-star hotel 
48.5 million Saigon 
Royal Graft Co. Ltd. 
- Wood & Ceramics 
0.89 million HCMC 
Da Nang Export Processing 
Zone 
24 million Da Nang 
Pilecon Engineering 




4.2 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Malayan Flour MiUs Bhd. Vima Flour Ltd. 
- grinding flour 
15 million Quang Ninh 
Sinaran Manufacturing 
Sdn. Bhd. 
Sinaran Vietnam Co. Ltd. 
- producing candles(100% 
foreign-owned) 
1.5 million Da Nang 
Saga Horizon Son Bhd. Cooperation Contract 
- surveying and salvaging 
tin from ship wrecks in 
Vietnamese waters 
N/A Ho Chi Minh City 
Mr. Ng Hai Ping Glove Industry (Vietnam) Ltd 
- manufacturing industrial 
gloves and gaiirients 
0.75 million Hanoi 
1995 Nam Fatt Bhd Viet-Nam Fatt Co. 
- to construct a steel works 
plant 
2.73 million Dong Nai 
- Bien Hoa 
Industrial zone 
Goh Hoch To construct a luxury resort 400 million Halong Bay 
Goh Hock Guan Tourism projects 
- construct tourist resorts 
- upgrading a hotel 
- establishing a tourist 
services center 
408 million near Hue 
Eng Chong Trading Co. Dal Lat Import-Export 
Industrial Co. Ltd. 
- garment & fme-arts for 
export 
1.7 million Lam Dong 
N/A : Not Available 
APPENDIX TABLE B (CONTINUED) 
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1995 Trenergy Gas Sdn Bhd Trenergy Gas (Vietnam) 
- cigarette lighters(100% 
foreign-owned) 
1.3 million Dong Nai 
Sadec Consortium & Emas 
Utilities 
Binh An Water Supply Co. 
- water producing & 
supply(100% foreign-owned) 
30 million Song Be 
Tego Sdn Bhd 
[Subsidiary of Kuok Bros. 
Sdn. Bhd.] 
Vinapack Joint Venture 2.25 million Hai Phong 
Saigon Bluechip Co. Vimasafco 1.69 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Federal Iron Works of 
Malaysia 
Nippovina 
- production of colour plated 
sheet iron 
1.2 million Hau Giang 
G & T Equities Sdn. Bhd. Vietnam TNT Fibre Co. Ltd. 
- producing fibre of all kinds 
(100% foreign-ownedO 
1.8 million Song Be 
N/A : Not Available 
* The numbers of project may be underestimated due to the difficulty in obtaining adequate data 
Source : Compiled from Indochina Digest (Electronic edition) [On line] from 1991 issue to 1995 
issue-Available Internet : W3C/ANU File : The World Wide Web Virtual Libraiy-
Vietnam; Vietnam Economic Nev̂ ŝ from No. 16 April 1994 to No.50 December 1995; 
Vietnam Economic News from issue of January 1995 to issue of June 1995; Vietnam 
Economic Times from issue of June 1994 to issue of January 1996; Nev^ Straits Times 
from 1992 to 1995. 
APPENDIX TABLE C : TAIWANESE OVERSEAS CHINESE COMPANIES* INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM, 
1991-1995 
YEAR NAME OF INVESTING 
COMPANY 




1991 The Top-Mill Enterprise Corp. To raise livestock 8& 
poultry and pigs and 
process meat 
2 million Suburban district 
of 
Thu Due 
The Paradise Development 
and Investment Co. 
Vung Tau Fairyland 97 million Vung Tau 
Oceanic Enterprise To catch and process 
seafood for export 
7.4 million N/A 
1. Formosa Co. Ltd. 
2. Jello Hung Co. 
Formosa Aqua Co. Ltd. 
- to raise and process 
fish and ducks 
1 million Ho Chi Minh City 
1992 1. Government-owned 
Central Trade and 
Development Corp. 
2. Pan Viet Corp. 
To build Vietnam's first 
Export Processing Zone 
90 million 740-acre zone 
outside Ho Chi 
Minh City 
Ching Fong Investment Co. 
Frank International 
Investment Corp. 
Motorcycle assembly plant 




Ho Chi Minh City 
Hanoi 
Thu Due 
Seng Chi Condition 
Machinery Company 
A hotel and restaurant 3 million Hau Giang 
1993 Ching Fong Investment Co. To build a cement plant 288.3 million Hai Phong 
Ching Fong Bank 
[an affiliate of Cathay 
Investment and Trust Co. Ltd] 
To open branch office 15 million Hanoi 
Taiwan's state-run Chinese 
Petroleum Corp. 
To build oil refinery 1.2 billion N/A 
Ching Fong Investment Co. To build the group's third 
motorcycle plant 
N/A Hai Tay 
Ngugen Phan Ltd. Co. 1. Binh Duong Frankfurt 
Taxi 
2. Viet Hung General 





1994 Ton Yi Industrial Corp. lant to produce tin plate 5 million Ho Chi Minh City 
1. Ching Fong Group 
2. Chinese Petroleum Corp. 
To build a liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG) plant 
11 million Hai Phong 
- Not Available 
APPENDIX TABLE C (CONTINUED) 
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1994 Lucky Cement Corp. To set up a cement factory 190 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Universal Cement Corp. To build 2 cement factories 380 million N/A 
Central Trading and 
Development Group 








Nha Trang Shrimp Farm Co. 
(100% foreign-owned) 
0.7 million Khanh Hoa 




1 million Thai Binh 
Galore Industrial Taiwan Puree Farming Industry 
(Vietnam) Ltd(100% foreign-
owned) 
- to farm and process 
shrimps and lobsters 
7 million Binh Thuan 
1. Ching Fa Fishing 
Equipment 
2. Ching Sheng Fishing Net 
Ching Fa Fishing Equip and 
Net Co. Ltd(100% foreign- . 
owned) 
13.4 million Dong Nai 
Chun Cheng Trading Co. Ltd Shrimp Farm An Phu JV 0.3 million Da Nang 
Orient Star International Orie Himex JV Co. 
- to build and operate hotels 
19.5 million N/A 
Tan Sieu Knift Holding Co. To produce industrial knives 
(100% foreign-owned owned) 
0.5 million Hau Giang 
Mr Juan Cheng I Royal International Hotel Co. 
- building a 5-star hotel and 
entertainment project 
39 million Quang Ning 
BODOK Trading Co. Ltd BODOK Vietnam Co. Ltd 
- manufacturing wearing 
gloves 
2.1 million Hau Giang 
Taiwan Ryder Co. Ltd Da Nang International 
Tourist Complex 
- construction of Resort 
32 million Da Nang 
1. Taiwan Sugar 
Corporation 
2. King Car Food 
Industrial Co. Ltd 
3. Imei Food Co. Ltd 
4. Fu-Mei Co. Ltd 
Vietnam-Taiwan sugar 
Company Ltd 
- producing sugar, honey • 
66 million Thanh Hoa 
N/A : Not Available 
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1994 SHI JAR Enterprise Co. Ltd. SHI JAR (Vietnam) Co. Ltd. 
- manufacturing enamel 
bricks (100% foreign-owned) 
12.82 million Song Be 
1. Hitson, International Inc. 
2. Gen Hong Food Industrial 
Co. Ltd. 
Phu Tai Tea - Agri Company 
- planting and processing tea 
2 million Yen Bai 
Botron Enterprise Co. Ltd. Dona Botron Textile Co. Ltd.. 
- first material layer used 
for the main body of sport 
shoes(100% foreign-owned) 
3.69 million Dong Nai 
Chu Hsing Garment Co. Ltd. Chu Hsing Garment Vietnam 
Co. Ltd. (100% foreign-owned) 
- manufacturing garments 
and bleaching garment 
products 
2.33 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Winawa International Co. 
Ltd. 
Soctrang Winawa (100% 
foreign-owned) International 
Co. Ltd. 
- producing female hygienic 
pads 
0.78 million Soc Trang 
1. Edisoned Industrial Corp. 
2. TA YING Plastic 
Industrial Co. Ltd. 
The First Chemical Plastic 
JV Co. Ltd. 
- producing plastic pipe 
1.5 million Long An 
1. Tien Fu Industrial 
Co. Ltd. 
2. Formosa Plastic Arts 
Co. Ltd. 
Thien Phu Co. Ltd. 
- making art products of 
Plaster, plastic, glass 
and producing handle 
implements 
0.8 million Song Be 
Lincoware International Inc. Lincoware International 
(Vietnam) Inc(100% foreign-
owned). 
- producing kitchen 
implements 
8.2 million Song Be 
United Agriculture Co. Ltd. 
Hualon Group 
Lam-Tai Co. Ltd. (100% 
foreign-owned) 






near Ho Chi Minh 
City 
N / A : Not Available 
APPENDIX TABLE C (CONTINUED 
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1994 l.Mitorient enterprise Pte First Logistics Development' 25 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Ltd. JV Co. 
2. Pan Viet Corporation - construction of container 
port in Nha Be district 
Grace County Grace County manufacturing 3 million Hai Phong 
manufactur ing Co. Ltd. Co. Ltd. (100%)) 
- producing multi-functional 
connections for machines. 
equipment 
Lien Ya International Co. Dong Tam Ceramic Tile JV 7.58 million Long An 
Ltd. Co. Ltd. 
- producing ceramic tiles 
Lien Chin Industrial Joint Viet Chin Industrial Co. Ltd. 1.9 million Dong Nai 
Stock Co. Ltd. - producing office chairs and 
motorcycle seats(100%) 
Control Techniques Hong Chi Co. Ltd. (100%) 0.7 million Dong Nai 
Worldwide B.V Co. - producing motorbike 
brakes 
Ztong Yee Industrial Joint 3.23 million Dong Nai 
Stock Co. Ltd. Ztong Yee-Vietnam -
Industries Co. Ltd.(100%) 
- producing vehicle batteries 
SEE WELL Industrial Joint 1.94 million Dong Nai 
Stock Co, Ltd. SEE WELL Investment Co. 
Ltd. (100% foreign-owned) 
- producing electrical wire, 
head lights and plastic 
products for vehicles 
Fong Hsiang Industrial Co. 2.27 million Dong Nai 
Ltd Vietnam Precision Industrial 
Co. Ltd.(100% foreign-owned) 
- producing motorbike 
spare parts 
Kai Fa Industrial Joint Stock 1.02 million Dong Nai 
Co. Ltd Kai Fa-Vietnam Industrial 
Co. Ltd. (100% foreign-owned) 
- producing shock absorbers 
Mei Lai Co. 39 million Ha Long Bay 
International Royal Ltd Co. 
(To build a 5-star hotel at 
Bai Chay beach) 
Mr. and Mrs : 0.49 million Dong Nai 
Chuang Ching Shiu K Source-Vietnam Co. Ltd 
J u a n g J a n Pei - producing motorbike 
Chuang Shen Chi mirrors(100% foreign-
Chuang Sheng Gue owned) 
Chuang Shu Fen 
N / A : Not Available 
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1994 Broad Bright Enterprises 
Joint Stock Co. Ltd 
Broad Bright Industrial Co. 
Ltd. ( 100% foreign-owned) 
- producing motorbike 
exhaust systems and 
spare parts 
4.1 million Dong Nai 
Chiù Yi Joint Stock Co. Ltd Chiù Yi-Vietnam 
Co.Ltd. (100% foreign-owned) 
- producing speedometers, 
switches, electric wire 
and locks for motorbikes 
2.44 million Ha Tay 
Hiep Phuoc Power Co. To build a 675 MW thermal 
power plant to supply the Tan 
Thuan Export Processing 
Zone and the new urban area 
in southern Saigon 
205 million Ho Chi Minh City 
1995 Central Trading 
(Taiwan's Nationalist Party) 
To build a 300 hectare 
industrial zone 
380 million Ho Chi Minh 
Double Johnson 
International Co. Ltd 
Double Johnson International 
Co. Ltd. (100% foreign-owned) 
- clothing 
2.8 million Hiep Thanh 
CMS International Co. Ltd Da Nang CSM 
Company(100%) 
- produce textiles for export 
1 million Da Nang 
Jin-Wen Group Vietnam Jin-Wen 
enterprise JV 
-to develop a 21-story hotel, 
38 stoiy office tower and 
a shopping center in a park 
524.6 million Ho Chi Minh City 
EIFO Co. Ltd Trang Bom Marble 
Exploration Co. 
0.58 million Dong Nai 
Phyllis Trading Co. Ltd Long Thanh JV 0.57 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Van Ban Co. Hong Phat Decoration 
Material JV, Ltd 
0.87 million Hanoi 
South Pacific Invest Vinapacific JV 0.44 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Moo Tsung Enterprise Viet Thuan Viet Co. 0.58 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Full Dextinity Ind. Co. 
Chingli 
Ly Phu Dong JV 1.5 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Ho Asia Enterprise Co. Ltd Tay Do Steel Co (TSC) 
- to laminate steel products 
investment capital 
12.1 million N/A 
N/A : Not Available 
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1995 Lieu Ya International 
Co. Ltd 
Dong Tam Ceramic Brick 
Producing JV Co. 
- production of ceramic 
bricks 
7.6 million N/A 
King Show International 
Co. Ltd 
Cooperation Contract 
- producing insecticides, 
cleaning substances 
and flavor oil 
6 million N/A 
Huacheng Toko electronics 
Co. Ltd 




5 million Dong Nai 
1. Hoa Trang Company Ltd 
2. Mr. Hsieh Sheng Ming 
Hoa Trang Food Processing 
Co. Ltd 
- processing foodstuff 
3 million Song Be 
Comforward Enterprise Co. 
Ltd 
Comforward Enterprise 
Vietnam Co. Ltd 
- producing carpets from 
coconut fibre 
1.427 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Johnson System Co. Ltd M.J Impex Co. Ltd 
- Garment manufacturing 
1.5 million Da Nang 
Taiwan Fertilizer Co. Ltd Vietnam Fertilizer Joint 
Venture Co. Ltd 
- producing of NPK fertilizers 
34.86 million Vung Tau 
Central Trading 60,000 hectares of land for 
reforestation 
27 million Kien Giang 
N/A : Not Available 
* The numbers of project may be underestimated due to the difficulty in obtaining adequate data 
Source : Compiled from Indochina Digest (Electronic edition)[On line] from 1991 issue to 1995 
issue—Available Internet : W3C/ANU File : The World Wide Web Virtual Library-Vietnam; 
Vietnam Economic News from No. 16 April to No.50 December 1995; Vietnam Economic News 
from issue of January 1995 to issue of June 1995; Vietnam Economic Times from issue of 
June 1994 to issue of January 1996. 
APPENDIX TABLE D : HONG KONG OVERSEAS CHINESE COMPAMNIES' INVESTMENT IN VIETNAM, 
1991-1995 
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1991 Hong Kong company joint 
venture with Japan, Taiwan 
and Hau Giang province 
Meko-Hau Giang 
- to produce leather, 
clothing and lacquerware 
3 million Hau Giang 
New World Development 
Co. Ltd 
Construction of a 4-star 
hotel 
60 million Ho Chi Minh City 
1992 Olympic Champion 
Investment Ltd 
Tocobest Investment Ltd 
To expand and manage 
Hanoi's Noi Bai airport 







Vegetables and fruit 
farming for export (100% 
foreign-owned) 
4.2 million N/A 
1993 Pacific Land Ltd First Pacific Straits Land 
Ltd 
- to build an office and 
hotel complex (60,000 
sq feet office space in 
2 buildings and 300-
room hotel) 
75 million Ho Chi Minh City 
ABC Communications Ltd Paging services 0.4 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Power V Company Ltd To build a 675 MW Hiep 
Phuoc power plant to 
supply the Tan Thuan 
Export Processing Zone 
82 million Ho Chi Minh City 
1994 Hong Kong Land Holdings Ltd To build an office complex 
(the fully air-conditioned 
seven-story Central 
Building) 
7 million Hanoi 
Inchcape Insurance Holdings To set up joint venture 
- Inchbrok 
0.125 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Hanoi 
Subsidiary of Golden 
Resources Development 
International Ltd 
For production plant to 
process high-quality rice 
for the Hong Kong market 
10 million Long An 
New World Development Co 
Ltd 
1. New World Hotel Saigon 
2. 25 storey office tower 




Ho Chi Minh City 
Ho Chi Minh City 
Halim International Marble Mining (100% 
freign-owned) 
4.15 million N/A 
N/A : Not Available 
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1994 ACER Asia Pacific Ltd ACER Consultants 
(Vietnam) Ltd 
- to provide services in 
design, consultancy and 
technical management 
for construction project 
0.6 million N/A 
Great Dragon International Thang Long Building Ltd 
- to rent apartment for office 
and residential use, 
- offer business services, 
transport and tour services 
2.7 million Hanoi 
Treasure Resources Mandarin Hanoi Hotel 
- to renovate and expand an 
exiting building to become 
a 3-star hotel 
2.74 million Hanoi 
Price Waterhouse Price Waterhouse 
(Vietnam) Ltd 
- Independent auditing and 
financial consultancy 
0.6 million N/A 
Intani Asser Ltd & Nan Kinh 
International Economic & 
Technical corp. 
Capital Hotel 
- to build and operate 
a new hotel 
13 million N/A 
Tung Shing Development 
Inc. 
Hanoi Tung Shing Square 
- to build and operate 
a trade centre 
13.4 million Hanoi 
Hamon Properties (Vietnam) 
Ltd 
Nguyen Du Park Building 
Co. Ltd 
- on constructing two 18 
story residential buildings 
19.95 million Ho Chi Minh City 
AVIO Indochina Properties 
Co. Ltd 
Housing Development 
Company in Quang Ba 
- on building living quarters 
3.22 million Hanoi 
Eva Footwear Co. Ltd Dona Victor Footwear 
Co. Ltd.(100% foreign-
ownedO 
- making sport shoes 
7.9 million Dong Nai 
NASSAU International 
Company Corp. 
Bimin JV Co. Ltd 
- producing garments and 
embroidered products 
0.72 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Vanny Chian Technology - To build and house 
monkeys to be used for 
scientific purposes. 
2 million Dong Nai 
N / A : Not Available 
YEAR NAME OF INVESTING 
COMPANY 




1994 Wesfarmers Kleenheat Gas 
(ASIA) Co. Ltd 
Klean-Petro Gas Co. Ltd 
- producing and trading 
liquefied petroleum gas 
12.5 million Hanoi 
Luks Industrial Co. Ltd Luks-An Khanh 
- to build and operate 
an office and apartment 
building 
20 million N/A 
Chia Hsin Vietnam Co Ltd To raise livestock and 
process frozen meat (100% 
foreign-owned) 
38 million Song Be 
Joint Venture Company 
between Hong Kong and 
Vietnam 
Danang Shipbreaking 
and steel Co Ltd 
4.7 million Da Nang 
Central States Trans Ltd Aquaculture Farm Chien 
Thang-Central.(100% foreign-
owned) 
1.2 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Crown Trade Development Saigon Airport Hotel 
- to build and operate a hotel 
24 million Ho Chi Minh City 
1995 Tanjun International 
Investment Ltd 
Asia Pacific Agriculture 
Development Co. (100% 
foreign-owned) 
- to grow and process 
vegetables for export 
2 million N/A 
PENTAD Constrution Co. 
Ltd 
PENTAD-LAVICO 
Construction JV Co. 
- Construction bidding 
overseas 
5.5 million N/A 
East Hall International Ltd 
Kim Hai Tourism & 
Investment Co. 
- to build Kim Hai Hotel & 
houses for rent 
16 million N/A 
San Miguel 
Golden Dragon Beer JV Co. 
- producing beer 
26 million N/A 
1. Procter and Gamble Far 
East Inc. 
2. Far East Co. 
Procter & Gamble Co. 
- producing Cosmetics 
14.3 million N/A 
N/A : Not Available 
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1995 Schmidt Vietnam 
[Subsidiary of Schmidt 
Group of Hong Kong] 
Announced the launching of 
the first phase of the Hanoi' 
International Technology 
Center 
93 million suburban district 
of Hanoi 
Th City Horse Trading Ltd To construct an urban 
development project 
1.1 billion Ho Chi Minh City 
Cable and Wireless Pic. To open representative office N/A Hanoi 
Hong Kong Land 
[Subsidiary of Jardine 
Metheson Holdings] 
To develop office building 30 million Hanoi 
[near the French 
colonial opera 
house] 
1. Lee Hing Development 
Ltd 
2. New World Development 
Co. Ltd 
To construct a 21 -story 
388 room hotel 
43.5 million Ho Chi Minh City 
Swire Pacific Ltd Construct of aluminum 
can plant 
41 million HaTay 
Paregrine Investment 
Holdings 
Peregrine Capital of Vietnam 
- to engage in direct 
investments and 
financial advisory services 
N/A Ho Chi Minh City 
Hanoi 
Mainbrace Holding Limited 1, Cuu Long Shipping Joint 
Venture 
- ferry service (hovercraft) 
3.5 million Ho Chi Minh City 




3.5 million Ho Chi Minh City 
RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. Da Nang-RJ Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. 
- cigarettes 
21.4 million Da Nang 
Trueway International Ltd Viet Hai International Ltd 
- hotel renovation 
2 million N/A 
N/A : Not Available 
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2.7 million Hanoi 
Dabema's Asia Ltd Gia Lai Wood Processing 
- bus iness cooperative 
2 million Gia Lai 
Pactrade Company Da Lat Fresh Food and 
Mushroom Processing 
0.5 million Lam Dong 
Gentle Glad Ltd Gentle Glad Da Nang-fishing 
( 100%foreign-owned) 
1 million Da Nang 
Lee Clan Trading Co. Quang Ninh Agriculture JV 
(100% foreign-owned) 
million Quang Ninh 
Shu Sang Co. Kien Sang Aquaculture Co. 
(100% foreign-owned) 
0.9 million Kien Giang 
Truong Sa Sea-products Farming & sea -product 
export (100% foreign-owned) 
0.5 million Hai Phong 
San Miguel Glass (Vietnam) 
Ltd 
San Miguel Hai Phong Glass 
Co. Ltd 
- producing various glass 
bottles 
27.3 million Hai Phong 
Goldtech Engineering Co. 
Ltd 
Goldtech Tuyen Phong 
International Office Complex 
JV Co. Ltd 
- construction of a building 
and operating office services 
7 million Ho Chi Minh City 
American Vehicles 
International Ltd 
Ben Tre Activated Carbon 
JVCo. 
- producing coals from 
coconut shell 
1.5 million Ben Tre 
N/A : Not Available 
* The n u m b e r s of project may be underest imated due to the difficulty in obtaining adequate data 
Source : Compiled from Indochina Digest (Electronic edition)[On line] from 1991 issue to 1995 
i s s u ^ A v a i l a b l e Internet : W3C/ANU File : The World Wide Web Virtual Library-Vietnam; 
Vietnam Economic News from No. 16 April 1994 to No.50 December 1995: Vietnam Economic 
News from issue of J a n u a r y 1995 to issue of J u n e 1995; Vietnam Economic Times from issue 
of J u n e 1994 to issue of J a n u a r y 1996. 
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